Russia | Raffaello Pantucci

Posts Tagged ‘Russia’

Russia’s Far-Right Campaign in Europe

Posted: May 22, 2023 in Lawfare
Tags: Russia, terrorism, Ukraine war, XRW

My pace has slowed a bit of late, been doing lots of different things. Most will eventually land in one form or another, though the topics remain the same. This is for Lawfare, taking a look at another aspect of Russia’s asymmetrical efforts against the west, this time digging into their links with the extreme right in Europe. Part of a pair which fits alongside my earlier CTTA piece looking at Russia in Africa in particular. More on the terror/great power conflict nexus to come.

Russia’s Far-Right Campaign in Europe

*Vladimir Putin attends a press conference with Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte in Rome, Italy, on July 4, 2019. Photo credit: Office of the President of Russia; CC BY 4.0.*

Editor’s Note: Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine may lead it to escalate, or simply lash out, against Ukraine’s European allies. Raffaello Pantucci of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research examines ways in which Moscow might support extreme right-wing groups in Europe in order to sow chaos and raise the price of European support for Ukraine.

Daniel Byman

***

NATO continues to thwart and confront Russia’s aggression in Ukraine through sanctions, political pressure, arms supplies, and economic support for Kyiv. Moscow’s direct response outside the battlefield, however, has been relatively limited beyond rhetoric and increasingly strident statements and actions on the international stage. But Moscow clearly sees Europe as the soft underbelly of the alliance and has increasingly used soft and hard measures to try to create friction and strike back. One key vector that Moscow might exploit is the far and extreme right in Europe, which has often tended in a pro-Russian direction.

Any Russian action in support of these groups is unlikely to be obvious. A hint of what might be coming may be visible in a series of letter bombs in Spain late last year; the New York Times reported that U.S. intelligence initially linked the attacks to a Russian intelligence effort that was working with extreme right-wing actors, but the bombs were ultimately traced to a lone individual who was inspired in part by Russian propaganda. Other traces could be found in the group of German “sovereign citizens” or “Reichsbürgers,” who were planning to overthrow the government before their arrest in December 2022. At least one of the suspects in the case was linked to the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) political party, and the group had sought to make contact with Russian authorities to solicit help stabilizing their government once they had taken over. Moscow has long cultivated links with different parts of Europe’s right wing, from mainstream politicians to proscribed terrorists. Given existing social tensions in Europe, this provides an ideal space for Russian meddling.

Russia’s Ties to the European Far Right

Russia already has a means to act on these threats. The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) is an international far-right group, which was listed as a specially designated terrorist organization by the United States in April 2020. The U.S. policy was “the first time in history” that the U.S. government had “designated a white supremacist group,” as then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pointed out at the time. Subsequent reporting highlighted how the group had provided training centers in St. Petersburg for Swedish, German, Slovakian, Finnish, and Danish right-wing radicals. One of the Swedes, Anton Thulin, was a member of the Nordic Resistance Movement and was jailed for bombing a refugee center in Gothenburg in 2017. That attack was one of three carried out by his cell; others targeted a Swedish left-wing organization and another refugee center. Upon his release, Thulin went to Poland where he sought additional training. RIM leader Stanislav Vorobyov has been linked to extreme-right groups across Europe. Other RIM members have trained and gone to fight in Ukraine in support of the Russian offensive. But the problem of far-right Russian sympathizers joining the fight goes well beyond just RIM—numerous Italian, French, and other European extremists have also elected to go and fight alongside Russian-supporting groups in Ukraine.

RIM is not the only strand of the terrorist extreme right that has ties to St. Petersburg. Shortly before RIM’s designation, investigations by the Guardian and the BBC uncovered that The Base, an international neo-Nazi accelerationist group, was being run from St. Petersburg by an American, Rinaldo Nazzaro, through a web of online platforms and encrypted applications used for recruitment and incitement. Nazzaro is accused of building networks of angry white men and instigating racially motivated attacks from his home in Russia. He has also appeared a few times in the Russian media from his new home (where he says he moved with his Russian wife in 2018 so that his child would not “grow up in the USA because I felt like it was too degenerate”) to criticize the West. While most of The Base’s targets seem to be in the United States, and U.S. members have been prosecuted, the group is also proscribed in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. In the U.K., it has been linked to the recruitment of teenagers to extremist networks. Nazarro has declared that he has stepped back from The Base, but his online posting still highlights his support for the group’s ideas.

Russia’s connection to the German Reichsbürger plot is weaker but present. In that case, it appears that one of the plotters was previously a member of the far-right AfD political party directly involved in the support the party received from Moscow. Members of the network are accused of seeking direct links with Russia to gain support (the Kremlin denied playing any role). In another recent example, the AfD appears to have played a role in Russia’s recruitment of a senior German intelligence officer, who supplied Russia with information about the war in Ukraine.

The AfD links shows how other, less overtly violent parts of the far right also have ties to Russia. Britain First—a far-right group in the United Kingdom that has published material later found with individuals involved in violent attacks, and that was briefly promoted on Twitter by President Trump—has long been suspected of receiving support from Russia. Its leader, Paul Golding, has made at least three visits to Russia, spoken in the Duma, and praised President Vladimir Putin’s Russia on Russian television. U.K. police have investigated his financial affairs on the suspicion that he has been receiving money from sources in Moscow, and charged and convicted him for refusing to cooperate with an investigation after returning from a trip to Russia. Many other mainstream far-right politicians in Europe have also cultivated relations with Russia.

An Unpopular Time to Be Pro-Russia

Russia’s war in Ukraine has somewhat dulled the influence of these mainstream pro-Putin politicians—given the negative overall view of what Russia is doing in Europe, it’s harder to maintain public support while voicing support for Russia. Italy’s current government coalition includes leaders who have spoken openly of their support for Putin, but Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni made it a point to highlight her country’s support for Ukraine, and Matteo Salvini (who infamously wore a pro-Putin T -shirt in parliament) cancel ed a visit to Moscow that he had planned in June 2022, though he has also said that he thinks sanctions targeting Russia will damage Italy. At the extreme, Nazzaro has told supporters to steer clear of the war in Ukraine, which he sees as a pointless “NATO proxy war,” and Britain First has called for peace in the conflict on its Telegram channel but continued to support Russia.

The political winds in Europe are blowing against Russia and its supporters at the moment. But among the violent fringe, sympathetic groups and individuals still provide Putin a tool to destabilize Europe; some of these extremists are receiving military training and experience on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Russia has a long history of violently targeting opponents in Europe. From shooting Chechens in the streets of Berlin and Istanbul, to poisoning defected intelligence agents in the United Kingdom, to the dramatic deaths of various prominent Russian businessmen across Europe over the span of decades, Moscow’s enemies in Europe often fall prey to violent incidents. In addition, through its intelligence agencies, the Kremlin has worked to destabilize governments, meddle in public discourse and elections, and generally stir trouble wherever it can. In 2017, British intelligence reported a plot stirred by Russian agents to overthrow the government in Montenegro, and shortly before the Russian invasion, they pointed to a plot to install a puppet regime in Kyiv. More recently, Moldovan authorities released documents that appear to lay out Russia’s playbook for destabilizing their country and arrested Russian agents linked to the Wagner Group reportedly entering the country to carry out the plot.

Beyond Europe, Russia has attempted to spread its influence through other means, particularly using counterterrorism cooperation as a tool of engagement and influence. Russia has used arms sales and Wagner Group operations to supplant French influence and cultivate a reputation as a willing partner across Africa. It is now deploying a similar approach in Myanmar, where a long-standing defense relationship has now blossomed into bilateral engagement focused on counterterrorism as the military regime in Naypyidaw continues to attempt to put down resistance to its February 2021 coup. Russia has not hesitated to weaponize counterterrorism rhetoric and policies around the world as a tool for international engagement and to undermine Western influence.

