My regular contribution to RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) Annual Assessment issue, this time on Central Asia with the lovely Nodir.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
As in the previous three years, Central Asia was free from domestic terrorist attacks in 2022. Nevertheless, the region’s security faced major instability with large-scale violence – for a variety of reasons – in all of the region’s countries except Turkmenistan. At the same time, concerns persisted over the potential for militant activities involving the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISK) in Afghanistan to spill over into the region, even as Central Asian militants on the ground have, for the most part, stayed loyal to the Taliban. Likewise, in Syria, most Central Asians continued to fight alongside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), though their focus remains regional. Similar to recent years, there was also some evidence of additional radicalisation, recruitment and fund-raising both within the region and amongst diaspora communities.
Mass Unrest
The widespread instability witnessed in Central Asia over the past year was not in fact terrorism, but rather a wave of mass unrest across the region. While each instance had its own drivers and cause the net result was a tumultuous year for Central Asia, even as terrorist threats appeared to be focused elsewhere.
2022 started with an unexpected set of clashes in Kazakhstan, where localised demonstrations in the city of Zhanaozen over a steep rise in fuel prices in early January escalated into mass riots across several cities, including the largest one, Almaty. The skirmishes led to the deaths of some 230 people, including 19 members of the security forces.1 Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described the unrest as a “well-organised and prepared act”, suggesting – without any presented evidence at the time – that the perpetrators also included “foreign militants from Central Asia and Afghanistan as well as the Middle East”.2
In order to restore stability, and reflecting a loss of confidence in his own security forces, President Tokayev was compelled to call upon the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), to deploy just over 2,000 troops to help relieve local forces by guarding critical national infrastructure.3 Kazakh officials suggested that up to 20,000 people arrived in the country to participate in the riots, while police seized more than 2,000 illegal weapons from rioters.4 These statements were, however, disputed by various analysts.5
The more likely cause of the violence appears to have a been a mix of internal political disputes, alongside deep-seated public anger over widespread grievances such as corruption, nepotism and growing economic inequality. President Tokayev appeared to acknowledge much of this in reforms he pushed through subsequently,6 while the arrests of senior figures linked to former President Nursultan Nazarbayev highlighted the fissures exposed by the in-fighting behind some of the violence.7 Tensions linger on in the country through reports of alleged mistreatment of some of those detained during the trouble.8
These events were followed in mid-May by an outbreak of violence in the majority ethnic Pamiri Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) in Tajikistan, on the country’s border with Afghanistan. On May 14, hundreds of local residents demonstrated in the region’s capital of Khorog, where the situation had been tense since November 2021, when police fatally injured a local man wanted on charges of kidnapping.9 Protesters demanded the resignation of top provincial authorities over their alleged failure to investigate the local man’s death.
After authorities refused these requests, a large group of local youth marched towards the provincial administration and clashed with security forces, who retaliated by using rubber bullets and tear gas.10 The Tajik Interior Ministry stated that a group of 200 young supporters of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, an alleged local criminal who was subsequently killed, conducted an armed assault using guns and firebombs on the ministry’s provincial headquarters.11 The riots and clashes left 29 perpetrators and one police officer dead.12
President Emomali Rahmon later stated that it was a pre-planned event through which “internal and external stakeholders sought to destabilise the situation”, accusing his long-standing bête noire, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), of running the armed attacks and spending nearly US$2.5 million to finance the perpetrators.13 The IRPT, which is banned in Tajikistan and Russia as an extremist and terrorist organisation, has denied these allegations.14 Most non-government observers, while acknowledging the possible role of influential, informal local powerbrokers in the outbreak of violence, have also highlighted low living standards, youth unemployment, rising food prices and bad central government-community relations as underlying causes.15 The violence also pulls on a long-standing tension between Pamiri communities and the rest of the country, one of many drivers of the brutal civil war that ravaged the country in the 1990s.
Soon after the violence in GBAO, in Nukus, the capital city of Uzbekistan’s autonomous Karakalpakstan republic, large-scale protests erupted in response to proposed constitutional amendments that would limit the region’s right to secede. The leader of the protests, Dauletmurat Tazhimuratov, a blogger from Nukus, was detained and released promptly.16 However, crowds of people assembled in the city centre announced Tazhimuratov as the new head of the autonomous republic, while demanding the resignation of its actual head, who came to meet and negotiate with the protesters at the scene. When protesters attempted to enter and seize the parliament building, they clashed with the National Guard, leading to violence and deaths. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev responded by revoking the proposed changes, while deploying security forces and declaring a state of emergency.
The clashes led to the reported deaths of 18 and 243 injuries.17 Tazhimuratov was arrested by the police and criminal cases have been opened against him and his accomplices.18 Some of his supporters insisted that he never promoted secession, but found himself used by separatists in their propaganda.19 Local authorities in Nukus have pointed to external responsibility without revealing any further details.20 Nevertheless, in his speech on August 26, President Mirziyoyev underlined unemployment, rising prices, unsatisfactory road conditions, shortage of potable water and disruptions in electricity supply as contributing to public discontent, which local authorities had failed to address effectively despite increased investment by the central government. He also announced additional economic support for the region.21
Clashes at the Kyrgyz-Tajik Border
On September 14, a new round of armed clashes ignited between border guards at the Kyrgyz-Tajik border close to Kyrgyzstan’s Batken province, where periodic provocations and clashes have taken place over the past decade.22 Violence this time around appeared to have erupted due to clashes in the Tajik exclave of Vorukh, which sits entirely surrounded by Kyrgyzstan. The violence rapidly escalated with three-day long clashes involving tanks and armoured personnel carriers, which left 63 dead (including 13 civilians), 144 injured and more than 140,000 evacuated in Kyrgyzstan, and 41 dead and dozens injured in Tajikistan.23 Predictably, both parties blamed each other for the clashes.
Understanding responsibility and blame, however, seems particularly confusing at this time, especially as both leaders were sitting together in Uzbekistan at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit when the clashes took place. Whatever the case, one of the most striking aspects of these clashes was Kyrgyzstan’s top security official’s insistence that they had proof that “terrorist mercenaries” fought on the side of Tajikistan forces, and officials in Kabul recognised their citizens.24 No more information was provided, and the Tajik side has rejected the claim as propaganda. While both sides have since agreed to demilitarise conflict areas along the border, the clashes highlighted the fragility of border relations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with the bout of violence a repeat of events in 2021, though with a higher casualty count.25
More broadly, while local political in-fighting might have fuelled much of the violence and instability witnessed in the region, these are also feeding off a widespread sense of public discontent. This in turn highlights a major issue that authorities across the region are clearly struggling to handle, one which poses a potential danger in the future.
Militant Groups in Afghanistan and Syria
The Taliban’s violent takeover of Kabul in August 2021 continued to cast uncertainty on Afghanistan from a Central Asian perspective. While all of the region’s countries that share a border with Taliban ruled Afghanistan share a concern about the overspill of violence, they have – with the notable exception of Tajikistan – chosen to embrace the Taliban authorities in an attempt to bring stability to Afghanistan.
In seeking international recognition, the Taliban have repeatedly insisted that Afghanistan under their rule will be a responsible state that would not allow any terrorist group to use their territory to launch attacks against others. However, these claims are belied by action on the ground (like the revelation that slain Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was resident in Kabul) as well as the ISK’s repeated references to Central Asia as a target in its propaganda and attempted attacks. This is a source of concern across Central Asia.
On October 19, Ramazon Rahimov, Tajikistan’s Minister of Interior, claimed that the Taliban had issued Afghan passports to more than 3,000 members of terrorist groups, including some Central Asians.26 He did not provide any details to substantiate his claim.27 Another top Tajik general assessed the situation in the north-eastern Afghan provinces that share common borders with Tajikistan – especially in Badakhshan, Takhar and Balkh – to be “complicated and tense”.28
He noted that it might further deteriorate in the near term as Al-Qaeda (AQ), the Islamic State (IS) and other terror groups continue to operate about 40 training camps and bases, with large numbers of light and heavy weapons, military hardware and even drones obtained as trophies from the toppled Afghan forces. He also revealed there were about 5,000 militants originating from former Soviet countries in the ranks of groups affiliated to AQ, the Taliban and IS in Afghanistan, without breaking down the figure by each group.
Currently, four Central Asian militant units, namely the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU or IJG), the Afghanistan wing of Katibat Imam Al-Bukhari (KIB), the Jamaat Ansarullah, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), are known to operate in Afghanistan under the protection and guidance of the Taliban. Since the Taliban prohibited foreign terrorist groups under its control from active online visibility in 2020, production and propagation of extremist propaganda in the online public domain by such groups has shrunk. The latest updates on these groups mostly come from official reports filtered through the United Nations (UN).
According to UN reporting, the Taliban takeover has granted these Central Asian groups greater freedom of movement inside Afghanistan, with several key terrorist figures recently showing up openly in Kabul.29 IJU, led by Ilimbek Mamatov, a Kyrgyz national who is also known as Khamidulla, and the group’s second-in-command, Amsattor Atabaev from Tajikistan, is active primarily in the northern provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan and Kunduz. IJU reportedly has the strongest military preparedness among Central Asian groups fighting in Afghanistan.