But it is in Europe where Russia is likely to have the most impact fostering threats, in large part because its efforts in Europe build on existing fissures in society. For almost a decade, there has been a political crisis in Europe over immigration and fears of violent Islamist terrorism, which has stirred concern and paranoia among a growing number of people. This situation has led people to radicalize, some in mainstream politics where a growing number of parties focused on such issues have come to prominence, but also through growing extreme far-right and white supremacist groups on the fringes of European politics. Russia has exploited other political faultlines in Europe as well, interfering in the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, the Catalan separatist movement, and German, French, and Dutch elections.

Creating a Climate of Confusion

In some cases, the degree to which threats in Europe are being directed by Russia may be overstated. For example, British Islamist Anjem Choudary’s appearance on Russian platform VKontakte (a Facebook equivalent) could be ascribed to Moscow’s meddling, or it could just be a pragmatic choice by someone shunned on most other platforms to take advantage of VK’s lack of interest. It is possible to find links to Russia across a wide range of threats and problems, but not all of these are necessarily part of a wider plot.

It is also the case that the extreme right has ties to both sides of the battlefield in Ukraine. While it is clear that Russia is using some of these groups to support its cause, there are others that fight on the Ukrainian side. A recent cross-border incursion into Russia was undertaken by the Russian Volunteer Corps, a group led by a man who has unabashedly trumpeted his extreme right-wing views. And prior to the invasion, there was a steady trickle of men linked to extreme right-wing groups traveling to join the Ukrainian Azov battalion, which is associated with Nazi iconography and hardline nationalist beliefs.

This is a muddled state of affairs. Russian ties to extremists are often present, but not every instance of smoke indicates fire. The politics of the moment are defined by the war in Ukraine, but far-right extremists have divided sympathies. Despite this confusion, Europe has thus far proved durable as a Ukrainian ally, suggesting that any efforts by Russia to foster extremism and pro-Russian attitudes has not had much effect overall. European intelligence has stepped up its efforts at countering Russian penetration, and overt political support for Russia is not as appealing as it was prior to the invasion. The clientele of Russia’s influence operations are a fickle group of opportunists.

But this confusion is also a key part of Moscow’s playbook for asymmetric warfare. While Russia appears to have very few limits on what it will do and what tools it might deploy, its actions are not always linked to a specific goal. For the Kremlin, stirring trouble and creating confusion is often a good result in itself. But meddling with the extreme right and inciting terrorist groups creates problems that could be difficult for Russia to control. There is of course considerable irony in Russia trying to manipulate the far right in the midst of a war in which it claims to be fighting fascists. But Moscow is nothing if not flexible when it comes to fighting its wars and seeing who it can use to advance its cause.

Take the Xi-Putin Relationship at Face Value

Posted: May 11, 2023 in Diplomat
Tags: China, China and the world, China-Russia, Russia

A brief piece for the Diplomat trying to temper down some of the China-Russia hype and hysteria and just call the relationship what it is. A topic doubtless to return to.

Take the Xi-Putin Relationship at Face Value

China and Russia are not in lockstep across the board, but they are clearly in strategic alignment at a global level.

*Credit: Russian Presidential Press and Information Service*

There is an almost hysterical need to find fissures in the Sino-Russian relationship. Yet, the most obvious thing to come out from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow was the fact that both he and President Vladimir Putin want to highlight to the world how close they are. No one forced Xi to go to Moscow, and Putin chose to make this a high-profile state visit. Their warm words to each other overheard as they left dinner may have seemed staged, but at the same time were unnecessary unless the point was to emphasize partnership. The endless search for gaps misses this clear strategic alignment which should be taken and reacted to at face value.

The narrative of underlying disagreement and dislike between Beijing and Moscow is likely born from the same place that the Cold War Two concept emerges from. During the first Cold War, China and Russia were at odds beneath their common Communist spirit, and the U.S. demonstrated impressive diplomatic deft in focusing on this to pull them apart. The times have changed, however, and the key thing now holding China and Russia together is an antipathy toward the West.

It is abundantly clear that there are disagreements between Moscow and Beijing at every level. India, for example, is a power that has a strong relationship with Moscow, but a violent one with China. The Russian intelligence service continues to detain scientists they claim are selling their country out to China. Shortly before Xi’s visit a group of Chinese miners were murdered in the Central African Republic, with the Chinese leader pledging their murders would be avenged. A rumor rattling around the Chinese internet was that they had been executed by Russian Wagner forces. All of this serves to show competing geopolitical interests as well as bilateral paranoia at a public level and within their respective security apparatuses.

Similarly, the economic sphere is riven with contradictions. No big gas deal has yet been signed – likely evidence of China deciding to play hardball on negotiations now that they have the upper hand and more options at hand (as well as the fact that to rebuild the infrastructure within Russia to shift European-facing gas to Asia will take some time). Yet at the same time, Moscow is clearly looking to sell more to China and Beijing is buying. Within the private sector, some Chinese firms see the evacuation of Western brands from Russia as a great market opportunity, while at the same time large tech firms like Huawei or Alibaba are pulling people out or suspending investments. Opportunity and fear of secondary sanctions are often wrapped up together.

But in focusing on all of these contradictions, we are missing that this is often the nature of international relations. To paraphrase British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston: Countries have interests, not friendships. The transatlantic alliance may have NATO binding it together, but is equally riven with contradiction and disagreement – Turkey’s role in the negotiations around Finnish and Swedish membership has highlighted this. European and American companies usually compete on the international stage and within each other’s markets, while the authorities seek to protect their own national firms. And it is worth remembering that we are only two short decades since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq – a war that tore at the fabric of the transatlantic alliance.

It is hard to understand why we cannot then see this echoed in the China-Russia relationship. Both have problems, disagreements, and contradictions with each other, and yet their leaders are happy to grandstand together on the world stage.

The overarching issues they wanted highlighted during this encounter was their proximity and the fact that they are both pushing forward the development of a non-Western led order (made up of institutions like BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and more). At an individual level, Beijing struck its pose as the peacemaker seeking to help resolve the Ukraine war (building on its success in the Middle East between Riyadh and Tehran), while Moscow got high level support on the global stage.

We have yet to see Beijing’s support go beyond this to actually arming Russia with the lethal hardware that they want to fight in Ukraine. And we have yet to see Moscow try to force Beijing to do something they do not want to do in advance of Russia’s interests.

The final point to make is that while it may be clear that Beijing increasingly has the whip hand in the relationship, this does not in itself necessarily mean anything. Growing Russian dependence on China does not hand all the chips to Beijing, but merely strengthens China’s hand in individual negotiations and potentially weakens Russian domestic capability in the longer run. This does not, however, lock Moscow into doing whatever Beijing wants. China has a few other “allies” in its immediate neighborhood where on paper it also has the “whip hand” – Pakistan, North Korea, and Myanmar – and in each case, Beijing struggles to get them to do what China might want. In fact, these countries have a tendency to do what they want rather than what China tells them to do, which sometimes actually appear to go against Beijing’s interests.

The West should take the Sino-Russian relationship at face value, focus less on how to pull the two apart and instead de-hyphenate them in their strategic thinking. They are not in lockstep across the board, but they are clearly in strategic alignment at a global level. Focusing on the relationship in this way will help identify where the differences mean one cares less than the other and therefore is a place where thinking of them as a union would be a distraction. It might also then offer some ideas as to where actually the differences in opinion matter on the ground, rather than seeking ones where little strategic advantage can be leveraged between Beijing and Moscow.

Counter Terrorism Meets Great Power Conflict in Africa

Posted: May 6, 2023 in RSIS
Tags: Africa, China, great power conflict, Russia, terrorism

A longer piece for my institutional home in Singapore RSIS and our quarterly journal Counter Terrorism Trends and Analyses (CTTA), this one exploring the great power conflict and terrorism nexus in Africa. The focus is mostly on Russia, but China gets a brief mention too. Am continuing to do a lot of work on the confluence of the two issues which are at the heart of the big geopolitical questions we are seeing play out at the moment.