KIB’s Afghan wing, led by Dilshod Dekhanov, a Tajik national who is also known as Jumaboi, operates mainly in Badghis province.30 The group has reportedly boosted its fighting force by recruiting several local Afghans. In September, Mamatov and Dekhanov visited Kabul on separate occasions, asking for the Taliban’s approval and assistance to unify Central Asian groups under their respective leadership. Taliban officials denied this request, pushing instead to make the groups part of the newly developed Taliban army. While the exact reasons and the pretext given by the two leaders for the proposed unification were unclear, they were competing to consolidate control over some Central Asian militant groups. It might also show the Taliban’s willingness to increase the size of its armed forces.
Jamaat Ansarullah, led by Sajod (the son of Amriddin Tabarov, alias Domullo Amriddin, the group’s notorious founding leader from Tajikistan who was killed in 2016 in Afghanistan), retains close ties with the Taliban and AQ. The group is also known in Afghanistan as the “Tajik Taliban”, as it unites about 300 militants in its ranks, predominantly Tajik nationals and some Afghan Tajiks. Since September 2021, Jamaat Ansarullah has assisted the Taliban force in administering some districts in Badakhshan and Kunduz, and in guarding sections of the common border with Tajikistan.31
In July, reports emerged that the leader of the group, Mohammed Sharipov, also known as Mehdi Arsalan, had broken away from Jamaat Ansarullah to create a new group called Tehreek-e-Taliban Tajikistan (TTT). However, since this declaration, there has been little change in the militants’ activities. The group appears to continue to operate alongside the Taliban in the north of Afghanistan, and the logic of re-naming itself seems unclear. It bears attention, however, as it could ultimately develop into a wider split from the Taliban, particularly given the tensions that have been visible between the Taliban and their Central Asian origin or ethnic cadres over the past year.32
ISK Boosts Propaganda Threats Against Central Asia
This tension was something noticed by the Islamic State’s branch in Afghanistan, with the ISK throughout 2022 intensifying its propaganda campaigns against Central Asian governments. Though the group’s capability remains debatable, their interest in Central Asia is strong, and they made three failed attempts to target the region with rockets fired across the border in 2022. Reports on the first case appeared on April 19 when ISK and its networks claimed to have hit a military camp in the southern Uzbek city of Termiz.33 Authorities in Uzbekistan denied the claim, though large deployments of the Uzbek military were seen in the region. The Taliban later confirmed, without providing evidence, that ISK members had fired rockets from inside Afghanistan towards Uzbekistan, but they did not reach the Uzbek border and the perpetrators were captured.
On May 7, more rockets were launched from Afghanistan’s Takhar province into the neighbouring Panj district in Tajikistan. ISK claimed responsibility for the incident, which Tajik authorities dismissed as “bullets [that] accidentally ended up on the territory of Tajikistan” after a shootout between Taliban and ISK forces near the shared border.34 Later on July 7, five dud rockets fired from Afghanistan landed in Uzbekistan’s border town of Termez, causing no injuries but slightly damaging four houses and a football stadium.35 Soon after, the Taliban announced the killing of three and the arrest of four ISK militants in Kunduz, whom it suspected of conducting the last two rocket attacks.36
Although these attacks were an operational failure for ISK, they generated attention and served as a morale booster for the group, while undermining the credibility of the Taliban. ISK had also expanded the production, reproduction and propagation of propaganda in Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz languages through its media teams, such as Al-Azaim Foundation and Xuroson Ovozi.37 Yet this noise has not resulted in an increased threat, with some analysts suggesting the terrorist group might be in decline.38
In this respect, and notwithstanding all the attention directed towards Central Asia in their publications, ISK has yet to hit any targets (outside the failed cross-border rocket attacks and a very lightly sourced report of an attempt to target the Turkmenistan Embassy in Kabul in late August 2021).39 The attack on the Russian Embassy by ISK in September, however, also highlighted the group’s ability to strike its desired targets.40 The recent revelations that the shooter in an ISK-claimed attack at a shrine in Shiraz, Iran, was a Tajik national also underscored how ISK’s Central Asian cadres are regionally mobile.41 All this raises further questions as to why the group has not yet followed through on its Central Asian rhetoric.