Counter Terrorism Meets Great Power Conflict in Africa

In parts of the world, there is a growing confluence between terrorist threats and great power conflict. Nowhere has this been clearer than in Africa, where a growing Russian presence under the auspices of counter terrorism is steadily pushing out western forces in an ever-expanding space. The danger for the longer term is that as counter terrorism becomes a proxy for conflict between great powers, attention on such security threats slips under the radar, leaving space for them to grow and multiply further.

Introduction

In December 2021, the political directors of the “Small Group of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS” – an offshoot of the larger Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS which was formed in September 2014 to defeat the terrorist group – met in Belgium to discuss the state of the conflict against the Islamic State (IS).[1] Amongst other announcements to emerge from the session, an “Africa Focus Group” was formed to permit the coalition to “undertake civilian capacity-building programs to help address the ISIS threat across Africa”.[2] The Coalition’s decision to focus on Africa followed a growing pattern of threat assessments which pointed to the continent as the new heart of the IS threat. According to the Global Terrorism Index, in 2021, almost 50 per cent (around 3,461) of the deaths attributed to IS worldwide took place in sub-Saharan Africa.[3] Yet, there has since been a steady retreat by Western counter terrorism forces across Africa as alliances are tested, and a growing Russian presence in Africa pushes the terrorist threat into becoming a strand of the wider geopolitical clashes buffeting the world.

2021 proved to be a particularly challenging year for Western efforts to counter terrorism in Africa. In May, Mali suffered its second coup in a year, leading to a breakdown in relations between Paris – a key player across the Sahelian, mostly Francophone, region – and Bamako. Both France and the United States temporarily suspended aid, only to restart it later in the year. By February 2022, however, Paris concluded the relationship was entirely broken and decided to close down the longstanding Operation Barkhane, which had started in 2013 as part of an effort to counter the growing violent Islamist threat that had almost enveloped the country.

Key behind this French decision was a growing frustration in Paris at the government in Bamako’s unwillingness to fulfil its commitments to the international community,[4] as well as their growing reliance on the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner. In announcing his forces’ withdrawal, President Emmanuel Macron of France stated that Wagner was “arriving in Mali with predatory intentions”. He went on to condemn the Russian presence in Libya and Central African Republic and their alleged “awful abuses against the civilian population”.[5]

The Russian Dimension

Wagner’s presence in Africa is part of a much wider Russian push into the continent which stretches back two decades. In the mid-2000s, Moscow sought to reinvigorate its relationships around Africa as part of an attempt to return the country to the global status that it held during the Soviet era. A major early focus was South Africa, where many of the African National Congress (ANC) party leadership had strong links to Russia through training they had undergone in the country during the period of anti-apartheid struggle.[6] However, it was after the first Russian invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea in 2014 that relations with Africa accelerated, particularly in the security domain. During 2015-2019, Russia signed some 19 government-to-government military agreements in Africa, mostly focused on arms sales.[7]

Wagner, or Russian PMCs more generally, are the latest expression of this Russian push, though it is one that has (until recently) been denied by the Kremlin and its associates. According to research by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., Russian PMCs are identifiable in an African context going back to 2016. The growing relationship was brought into a clearer public focus in October 2019, when Moscow held a Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi where 43 heads of states were hosted by President Vladimir Putin at an event that was heavily focused on Russian defence cooperation and military sales with the continent.[8] Throughout this period, Wagner forces were identified as present across the region, playing roles in conflicts in Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Central African Republic and Mali. In most conflicts, the role was supportive of local authorities and focused on a counter terrorism mission.

It has not always worked, with Mozambique proving an example of where the local IS affiliate was seemingly able to push Wagner out of the country.[9] More worrying, however, has been evidence of Wagner‘s involvement in reported human rights abuses and massacres, issues that are likely to only inflame the tensions which underpin the narratives that foster extremism in the first place.[10]

Western Cooperation and Challenges

For local leaders, Russia’s willingness to provide uncritical support is attractive. This, alongside active disinformation campaigns which seek to play on local tensions with former European colonisers[11] as well as cultivate local figures to help lay the groundwork for Russia’s arrival,[12] have created a context where Russia is seen as a positive alternative to Western partners. Part of the problem for Western countries, however, is that there is often a poor track record of their own efforts in countering terrorism across the region. This can be seen through two metrics: first, the unintended consequence of working through and building up local security forces; and second, through the bitter reality that terrorist groups in the region have been able to expand considerably in the past decade. For example, rather than shrinking, IS has only grown across the continent, while two of Al-Qaeda (AQ)’s most effective remaining affiliates – Al-Shabaab in East Africa and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in North Africa – have continued to thrive.

One of the major pillars of Western counter terrorism efforts in Africa has been to develop local forces who are then able to help lead the local efforts at countering terrorist group expansion. This has, unfortunately, generated some unintended consequences. For example, Africa has seen 12 coup d’états since 2020.[13] Many (if not all) have been led by officers who had been through training programmes guided by the US (or allied) military under the aegis of counter terrorism cooperation.[14] In a particularly awkward moment, in September 2021, soldiers being trained under such a programme in Guinea left their US Green Beret trainers to participate in the overthrow of the authorities in the capital Conakry.[15] In Somalia, the special force developed by the US to counter Al-Shabaab and IS became so entangled in local politics that it had to suspend its counter terrorism activities.[16] In both cases, the core counter terrorism goals for which the forces were initially assembled were clearly impacted, even if only temporarily.

Another problem is that local forces do not always follow the rules of engagement or practise behaviour that their Western supporters would like or train them for. A recent grim Reuters investigation uncovered massive human rights abuses by Nigerian military forces in their conflict against militants in the northeast of the country.[17] Earlier reports in Kenya linked the elite Western-supported anti-terrorism force to numerous extrajudicial killings.[18] One such murder that was never resolved was the shooting of extremist cleric Mohammed Rogo, a senior figure in East African jihadist circles with close links to Al-Shabaab and AQ networks around the region. Shot in his car in September 2012, his murder led to widespread violence and radicalisation but was never formally solved.[19] His image continues to feature prominently in extremist material emanating from both IS- and AQ-linked groups across East Africa.

Growth of Extremist Groups

The most obvious expression of failure, however, has been the growth of extremist groups in Africa. During the pandemic, for example, Africa was one of the few places where terrorist threats and violence actually increased.[20] The Islamic State of Western Africa Province (ISWAP) has, in particular, shown itself to be a highly successful organisation which has displaced the AQ-aligned Boko Haram as the preeminent extremist group in the Lake Chad basin.[21] Groups operating in the Sahel linked to both IS- and AQ-backed groups in the region have increasingly expanded their presence south, reaching into countries previously untouched by such problems, like Benin and Togo.

On the opposite end of the continent, Al-Shabaab continues to be highly resilient, substantial and ambitious in the face of repeated campaigns against it.[22] Threat groups in Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have all adopted IS messaging and links highlighting the group’s ideological expansion across the continent. Some of these links appear to be supported by money flowing between them,[23] while in other cases there is clear frustration by the African affiliates that they are not able to get the attention of the core IS leadership.[24]

Evolving CT Support

All of this has taken place against a context in which Western forces have continued to seek deployments and play roles in countering terrorist groups in the continent. It is consequently not entirely surprising (notwithstanding clear disinformation campaigns and likely corrupt practices by Russian actors) to find that local authorities find Western support efforts ineffective and are willing to explore other alternatives like those offered by Russia. The answer to this so far by Western governments has been to try to call out Russian efforts, but also to withdraw and seek to support more local initiatives to undertake counter terrorism efforts in the region.

For example, following the collective withdrawal from operations in Mali by Western forces, the decision was made to support the Accra agreement, which called for regional powers using structures like the G5 grouping and ECOWAS (with African Union support) to take a leadership role in working with the Malian authorities to deal with the threats they face.[25] This partner-led effort is at the core of the current US thinking, which seeks to encourage local forces to take on the militant groups, with the US and other allies playing a supportive role in the background.

This has not, however, stopped Western forces continuing to take a proactive kinetic role where required. The recent death of IS in Somalia leader Bilal al-Sudani in a US special forces raid highlighted this, and his death is merely the latest in a long list of kinetic actions that the US in particular has taken across the continent to deal with specific menaces.[26] France has continued to undertake such missions too – for example, the killing of Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) leader Adnan Abou Walid al Sahraoui, even as French forces withdrew from Mali.[27] Such strikes demonstrate a capability by Western forces to reach in and strike individuals of concern, even as the wider operating environment becomes complicated. Whether this overwatch capability can be maintained as forces withdraw further will have to be seen.

However, it is clear that this targeted kinetic capability and local security development is unlikely to eradicate terrorism on the continent. The deep-seated issues that foster an environment in which extremist groups can grow goes far deeper. In part to answer this, there has been an increasing push to increase aid and support to Africa. Over time, billions of dollars have been spent on the continent, and this has been further boosted. The US has promised a new fund of some US$2 billion this year,[28] while the EU has offered hundreds of millions through different funds (for example, a €100 million fund to support teachers,[29] a €175 million for humanitarian aid in Central and West Africa,[30] and an additional €25.5 million in humanitarian aid in January 2023[31]), as well as a promise of a whopping €150 billion in investment over seven years at the EU-Africa Summit in February 2022.[32]

At the same time, there has been an effort to push a narrative of trying to help Africa stand up and develop by itself and not simply be an aid recipient – something reflected in US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s January 2023 10-day visit to Africa, which sought to highlight the ambition with which the United States wanted to engage with the continent.[33]

Jostle For Geopolitical Influence

The driver of this engagement, however, is not counter terrorism (even though the aid may help to deal with some of the underlying development issues which underpin radicalisation), but rather a range of issues from migration (in a European-specific context), to wider geopolitical plays against China and Russia. Both powers are perceived to be increasingly competing for influence in Africa, using a mix of hard security, investment, aid, development and wider support. This plays against the wider context of geopolitical competition between the West and China-Russia. China, in particular, has offered billions to a variety of African countries in terms of infrastructure investments and opportunities. Russia has contributed less in these terms, but has sought to offer some non-military support in the form of food or hydrocarbons.

Whilst there is little evidence of the two directly cooperating in Africa, it is clear that both China and Russia have identified counter terrorism as an issue through which they can engage with Africa to Western detriment and ultimately their own benefit. Whilst Moscow’s activities have already been highlighted, China has sought to displace the US from key counter terrorism bases in Kenya[34] as well as spoken at a United Nations (UN) level against sanctions placed on African countries dealing with terrorist threats.[35] This has translated into support for China and Russia in other UN votes, for example, on issues surrounding Xinjiang or Ukraine. Highlighting how much geopolitics has started to become entangled with local issues, the South African Development Community (SADC), made up of 16 nations, actively condemned US legislation that sought to counter Russian malign influence in Africa.[36] Counter terrorism, it appears, has become a tool of great power conflict in Africa.

Outlook

The specific impact on Western counter terrorism efforts continues. The current focus of attention is Burkina Faso, which, following a coup last year, has appeared to follow the path already taken by neighbouring Mali and turned on France as a counter terrorism partner. This led to a decision by Paris to close down its counter terrorism operation there as well.[37] Again, similar to developments in Mali,[38] this was preceded by an active Russian disinformation campaign as well as consistent rumours of Wagner deployment.[39] It is not clear that this is going to happen, but there has been a noticeable volume of statements from the government in Ouagadougou that the relationship with Moscow has been strengthening. Should Wagner, the private military firm, be deployed, it will be widely interpreted as further evidence of Western loss and Russian gain, with little focus actually paid to the terrorist threat which underpins the security attention in the first place.

This is likely to be the most damaging effect of the growing focus on African terrorism through the lens of great power politics. The attention on the actual threat will likely fall to the wayside as powers compete for influence or seek to keep each other out. This could create a space in which groups can develop further or, as has been seen in the context of some Russian deployments, problems actually get worse. And while thus far, most Africa groups appear quite regionally focused, the danger is that over time, a capability and space could develop into which more dangerous outward-facing groups could establish themselves.

About the Author

Raffaello Pantucci is a Senior Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at israffaello@ntu.edu.sg

Thumbnail photo by Pawel Janiak on Unsplash

Citations

[1] “Political Directors Small Group Meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS,” Media Note, US Department of State, December 3, 2021 https://www.state.gov/political-directors-small-group-meeting-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-daesh-isis/.

[2] Ibid.

[3] “Global Terrorism Index 2022,” Institute for Economics and Peace, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022.

[4] “Joint Declaration on the Fight Against the Terrorist Threat and the Support to Peace and Security in the Sahel and West Africa,” Elysée, February 17, 2022, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/02/17/joint-declaration-on-the-fight-against-the-terrorist-threat.

[5] “Macron Warns of ‘Predatory’ Russian Mercenaries in Mali,” France24, February 17, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220217-macron-warns-of-predatory-russian-mercenaries-in-mali.

[6] Paul Stronski, “Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_Paul_Stronski_-_Russia-Africa-v31.pdf.

[7] Federica Saini Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, Commercial Concessions, Rights Violations, and Counterinsurgency Failure,” Brookings Institution, February 8, 2022,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/.

[8] Henry Foy, “Russia Turns on the Charm at First Africa Summit,” The Financial Times, October 24, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/b042bd8e-f648-11e9-9ef3-eca8fc8f2d65.

[9] “Moscow Remains Involved in Cabo Delgado Despite Wagner’s Exit,” Africa Intelligence, February 2, 2021, https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2021/12/02/moscow-remains-involved-in-cabo-delgado-despite-wagner-s-exit,109708624-gra.

[10] “Wagner Group Operations in Africa,” ACLED, August 30, 2022, https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/.

[11] Grigor Atanesian, “Russia in Africa: How Disinformation Operations Target the Continent,” BBC, February 1, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64451376.

[12] Benjamin Roger and Mathieu Olivier, “Wagner in Mali: An Exclusive Investigation Into Putin’s Mercenaries,” The Africa Report, February 18, 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/178331/wagner-in-mali-an-exclusive-investigation-into-putins-mercenaries/.

[13] Peter Mwai, “Are Military Takeovers On the Rise in Africa?” BBC, January 4, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600.

[14] Michael M. Phillips, “In Africa, US Trained Militaries Are Ousting Civilian Governments in Coups,” The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-africa-u-s-trained-militaries-are-ousting-civilian-governments-in-coups-11649505601.

[15] Delan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, “US Forces Were Training the Guinean Soldiers Who Took Off to Stage a Coup,” The New York Times, September 10, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/africa/guinea-coup-americans.html.

[16] Michael M. Phillips, “Caught in a Political Crossfire, US Trained Somali Commandos Suspend Fight Against Islamic State,” The Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/caught-in-a-political-crossfire-u-s-trained-somali-commandos-suspend-fight-against-islamic-state-11639145293.

[17] “Nightmare in Nigeria,” Reuters, December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/section/nigeria-military/.

[18] “We’re Tired of Taking You to the Court: Human Rights Abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit,” Open Society Justice Initiative, November 20, 2013, https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/were-tired-taking-you-court-human-rights-abuses-kenyas-anti-terrorism-police-unit.

[19] Joseph Akwiri, “Kenyan Cleric Shot Dead, Sparks Riots in Mombasa,” Reuters, August 27, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-riots-idUSBRE87Q0UP20120827.

[20] “Political Violence: January 1 – December 31, 2020,” Review, Chicago Project on Security & Threats, March 2021.