HTS-Linked Groups and Individuals
In Syria, AQ-linked Central Asian combat units, such as Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ) and KIB’s central core, have remained active primarily in north-western Idlib province. As in previous years, both KTJ and KIB are part of the jihadist alliance under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), itself an evolution of AQ’s former representative on the Syrian battlefield. KTJ, led by Ilmurad Hikmatov (alias Abdul Aziz) and his deputy Akhliddin Novkatiy (Navqotiy), is assessed to have been relatively weakened by the quarrel that broke out between Hikmatov and former KTJ leader and key ideologue, Abu Saloh, after the latter’s defection to Jabhat Ansar al-Din (JAD) in June 2020.42
On September 11, Russia’s Defence Ministry reported that its air forces had killed Abu Saloh, whose real name was Sirajuddin Mukhtarov, along with several top HTS members in an airstrike in Syria.43 If confirmed, his removal would be a major blow to the group, which has been accused by the US State Department of being linked to both the 2016 attack on the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek and the 2017 Metro attack in St Petersburg.44 The group’s future trajectory remains unclear, even with the emergence of Navqotiy as its chief ideologue.45 His recent propaganda narratives have centred on the importance and legitimacy of conducting armed jihad in Syria.
KIB is led by Ramazan Nurmanov, a Tajik national whose father was reportedly a veteran jihadist militant who gained fighting experience in Afghanistan and Syria. KIB has kept its 2016 public pledge of allegiance to the Taliban, possibly facilitated by the key group leaders’ fighting background and networking in Afghanistan. Currently, KIB has a force strength of 110 fighters who operate mainly in north-western Latakia province. Online videos and photos released by KIB and KTJ indicate that both groups have played an active role in HTS-led operations against the Syrian Armed Forces and rival terrorist groups in Idlib and Latakia, and lately against the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in Afrin in October.
Besides the two groups, there are some notorious individuals, such as Farrukh Fayzimatov, who are affiliated to HTS. As discussed in the 2021 annual report, Fayzimatov is an Idlib-based Tajik militant who goes by the nom de guerre Faruq Shami, and who allegedly had links to the perpetrator of the October 2020 Paris attack on the schoolteacher Samuel Paty. While presenting himself as an “independent blogger-reporter”, Fayzimatov in 2022 continued to produce and circulate videos in the online domain, including blogging sites, YouTube and Twitter. However, unlike in the past, recent materials did not contain words like “jihad” or scenes of fighting and training.46
Although both KTJ and KIB have confined their operational activities within Syria, they have increased online efforts to reach out to potential sympathisers, including various diaspora communities. Throughout the year, officials in both Central Asia and Russia reported arrests of suspected members or supporters of regional groups (KTJ and KIB in particular). It is difficult, however, to appreciate the nature of these links in some cases due to the paucity of publicly available information. For example, in late August, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed to have detained a Central Asian whom they stated had been radicalised in Turkey to travel to India via Moscow. The individual had planned to launch a punitive attack on IS’ behalf in response to alleged inflammatory comments made on Indian television by Nupur Sharma, a former spokesperson for India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).47 Since then, nothing more has been heard about the case.
Responses
There were no major changes in the region’s responses to terrorist threats in 2022, with most authorities continuing existing policies. The biggest source of radicalisation appears to be the experience of labour migration in Russia, which continues to account for the largest portion of radicalised individuals of Central Asian origin. In the first half of the year, Uzbekistan repatriated 59 nationals who were detained abroad, including in Russia, for their alleged links to militant groups.48 Over the same period, the country disrupted several online (particularly on Telegram) recruitment and fund-raising cells linked to groups such as IS and KTJ, leading to the detention of 250 radical suspects.49
At the same time, events in Afghanistan continued to pose a major concern for security forces across the region, as highlighted above. In response, all of the region’s countries – except Tajikistan – have chosen to embrace and work closely with the Taliban authorities on the assumption that this offers the best hope for stability. And even in Tajikistan, the government has chosen to resume some border trading, suggesting they see a path of engagement as a possibility on specific issues.
The path of engagement has also faced issues – the repeated (if failed) ISK cross-border strikes into Uzbekistan caused major frictions between Kabul and Tashkent. Some in the region worry about what precedent might be set if the Taliban successfully builds an Islamic Emirate on the borders of secular Muslim-majority Central Asia. Local observers point to growing levels of public, outward religious expression, alongside larger societal tensions illustrated by the mass unrest highlighted at the beginning of this article.
There has been a growing volume of discussion by external partners about supporting counter terrorism efforts in the region, with a particular focus on Afghanistan. This has included a growing volume of visits and attention by the United States (US) to strengthen its ‘overwatch’ capability of Afghanistan from the region. In the case of Tajikistan, it is notable the degree to which the government attracted considerable external support from competing powers. The country received and hosted an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support from Iran, China and the US, while the Russian military base there has remained, though the number of soldiers present has been depleted following their redeployment to Ukraine. This broader pattern of activity is worth keeping in view given its potential to become a focus for great power tensions and conflict.