[21] Maman Inoua Elhadji Mahamadou Amadou and Vincent Foucher, “Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin: The Bakura Faction and its Resistance to the Rationalisation of Jihad,” SWP Policy Brief, December 2022, https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA_PB_Foucher_ElHadji_Bakura_EN.pdf

[22] There is, however, some hope seen by analysts in the current anti-Shabaab push by the authorities. Stig Jarle Hansen, “Can Somalia’s New Offensive Defeat Al-Shabaab?” CTC Sentinel Vol. 16, No.1 (2023), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/can-somalias-new-offensive-defeat-al-shabaab/.

[23] “IS in Somalia ‘Letter’ Discusses Sending Funds to Other Branches,” BBC, January 27, 2023, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c2041zu6.

[24] A letter emerged in 2022 which seemed to suggest that the ISWAP head had been sending communications to ISIS core as early as 2017 and receiving no reply.

[25] “Joint Declaration on the Fight Against the Terrorist Threat and the Support to Peace and Security in the Sahel and West Africa,” Elysée, February 17, 2022, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/02/17/joint-declaration-on-the-fight-against-the-terrorist-threat.

[26] Cecilia Macaulay, “Bilal al-Sudani: US Forces Kill Islamic State Somalia Leader in Cave Complex,” BBC, January 27, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64423598.

[27] “French Troops Kill Leader of Islamic State Group in Sahel, Macron Says,” France24, September 16, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210915-french-troops-neutralise-leader-of-islamic-state-in-the-greater-sahara-macron-says.

[28] “United States to Provide $2 Billion in Humanitarian Assistance for the People of Africa,” USAID Office of Press Relations, December 15, 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/dec-15-2022-united-states-provide-2-billion-humanitarian-assistance-people-africa.

[29] “Quality Education in Africa: EU Launches €100 million Regional Teachers’ Initiative,” EU Commission Press Release, January 26, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_288.

[30] “EU Announces €175 Million in Humanitarian Aid for West and Central Africa,” EU Commission Press Release, January 27, 2022, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-announces-eu175-million-eu-humanitarian-aid-west-and-central-africa-2022-01-27_en.

[31] “Humanitarian Aid: EU Allocates Additional €25.5 Million in African Countries,” EU Commission Press Release, January 12, 2023, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/humanitarian-aid-eu-allocates-additional-eu255-million-african-countries-2023-01-12_en.

[32] Kingsley Ighobor, “EU-AU Summit 2022: The EU Wants to Be Africa’s Friend in Need – And Indeed,” UN Africa Renewal, March 21, 2022, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/eu-au-summit-2022-eu-wants-be-africa%E2%80%99s-friend-need%E2%80%94and-indeed.

[33] Edward A. Burrier, “Four Takeaways from Treasury Secretary Yellen’s Trip to Africa,” United States Institute for Peace, February 1, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/02/four-takeaways-treasury-secretary-yellens-trip-africa.

[34] Michael M. Phillips, “Fears of Losing Out to China Put US Under Pressure Over Kenya Base,” The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/fears-of-losing-out-to-china-put-u-s-under-pressure-over-kenya-base-11675313752.

[35] “Remarks by Ambassador Zhang Jun, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, At the Security Council High-Level Debate on ‘Counter Terrorism in Africa’,” Chinese Mission to the United Nations, November 10, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202211/t20221112_10973113.html.

[36] “SADC Protests New US Law on Africa-Russia Relations,” The Citizen, August 19, 2022, https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/sadc-protests-new-us-law-on-africa-russia-relations-3919698.

[37] Cecilia Macaulay and Joseph Winter, “Burkina Faso Unrest: France Agrees to Pull Its Troops Out,” BBC, January 26, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64397730.

[38] Benjamin Roger and Mathieu Olivier, “Wagner in Mali: An Exclusive Investigation Into Putin’s Mercenaries,” Africa Report, February 18, 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/178331/wagner-in-mali-an-exclusive-investigation-into-putins-mercenaries/.

[39] Sam Mednick, “Russian Role in Burkina Faso Crisis Comes Under Scrutiny,” Associated Press, October 18, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-africa-france-west-a6384d7134e8688c367a68721f657857.

China’s embrace of Russia is mostly for show

Posted: February 28, 2023 in Nikkei Asia Review
Tags: China, China-Russia, Russia

A new column for Nikkei Asia Review looking at the China-Russia relationship. Was initially drafted ahead of Wang Yi’s visit, but then pivoted a bit to reflect it, though nothing during the visit particularly surprised. Doubtless this will be a major talking point this year.

China’s embrace of Russia is mostly for show

Rhetoric about close ties is not translating into cooperation on tangible goals

*Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meet via video link on Dec. 30, 2022: The problem for Russia is that its dependence on China keeps getting deeper. © Xinhua/AP*

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and author of “Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire.”

This week’s visit to Moscow by Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, just ahead of the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlights the closeness of the two powers.

But grand rhetoric about the strength the relationship and revived U.S. assertions that Beijing is considering upgrading the quality of its military support to Moscow are overshadowing the day-to-day reality that China and Russia are on very different tracks.

Beijing has been coy about the invitation extended by Russian President Vladimir Putin in a year-end call with Xi Jinping for the Chinese leader to pay a visit this spring, although it was reiterated by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late January.

While Beijing may not want to appear to commit yet as to when Xi will visit Moscow, he and Putin are due to meet midyear at a Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders’ summit to be held in India and again in Durban, South Africa, at a BRICS summit in August.

In the meantime, China has continued to make it clear that its relationship with Russia is important. Visiting Moscow earlier this month, Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu said, “China is willing to work with Russia to implement the important consensus reached by the two heads of state and to promote new progress in bilateral relations in the new year.”

Doubtlessly, throughout the year we will continue to hear affirmations of the two nations’ friendship. This is likely to continue to be reflected in military exercises, which are increasingly held with other nations as well.

Chinese and Russian vessels are now engaged with South African counterparts in a large-scale, 10-day naval exercise off KwaZulu-Natal province that began on Friday.

Moscow and Beijing are happy to mutually antagonize others with these activities. Last December, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno expressed “severe concerns” over frequent joint air force activities by Russia and China near Japanese airspace. The two have undertaken similar exercises regularly around South Korean airspace and conducted joint exercises with Iranian forces.

Yet if one digs deeper, there is little evidence of significant cooperation that might advance more tangible goals, despite U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s claims about Chinese support for Russia’s war effort.

For example, the growing volume of Russian troops and mercenaries in Africa seems to be doing little to help protect the many Chinese businessmen who keep getting kidnapped by militant groups. In Tajikistan, both Moscow and Beijing have military posts near the Afghan frontier but they do not work together and the Russians reportedly have complained that the Chinese there do not even communicate with them.

At the same time, Russian counterintelligence continues to detain senior scientists for alleged selling sensitive technology to China. Last June, for example, physicist Dmitry Kolker was detained on charges of suspected treason involving collaboration with China.

A similar pattern can be found at an economic level.

Both sides champion the fact that bilateral trade rose 29.3% last year to reach $190 billion. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in January that Moscow is looking forward this year to finding ways of harmonizing China’s Belt and Road Initiative with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Russian central bankers are proud too of their shift away from Western currencies to the yuan.

Yet the reality is that much of the growth in trade volumes in 2022 came in crude oil and coal sales where China took advantage of discounted supplies from Russia, which has been faced with a shrinking pool of customers.

Chinese companies continue to express concern about how they can keep up purchases of Russian energy and to seek new ways to protect themselves from sanctions while also worrying about insurance coverage. And while there is growing evidence that Chinese companies are still selling high technology products like microchips to Moscow, the companies doing this are often either hiding their tracks or have publicly withdrawn from the Russia.

Lenovo and Xiaomi, which both were major players in the Russian tech market before the war, quietly scaled back operations dramatically last year. Huawei Technologies moved many staff to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan while closing some units. And Russian consumers seeking to use UnionPay cards to replace the Visa, American Express or Mastercard credit cards that no longer work increasingly find the Chinese cards do not function either.