Beyond this, the Tajik government repatriated another 146 women and children from camps in Syria.50 While exact numbers of Central Asians left in the camps in Syria remain unclear, it appears that Kyrgyzstan might undertake another repatriation exercise of children from the camps soon.51 There have currently been no reports of recidivism amongst the Central Asians who have returned, though it is unclear exactly what has happened in all cases.52
Finally, it is hard to gauge the practical impact of the decision by the US State Department to add KTJ to its list of proscribed terrorist organisations.53 However, it was notable that they chose to highlight the group’s responsibility for the 2017 St Petersburg attack and the 2016 attack on the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek. The 2016 attack, for example, had previously been linked to Uyghur networks with links to Syria, though it is possible these might have had links to KTJ as well. Washington’s decision to specifically highlight the attacks on China and Russia came as relations between Washington, Beijing and Moscow continued to become more tense, suggesting a possible attempt by the US government to highlight possible counter terrorism cooperation with their otherwise adversaries. This might be an attempt by the Biden administration to counter the damage done by the previous Trump administration’s decision to de-list the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).54
Outlook
In sum, Central Asia continues to have many strands of radicalisation threatening regional security, despite the absence of attacks at home. This might be due to a highly effective local security apparatus, or a threat which has yet to materialise. Certainly, events in Afghanistan remain a concern on several fronts, and the instability seen across the region since the beginning of the year suggests high levels of disenfranchisement from which extremist groups might be able to profit, unless the authorities develop more effective mechanisms to address the socioeconomic and other grievances fuelling these tensions. This, atop the continuing war in Ukraine which is resonating across the former Soviet space, suggests a bumpy year ahead for Central Asia.
About the Authors
Nodirbek Soliev is a Senior Analyst and Raffaello Pantucci is a Senior Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. They can be reached at isnsoliev@ntu.edu.sg and israffaello@ntu.edu.sg, respectively.
1 Anastasiya Lejepekova, “V Kazakhstane vo Vremya Yanvarskikh Besporyadkov Pogibli 230 Chelovek [230 People Were Killed in Kazakhstan During January Riots],” Gazeta.ru, March 14, 2022, https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2022/03/14/17421187.shtml.
2 “V Agressii Protiv Kazakhstana Uchastvovali Inostrannyye Boyeviki, Zayavil Tokayev [Foreign Fighters Participated in the Aggression Against Kazakhstan, Tokayev Said],” RIA Novosti, January 10, 2022, https://ria.ru/20220110/boeviki-1767209576.html.
3 The CSTO is a regional military alliance of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
4 Aibarshyn Akhmetkali, “Terrorism Should Be Condemned By Both Government and Civil Society Says State Secretary Erlan Karin,” The Astana Times, January 21, 2022, https://astanatimes.com/2022/01/terrorism-should-becondemned-by-both-government-and-civil-society-says-state-secretary-erlan-karin/.
5 “Kazakhstan in Crisis: Politics and Geopolitics – Three Questions to Nargis Kassenova,” Institut Montaigne, January 13, 2022, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/kazakhstan-crisis-politics-and-geopolitics; Claire Parker and Mary Ilyushina, “Why is Kazakhstan Claiming Foreign Links to the Unrest? Here’s What We Know,” The Washington Post, January 8, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/08/kazakhstan-foreign-protests/.
6 Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, “Turbulence Across Eurasia Will Not Slow Kazakhstan’s Progress,” The National Interest, April 4, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turbulence-across-eurasia-will-not-slow-kazakhstan%E2%80%99sprogress-201591.
7 Mariya Gordeyeva and Tamara Vaal, “Ex-Security Chief Arrested as Kazakhstan Presses Crackdown on Unrest,” Reuters, January 9, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kazakhstan-detains-ex-security-chief-crisisconvulses-nation-2022-01-08/.
8 Joanna Lillis, “Shot, Tortured, Facing Jail: Can Kazakhstan Deliver Justice After Bloody January?” Eurasianet, April 15, 2022, https://eurasianet.org/shot-tortured-facing-jail-can-kazakhstan-deliver-justice-after-bloody-january.
9 “MVD Soobshchilo Novyye Podrobnosti Sobytiy v GBAO [The Ministry of Internal Affairs Reported New Details of the Events in GBAO],” Avesta Information Agency, May 19, 2022, https://avesta.tj/2022/05/19/mvd-soobshhilo-novyepodrobnosti-sobytij-v-gbao/.
10 “Protiv Protestuyushchikh v Tadzhikistane Primenili Slezotochivyy Gaz [Tear Gas Used Against Protesters in Tajikistan],” RBC, May 17, 2022, https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/6282b2aa9a7947355fb559b4.
11 “V Khoroge Ubit Podozrevayemyy v Besporyadkakh po GBAO Mamadbokirov [Suspect in the GBAO Riots, Mamadbokirov, Killed in Khorog],” Sputnik News, May 22, 2022, https://tj.sputniknews.ru/20220522/v-khoroge-ubitpodozrevaemyy-v-besporyadkakh-po-gbao-mamadbokirov-1048633581.html.
12 “Genprokuratura Soobshchila Nekotoryye Podrobnosti Mayskikh Sobytiy v GBAO [The Prosecutor General’s Office Reported Some Details of the May Events in GBAO’],” Avesta Information Agency, October 10, 2022, https://avesta.tj/2022/10/10/genprokuratura-soobshhila-nekotorye-podrobnosti-majskih-sobytij-v-gbao/.
13 “Prezident Poruchil Obespechit’ Realizatsiyu Proyektov po Razvitiyu GBAO,” Khovar, June 28, 2022, https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/prezident-poruchil-obespechit-realizatsiyu-proektov-po-razvitiyu-gbao-samoj-krupnoj-poterritorii-oblasti-tadzhikistana-predrekayut-burnoe-razvitie/.
14 “Emomali Rakhmon o Sobytiyakh v GBAO: ‘Drugogo Vykhoda ne Bylo’ [Emomali Rahmon on the Events in GBAO: ‘There Was No Other Way Out’],” Radio Ozodi, June 19, 2022, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31905149.html.
15 Odil Madbekov, “What Are the Causes of Protests in Gorno-Badakhshan?” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting (CABAR), February 28, 2022, https://cabar.asia/en/what-are-the-causes-of-protests-in-gorno-badakhshan.
16 “Qoraqalpog’istonagi Voqealar Haqida Yangi Ma’lumotlar Berdildi (+ Video) [New Details on the Events in Karakalpakstan Were Revealed (+ Video)’],” Uzbekistan National News Agency, July 7, 2022, https://uza.uz/uz/posts/qoraqalpogistondagi-voqealar-haqida-yangi-malumotlar-berildi-video_388152.
17 “Chislo Zhertv Besporyadkov v Karakalpakstane Vozroslo do 21 [The Number of Victims of Riots in Karakalpakstan Rose to 21],” Interfax, July 18, 2022, https://www.interfax.ru/world/852703.
18 “Dauletmurat Tajimuratov Arrested,” Kun.uz, July 8, 2022, https://kun.uz/en/news/2022/07/08/dauletmurattajimuratov-arrested.
19 Navbahor Imamova, “Unrest in Remote Karakalpakstan Tests Uzbekistan’s State, Society,” VoA, July 13, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/unrest-in-remote-karakalpakstan-tests-uzbekistan-s-state-and-society-/6657260.html.
20 Jokargy Kenes of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, K Sobytiyam v Karakalpakstane [On the Events in Karakalpakstan], July 2, 2022, https://joqargikenes.uz/ru/11171.html.
21 “Murat Kamalov Osvobozhden ot Dolzhnosti Predsedatelya Zhokargy Kenesa [Murat Kamalov Has Been Dismissed from the Post of Chairman of Jokargy Kenes],” Novosti Uzbekistana, August 26, 2022, https://nuz.uz/politika/1253049-murat-kamalov-osvobozhden-ot-dolzhnosti-predsedatelya-zhokargy-kenesa.html.
22 Over the past 10 years, more than 150 clashes took place between the Kyrgyz and Tajik communities and border guards over the disputed ownership of undefined territories, cross-border water streams and roads, as well as illegal crossings and livestock grazing. Before the September events, there had been at least three major outbreaks in 2022 – in January, March and June. Nazir Aliyev, “Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Border Disputes Continue for 31 years,” September 17, 2022, Anadolu Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-border-disputescontinue-for-31-years/2687807#.
23 “MCHS Kirgizii Soobshchayet ob Uvelichenii Chisla Pogibshikh na Granitse s Tadzhikistanom do 63 Chelovek [The Ministry of Emergency Situations of Kyrgyzstan Reports That the Death Toll at the Border with Tajikistan Rose to 63 People],” September 28, 2022, Interfax, https://www.interfax.ru/world/865217; “MID Tadzhikistana: ‘Akt Agressii Kyrgyzstana Protiv Tadzhikistana byl Zaraneye Splanirovannoy Aktsiyey’ [Tajik Foreign Ministry: ‘The Act of Aggression of Kyrgyzstan Against Tajikistan was a Pre-Planned Action’],” ASIA-Plus, September 19, 2022, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/20220919/mid-tadzhikistana-akt-agressii-kirgizstana-protiv-tadzhikistana-bilzaranee-splanirovannoi-aktsiei.