*Russian consumers seeking to use UnionPay credit cards to replace Visa or Mastercard increasingly find the Chinese cards do not function either. © Imaginechina/AP*

Of course, this does not mean that Chinese products are disappearing from Russia. In reality, Chinese products are increasingly present but often arrive indirectly which can raise costs for consumers. The trade in non-sanctioned goods is likely to increase with the opening of two new bridges across the Amur River.

The problem for Russia is that its dependence on China keeps getting deeper. For now, China may be providing a lifeline, but there is high risk to this position as well.

In trading the dollar for the yuan, the Russian central bank is binding itself to a currency which is tightly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and is answerable to its needs. Opening Russia’s markets to greater Chinese penetration is only going to emasculate the domestic economy and make it harder for local competitors to survive.

For all the lofty rhetoric, there continues to be a disparity in the China-Russia relationship. Despite frequent demonstrations of affection, there are distinct limits to this partnership.

2023 outlook: Central Asia is not out of the woods yet

Posted: January 23, 2023 in Nikkei Asia Review
Tags: Afghanistan, Central Asia, China, Russia, Ukraine

A final column for last year, this time a forward look at Central Asia in 2023 for Nikkei Asia Review, repeats the same format last year. The last one became somewhat obsolete quickly in large part because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It remains to be seen how this one will play out.

2023 outlook: Central Asia is not out of the woods yet

Spillover effects from Ukraine and Afghanistan, so far limited, still pose risk

*Vladimir Putin met with other presidents at the Central Asia-Russia summit in Astana on Oct. 14: Central Asia will continue to find Moscow a complicated partner. © Reuters*

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and author of “Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire.”

It has been a tumultuous year for Central Asia. It started with large-scale internal violence and is ending with talk of a formal alliance between the region’s two most powerful players, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Yet uncertainty remains on the horizon for the coming year, with the potential for violence to boil over, geopolitics to come crashing down around regional states or internal pressures to escalate once again.

The biggest question that still hangs in the balance is what will happen next in fellow former Soviet republic Ukraine. With little sign of an end to its conflict with Russia in sight, Central Asia will continue to find Moscow a complicated partner with which to engage over the coming year.

So far, gloomy economic predictions offered in the immediate wake of Russia’s invasion have not played out.

Higher energy prices have meant increased revenues for energy-rich Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Rather than falling as expected, remittances from Central Asian migrant workers in Russia have risen, thanks to a surge in demand for labor, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Meanwhile, Russian and Belarusian companies seeking to get around Western sanctions have set up operations in the region, as have some Western companies exiting Russia.

These trends helped prompt the EBRD to raise its 2022 gross domestic product growth forecast for the region to 4.3% in September from just 1.1% in May. It also adjusted its 2023 outlook to 4.9% from 4.7%.

It remains to be seen whether these trends can hold.

Europe’s desire to get access to Central Asian energy was on clear display during European Council President Charles Michel’s visit to the region in October. But the same fundamental problems that have long held up trans-Caspian energy routes persist and are unlikely to be resolved in the near future.

Other world leaders are courting the region, too, with Chinese President Xi Jinping choosing Central Asia for his post-COVID return to the international stage, a stream of U.S. officials coming through and Russian President Vladimir Putin taking advantage of some of the few doors around still open to him.

Xi Jinping and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana on Sept. 14: The Chinese president chose Central Asia for his post-COVID return to the international stage. (Handout photo from press service of the president of Kazakhstan) © Reuters

But despite the surge of attention and economic resilience so far, the Ukraine conflict could still carry major downsides for Central Asia.

The Russian economy could still implode, or the geopolitical balance that Central Asia has managed to strike could suddenly shift.

There has also been little international condemnation or fallout from the instability seen earlier this year in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the continuing crackdown in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan region or violent border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The general attitude taken by outside powers, including the usually accusatory Western ones, is to simply move past these issues, hoping the governments will be able to handle them.

But the raft of incidents this year exposed a dangerous risk. The large-scale violence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was a shock to most observers. While things appear to have settled down, the unrest underscored that there are potential issues bubbling under the surface, even in the region’s traditionally more stable countries, which could lead to widespread problems.

What other surprises lie beneath the surface is of course unknown. Few, for example, would confidently speculate about what exactly is going on in Turkmenistan.

A more clear and present danger can be found across the border in Afghanistan, where the Taliban continue to exert a weak grip on power. The Islamist regime may face no direct and obvious challenger, but it is clearly unable to enforce its mandate very far.

This has particular repercussions for Central Asia, due to the continuing threat of Islamic State Khorasan as it broadcasts threats in regional languages and seeks recruits from its outposts in Afghanistan.

Led mostly by Uzbekistan, Central Asia has sought to answer Afghanistan’s problems with a push for connectivity with South Asia, but the cost of realizing this dream is prohibitively high for the countries involved to absorb themselves. International finance could help, but Taliban rule continues to pose a threat to project completion.

So far, much external engagement with the region has focused on security support for mitigating potential problems from Afghanistan, rather than large-scale transformative investment.

China remains an important partner, and the end of zero COVID might bring new economic exchanges, but it is unlikely that Beijing will be willing to expend much to realize Central-South Asian connectivity dreams.

Meanwhile, although Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have started to make a show of strengthening their promising partnership, Putin’s proposal to join with the two Central Asian states in a “natural gas union” has not been flatly rejected.

There is a long history of grand Central Asian visions that have not managed to catch on, so it remains to be seen how these trends will play out.

The fallout from Ukraine has so far not been as bad as initially expected. And while Afghanistan remains a problem, the spillover has been limited so far.

Yet the downside risk in both cases for Central Asia remains high. The new year looks to be a challenging one.

Why Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s hopes of using China as hedge against Russia could be doomed

Posted: January 20, 2023 in South China Morning Post
Tags: Central Asia, China, China-Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Russia-Central Asia, Uzbekistan

More from late last year, this time trying to dig into the narrative that emerged of Kazakhstan in particular seeking to use China as a counter-weight to Moscow for the South China Morning Post.

Why Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s hopes of using China as a hedge against Russia could be doomed

Central Asia’s increasingly tense relations with Russia have made closer ties with China attractive, but achieving that is not without its problems.

Far from Beijing proving a hedge against Moscow, the opportunities on offer in Russia might simply increase the competition for China’s attention.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) walks alongside Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Uzbekistan on September 16. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have welcomed China’s interest in Central Asia, but that interest has been complicated by the pandemic and geopolitical concerns. Photo: EPA-EFE

Uzbekistan has in many ways always been the heart of Central Asia. It might be dwarfed in hydrocarbon wealth and physical size by Kazakhstan, but its other attributes give it influence. Yet, China does not have the same sort of commanding position within the country as it has with Kazakhstan.

There are numerous reasons for this, from local hesitance to problems in China, but collectively they illustrate the trouble Central Asia faces as it seeks to use Beijing as a hedge against Moscow, with whom relations have grown increasingly testy.

The difference in how Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan see their relationships with the two capitals was most clearly seen in the past few weeks. They both abstained from a vote against Russia on Ukraine at the United Nations, while they voted against a UN resolution seeking a debate on Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang.

Both have been appalled by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While some individuals within the countries might hold some moral objections towards what China is doing in Xinjiang, they largely see this as a domestic issue within China.

There is no doubt some element of hard geopolitics has also played into their thinking. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have expressed reservations about Russia’s actions in Ukraine publicly before and are concerned about the clear evidence of Russian weakening.

They seek new partners to help stabilise their increasingly tormented neighbourhood. Their embrace of President Xi Jinping’s visit to the region in September underlines their eager eagerness for more Chinese investment.

But at the same time, both are aware of the complications of increasing their dependence on China. This came into view during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Uzbek traders report that during the height of the pandemic, the costs of containers going through China to Uzbekistan rose by at least five times. While they have since gone down, they remain more expensive than they were pre-pandemic. The growth of traffic through the region to Russia helps keep them high alongside complications on the Chinese side.

At the same time, routes into China have only recently reopened, even though opening them was a focus of regular lobbying during the pandemic as landlocked Central Asians sought to get goods out and in.