24 No further details were provided, though numerous officials on the ground in Central Asia report having seen a video which showed heavily bearded men saying ‘Allahu Akhbar’ and claiming to be jihadist warriors fighting on the Tajik side. “Marat Imankulov: V Boyevykh Deystviyakh na Storone RT Uchastvovali Afganskiye Nayemniki [Marat Imankulov: Afghan Mercenaries Participated in the Fighting on the Side of the Republic of Tatarstan],” 24KG, September 19, 2022, https://24.kg/vlast/245647_marat_imankulov_vboevyih_deystviyah_nastoronert_uchastvovali_afganskie_naemniki/.
25 A long-term solution to the tensions will require mutually agreed border delimitation and demarcation, although the process is complicated due to long-standing geographical and demographic complexities, and disputes over territorial and resources ownership.
26 “Tysyachi Terroristov Poluchili Afganskiye Pasporta [Thousands of Terrorists Obtained Afghan Passports],” Sputnik News, October 19, 2022, https://tj.sputniknews.ru/20221019/tysyachi-terroristov-poluchili-afganskie-pasporta1052255117.html.
27 The logic from a Taliban perspective would be to both reward them for their support and gain loyalty from the Central Asian fighters, while also strengthening the Taliban narrative of no ‘foreigners’ operating from their territory.
28 “Pogransluzhba Tadzhikistana: U Terroristov v Afganistane Yest’ Mnogo Oruzhiya i BPLA [Border Service of Tajikistan: Terrorists in Afghanistan Have a Lot of Weapons and UAVs],” TASS, October 19, 2022, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/16095199.
29 United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Dae’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2022/83, February 3, 2022, p. 16, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3957081?ln=en.
30 Ibid.
31 United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 25 May 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1988 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2022/419, May 26, 2022, p. 21, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3975071?ln=en.
32 Earlier in January 2022, the Taliban arrested an Uzbek commander named Makhdom Alim, who was reportedly involved in local criminality, in Faryab. His detention led to clashes and widespread protests amongst local Uzbeks, which in turn led to a Taliban crackdown in the region. It was ultimately not clear whether ethnicity played any role in his detention (Alim was reportedly moved to serve a different security role in Ghazni). See Ehsanullah Amiri and Saeed Shah, “Afghanistan’s Taliban Battle Rebellion by Ethnic Minority Fighters,” The Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanistans-taliban-battle-rebellion-by-ethnic-minority-fighters-11642197509; “Taliban Replaces Its Acting Education Minister in Reshuffle,” Amu TV, September 21, 2022.
33 “Rakety IGIL ne Doleteli do Uzbekistana – Taliban [ISIS Missiles Did Not Reach Uzbekistan – Taliban],” Gazeta.uz, April 20, 2022, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2022/04/20/afghanistan-border/.
34 “Pogranichnyye voyska Tadzhikistana Privedeny v Sostoyaniye Polnoy Boyevoy Gotovnosti [The Border Troops of Tajikistan Are Put On Full Combat Readiness],” Avesta Information Agency, May 9,2022, https://avesta.tj/2022/05/09/pogranichnye-vojska-tadzhikistana-privedeny-v-sostoyanie-polnoj-boevoj-gotovnosti/.
35 “Na Territoriyu Uzbekistana Upali Pyat Snaryadov Predpolozhitel no so Storony Afganistana [Five Shells Allegedly from Afghanistan Fell on the Territory of Uzbekistan],” Gazeta.uz, July 5, 2022, https://www.gazeta.uz/uz/2022/08/19/termez/.
36 “Taliby Zayavili o Zaderzhanii Lits, Prichastnykh k Obstrelu Territoriy Uzbekistana i Tadzhikistana [The Taliban Announced the Detention of Persons Involved in the Shelling of the Territories of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan],” Avesta Information Agency, July 17, 2022, https://avesta.tj/2022/07/17/taliby-zayavili-o-zaderzhanii-lits-prichastnyh-kobstrelu-territorij-uzbekistana-i-tadzhikistana/.
37 Lucas Webber and Riccardo Valle, “Islamic State in Afghanistan Seeks to recruit Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz,” Eurasianet, March 17, 2022, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-islamic-state-in-afghanistan-seeks-to-recruit-uzbekstajiks-kyrgyz.