The problems went beyond goods at borders. According to Uzbek data, the pandemic led to an abrupt drop in the number of new companies being created in Uzbekistan with Chinese investment. The numbers have started to rise again but are far below pre-pandemic levels.

China has retained its trade primacy in Uzbekistan, though the numbers are lower than before the pandemic and dipped substantially in 2020. All of this comes on top of Chinese companies in Uzbekistan being seen as behaving in ways that will keep local authorities happy but do not always actually deliver.

For example, media reports and experts on the ground suggest there has been a steady growth in recent years of Chinese companies opening factories in Uzbekistan. This is something the authorities welcome, eager to turn the country into a manufacturing hub. Yet at the same time, it is not clear how much these factories are actually manufacturing rather than serving as assembly plants.

The reasons for this from a Chinese perspective are logical – it is often not clear the local market will be able to absorb the volume more active plants could produce. However, the consequences are a smaller level of local capacity building.

It also means it can often be quicker and cheaper to simply import the desired piece of machinery directly from China rather than purchase it from the local manufacturing plant. The factory is going to have to wait for the parts from China and then take time to assemble the product in Uzbekistan. Once you factor order book backlogs on top of this, it can become quite a long wait. These problems are not exclusive to Uzbekistan. Import-export firms across the region have noted the trade problems with China during the pandemic, and the unpredictability these have injected into an economic relationship both sides assumed would simply continue to boom.

This reality lurks in the shadows of the push to warmly embrace Xi. Both Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made it clear they welcomed and sought a closer relationship with China. Kazakh officials behind the scenes were ecstatic about Xi’s comments about being willing to defend their national sovereignty, interpreting it as a protective clause should Moscow’s revanchist eye fall on their territory.

Yet the reality is that China is unlikely to play that role or do much to prioritise trade with the region. This reticence will emerge elsewhere as well, leading to frustration on the ground.

This might eventually turn in an even more complicated direction as Beijing leverages the surge of hydrocarbons and other opportunities that will present themselves as Moscow seeks new markets, against the same purchases and opportunities they see in Central Asia. Far from Beijing proving a hedge against Moscow, Russia might in the end simply increase the competition for China’s attention.

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London and a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore

China won’t be filling the void left by the US in Afghanistan any time soon

Posted: December 19, 2022 in South China Morning Post
Tags: Afghanistan, China, China and the world, China-Afghanistan, iran, ISKP, Russia, Russia-Afghanistan, Taliban

A new piece for the South China Morning Post this time exploring the fact that all of the prognostications of China, Russia and other adversary powers sweeping into Afghanistan have not come to pass. In fact, they all appear to have more complicated relations with the Taliban than the US does at this point. There is more to say on this topic, so look out for a refresh soon.

China won’t be filling the void left by the US in Afghanistan any time soon

Rather than being quick to gain an edge in Afghanistan following the US withdrawal, China, along with Russia and Iran, remains uneasy about security threats coming from the country

Meanwhile, the Taliban government is frustrated at the lack of economic support being provided by its neighbours

A Taliban fighter stands guard at Wazir Akbar Khan hilltop in Kabul on August 30, the one-year anniversary of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. A year and a half on from its withdrawal, the US has managed to establish a regional foothold which enables it to at least deal with some of its security concerns. Photo: AFP

There was a lazy narrative that emerged in the wake of the Taliban takeover of Kabul that this would be a major victory for China. The operating assumption was that Beijing would swoop in and fill the geopolitical void left by the Western withdrawal.

Underpinning this was a general sense of Western decay which “adversary” powers – China, Russia, Iran – would be able to take advantage of. Yet as we have seen ahead of this month’s meetings known as the Moscow format talks, these powers are having as many, if not more, problems with the Taliban government as the West.

The Moscow format is a Russia-initiated group that was established in 2017 to bring together Afghanistan’s neighbours. It includes Russia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The last meeting of the group was held in October 2021 and included representatives from the Taliban, who walked away from the session feeling that there was a “positive atmosphere”. The format also agreed to treat the Taliban as the de facto authorities in Afghanistan (acknowledging without acknowledgement) and sought to put pressure on the United States to lift all sanctions against the regime.

It is consequently quite a turnaround for Russian coordinator Zamir Kabulov to announce that “the Taliban delegation will not take part [in the meeting], it is only for members of the Moscow format”. The format in his view was to focus on fostering closer cooperation among Afghanistan’s neighbours, while encouraging the Taliban to act on women’s rights and deal with terrorist threats.

Kabulov did not offer any explanation for not inviting the Taliban to the talks. It is not hard, however, to guess why.

The decision is likely linked to a growing frustration among Afghanistan’s neighbours at the Taliban’s seeming inability to deal with the security threats they are all worried about. The ISKP, an affiliate of the Islamic State militant group, has lashed out in its neighbourhood with little evidence of an effective Taliban response.

Iranian authorities have pinned the recent terrorist attack that killed 15 at a shrine in Shiraz on ISKP, while the group also claimed responsibility for the attack on the Russian embassy in Kabul in September that killed two Russian officials, among others. Rocket attacks on Central Asia that came from Afghanistan have also been claimed by the group.

China has so far been spared any direct assault, but the ISKP’s publications are full of anti-Chinese narratives. And Beijing continues to be frustrated by the Taliban’s failure to crack down on armed Uygur groups that are living in the country.

The irritation goes both ways. The Taliban have also found themselves frustrated by the level of commitment from some of Afghanistan’s neighbours. While Central Asian countries have sought a tight economic embrace to help stabilise the country, China has delivered very little.

Beijing has sent some aid, but much of the economic activity seen in Afghanistan has been driven by private enterprise. The large Chinese state-owned enterprises with interests in Afghanistan have held numerous meetings, but actual progress has been slow.

Russia has sent delegations of officials to Kabul and hosted Taliban interim Minister of Industry and Commerce Nooruddin Azizi. They have signed agreements about food, oil and aid, but investment has not been forthcoming.

This stands in contrast to the success of the United States in dealing with its direct security concerns – as exemplified by the drone strike that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The US has also provided at least US$327 million in aid, and has opened direct lines of communication with the Taliban through meetings in Kabul and Doha attended by the CIA chief and his deputy, respectively.

The US has also leaned heavily into its security cooperation with Afghanistan’s Central Asian and South Asian neighbours. At the same time, Washington has not compromised on handing over money it had frozen in the wake of the Taliban takeover, instead creating a special fund in Switzerland which will manage the money to pay for key national requirements like electricity.

This has not been seen as positive by the Taliban, who remain furious at Washington for “usurping” their money. And yet, the approach has borne some fruit for the US. The release in September of US prisoner Mark Frerichs in exchange for a Taliban warlord and drug dealer in American detention reflects an ability to strike an agreement with the Taliban that pleases both sides. And it is likely other agreements have been reached behind the scenes too.

It is not impossible that both China and Russia have sought similar arrangements, but the public optics are noticeably different. Russia failing to invite the Taliban to the Moscow format follows growing irritation in Kabul around the lack of Chinese investment, and growing concern in Iran about terrorist attacks on its territory.

A year and a half on from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, we have come full circle. The much vaunted vacuum has not been filled by regional “adversary” powers, while the United States has managed to establish a regional foothold which enables it to at least deal with some of its security concerns.

So much for the narratives of China filling the void.

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London and a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore

Russian proxies seize the advantage in Africa’s Islamist insurgencies

Posted: December 13, 2022 in Financial Times
Tags: Africa, Africa terrorism, counter-terrorism, great power conflict, Russia, Sahel terrorism, terrorism, Wagner

My latest column for the Financial Times on Russia’s purported ‘counter-terrorism’ activity in Africa. Not so much CT as counter-influence operations really, none of which bodes well for the underlying problems.