38 Antonio Giustozzi, “The Islamic State-Khorasan Is Weaker Than It Looks,” World Politics Review, October 4, 2022, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/isis-afghanistan-islamic-state-taliban/.
39 Shishir Gupta, “14 Keralites With ISKP, Blast Outside Turkmenistan Mission Mission in Kabul Foiled,” Hindustan Times, August 28, 2021, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/14-keralites-with-iskp-blast-outsideturkmenistan-mission-in-kabul-foiled-101630120774066.html.
40 Mohammad Yunus Yawar, “Two Russian Embassy Staff Dead, Four Others Killed in Suicide Bomb Blast in Kabul,” Reuters, September 5, 2022 https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-police-report-suicide-bomb-blastnear-russian-embassy-kabul-2022-09-05/.
41 “All of Those Involved in Shiraz Terror Attack Arrested: Iran Intelligence Ministry,” Tasnim News Agency, November 7, 2022 https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/11/07/2800386/all-of-those-involved-in-shiraz-terror-attackarrested-iran-intelligence-ministry.
42 UNSC, Letter Dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Dae’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security Council.
43 While there was some scepticism about the Russian claim, there has been nothing presented to either dispute or confirm it in the public domain. “Terrorist Group’s Leader, Native of Kyrgyzstan, Killed by Russian Forces in Syria,” AKIpress News Agency, September 11, 2022, https://akipress.com/news:678675:Terrorist_group_s_leader,_native_of_Kyrgyzstan,_killed_by_Russian_forces_in_Syria/.
44 U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Designation of Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2022), https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-katibat-al-tawhid-wal-jihad/.
45 Currently, several public accounts on YouTube carry propaganda videos featuring Navqotiy, with the number of subscribers ranging from several dozens to hundreds, while a page attributed to him on Instagram has nearly 4,500 followers.
46 For instance, in a disclaimer on Twitter, where he has more than 10,000 followers, Fayzimatov claimed that his postings are for “informational purposes only” and “do no promote violence or terrorist organisations”. After the US Treasury Department blacklisted him in 2021 for his connections with HTS, Fayzimatov appears to have taken a more cautious approach in the online domain in an apparent attempt to present himself more positively.
47 Shishir Gupta, “IS Terrorist Arrested in Russia for Plotting Attack in India Over Prophet Remark,” Hindustan Times, August 23, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/is-terrorist-arrested-in-russia-for-plotting-to-carry-outattack-in-india-over-prophet-remark-101661190182981.html.
48 “Rost Terroristicheskoy Aktivnosti v Uzbekistane Trebuyet Kompleksnogo Podkhoda [The Growth of Terrorist Activity in Uzbekistan Requires an Integrated Approach],” Center for Studying Regional Threats (CSRT), June 28, 2022, https://crss.uz/2022/06/28/rost-terroristicheskoj-aktivnosti-v-uzbekistane-trebuet-kompleksnogo-podxoda/.
49 In July, Tajik authorities also announced it had registered 720 criminal cases related to terrorist and extremist activity in the first half of 2022, a slight increase over the same period in the year prior. See “General’nyy Prokuror Zayavil o Pugayushchey Tendentsii v Tadzhikistane [The Prosecutor General Announced a Frightening Trend in Tajikistan], Sputnik News, July 15, 2022, https://tj.sputniknews.ru/20220715/tajikistan-terrorizm-ekstrimizm-rost1050026384.html.
50 “Syrian Kurds Repatriate 146 Tajik Women and Children from Camps Holding Relatives of IS Fighters,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 26, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/syrian-kurds-repatriate-tajik-women-children-isfighters/31959893.html.
51 “Mothers With Children Will Be Repatriated to Kyrgyzstan from Northern Syria,” AKIpress News Agency, October 30, 2022, https://akipress.com/news:684263.
52 Nurbek Bekmurzaev, “Promises and Pitfalls of Tajikistan’s Latest Repatriation Program for Islamic State Families from Syria,” Terrorism Monitor Vol. 20, No. 19, https://jamestown.org/program/promises-and-pitfalls-of-tajikistanslatest-repatriation-program-for-islamic-state-families-from-syria/; Asanbek Pazyl, “Long Way Home: Kyrgyzstan Resumed Repatriation of Citizens from Syria and Iraq,” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting (CABAR), February 18, 2022, https://cabar.asia/en/what-are-the-causes-of-protests-in-gorno-badakhshan.
53 U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Designation of Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad.
54 Asim Kashgarian, “Uighur Diaspora Hails Removal of ETIM From US Terror List,” VoA, December 25, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_uighur-diaspora-hails-removal-etim-us-terror-list/6200004.html.
Raffaello Pantucci 