Russian proxies seize the advantage in Africa’s Islamist insurgencies

As western counter-terrorism efforts flounder, Kremlin-backed militias are offering support in Mali and Burkina Faso

Supporters of Ibrahim Traoré after the coup in Burkina Faso. Russian flags were on display when the leader took over the capital Ouagadougou © Issouf Sanago/AFP/Getty Images

When Russia was widely condemned for its illegal referendums in the Donbas at a vote of the UN General Assembly last month, it was notable that a clutch of African countries chose to abstain or stay away. Many of these had benefited from Russian counter-terrorism support; Burkina Faso – still reeling from a coup sparked by the government’s failure to stem an ongoing Islamist insurgency – might be about to ask for it. As al-Qaeda affiliates and Isis representatives converge in the Sahel region and across the continent, Moscow is increasingly bending terrorism to its advantage in the pursuit of political influence.

The terrorist threat picture across Africa has always been a messy one. Most groups are active locally, and the aspiration or capability to launch attacks beyond the continent’s borders tends to be confined to Isis networks in Libya or Egypt and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Terrorist groups across the region target foreigners, with mixed motives: attacking the Westgate Mall or DusitD2 Complex in Kenya, or the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria attracts attention; kidnapping can often be as much about profit as terror.

The situation is even more complex when groups without clear affiliations declare Isis as their inspiration. Almost half the deaths attributed to Isis worldwide in 2021 took place in sub-Saharan Africa. But it can be hard to distinguish between Islamist violence and longstanding regional conflicts. The jihadifuelled insurgency in Mozambique’s northern province of Cabo Delgado appears to have some international links but draws on a long history of local disenfranchisement.

Counter-terrorism support from the west has a chequered history. Former regional colonial powers like the UK and France have played a significant role in countries such as Mali, while the US has funded or trained special forces to varyincreased, degrees across the Sahel to help combat threats. Non-military aid in the region has been targeted at the underlying causes of instability.

Yet none of this has done much to suppress the overall threat and may even have been counter-productive. In September 2021, Guinean forces left their training with the US Green Berets to join the military takeover of Conakry. The 2020 coup in Mali, which led to the eventual breakdown in relations between Paris and Bamako, was led by forces built up by the French army over the previous seven years under Opération Barkhane. This project – established by the French after the near takeover of Mali by Islamist militants in 2013 – was undermined by loosely defined goals. As tensions with Bamako the Élysée finally announced in February a withdrawal of troops.

The result has been a turn by Malian authorities towards mercenaries such as the Wagner Group, which has close links to the Russian GRU intelligence agency. This is not unique to Mali: Wagner forces have also appeared in Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Mozambique. In Bamako, members of this Russian proxy militia are celebrated in the streets. In exchange for their services, Wagner appears to be receiving access to minerals while Moscow wins strategic allies, as evident in UN voting patterns.

But the signature of Wagner deployments tends to be a focus on subduing civilian populations and harshly suppressing insurgencies. While the western approach may have not been as effective as intended, it at least avoids the indiscriminate brutality exercised by Russian-backed forces.

In Burkina Faso, the latest coup leader Ibrahim Traoré seems to be playing both sides: he reportedly told US diplomats that he did not intend to call on Wagner forces, but some of his local suping porters have called for a new strategic partnership with Moscow, and Russian flags were prominently on display as he took over the capital Ouagadougou. Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin also posted his support for the takeover on Telegram, saying soldiers had done what was necessary.

Given the failure of many western counter-terrorism efforts, it is hard to see how this battle for influence can be resolved. Moscow is acting both to frustrate the west and benefit itself. It is imperative that the US, UK, France and their allies find ways to continue engaging with Sahelian countries and working to alleviate the disenfranchisement that is often a touchpaper for insurgency.

Security engagement around specific terrorist groups must continue, with better safeguards to prevent it backfiring. And crucially, these efforts must be disentangled from the wider geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the west. Otherwise, the Sahel will remain a region ripe for manipulation.

The writer is senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies

China’s growing clout in Central Asia

Posted: October 10, 2022 in Straits Times
Tags: Central Asia, China, China-Central Asia, Russia

Another piece written around President Xi’s visit to Central Asia, this time for the Straits Times exploring the growing clout that China has within the region. Draws on ideas in the book of course, but also on the fact that travel is now possible once again so am able to get to the region a bit again.

China’s growing clout in Central Asia

A vacuum is developing as Russia’s war in Ukraine dismantles Moscow’s credibility and strength across the Eurasian heartland.

*A broadcast of the meeting between Mr Xi Jinping and Mr Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Uzbekistan. PHOTO: REUTERS*

President Xi Jinping’s decision to pick Central Asia for his first foreign trip since the Covid-19 pandemic began reflects Beijing’s confidence that it is now the ascendant power in the Eurasian heartland. This was clearly evident from both Mr Xi’s tour of the region and the much-watched meeting between the Chinese leader and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on the fringes of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, last week.

The optics around Mr Xi’s visit underlined China’s rising star in the region. First, the grandiloquence was apparent in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two countries he chose to visit.

The Kazakhs were clearly very pleased that theirs was the first country Mr Xi decided to visit. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was at the airport to personally welcome the Chinese leader in fluent Mandarin and nothing was spared in the way of pomp and ceremony for the state visit, including the awarding of the Order of Altyn Kyran (Order of the Golden Eagle) to Mr Xi. The two leaders also toured a recently opened exhibit of archaeological artefacts that was displayed under the title “Kazakhstan-China: Dialogue of the Millennia”.

Not to be outdone, the authorities in Uzbekistan also put on a grandiose welcome for Mr Xi, with large groups of dancing people at the airport. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev could not match his Kazakh counterpart’s Mandarin skills, but he also awarded Mr Xi the country’s “highest friendship award”, the Order of Friendship.

The contrast could not have been more striking during Mr Mirziyoyev’s meeting with Mr Putin. Rather than the Uzbeks offering their visitor an award, it was the Russian leader who dished out a medal to his Uzbek counterpart. He awarded Mr Mirziyoyev the Order of Alexander Nevsky, which is given to foreign leaders “for major contributions to promoting friendly ties with Russia”.

The strains were also palpable during the bilateral meeting between the Chinese and Russian leaders, with Mr Putin openly acknowledging that China had expressed concerns and questions about the war in Ukraine. Mr Putin made similar comments during his separate bilateral meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who was also in town for the SCO summit. Mr Putin’s comments separately to both leaders only served to emphasise the sense that neither China nor India was in fact very pleased with the Russian leader’s aggression in Ukraine.

But the differences should not be overplayed. In Beijing’s case, at least, the reality is that it has little desire to put Russia down or see Moscow lose in a conflict against the West. The net result of that would be to weaken Beijing’s support base in its larger geopolitical confrontation with the West, and would also provide more space for the West to focus more on China. The conflict in Ukraine provides a useful distraction at the moment.

China is certainly not happy with the global disruptions and costs generated by the conflict, but at the same time, it has little choice but to support Moscow as an important geopolitical partner in confronting the United States-led West.

Wider context

The wider context of the summit in the Uzbek capital was more interesting. Established in 2001 with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and China, the SCO has grown, in large part due to Chinese efforts, to become a multilateral organisation bringing together the leaders of around 40 per cent of the world’s population. It now includes India, Pakistan and Iran, with countries like Belarus and Turkey knocking at the door. An organisation often overlooked in the West (or in much strategic discourse), it is in fact emblematic of the growing influence that China has across a growing swathe of the central and eastern Eurasian heartland.

Mr Xi’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative came from a desire to carve routes across this region, rewiring infrastructure and trading routes that used to lead to Moscow to instead be diverted to China. While the Kremlin was initially dismissive of China’s inroads into the region, Moscow now finds itself trying to co-opt or counteract Beijing by touting to the others what it can offer that China cannot.

Russia, though, is increasingly on the back foot among its neighbours, largely because of Ukraine. In the past couple of weeks, violence has erupted once again between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus. A long-running border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has also escalated again, leading to dozens of deaths as security forces on both sides shell and shoot at each other. This is occurring as trouble on the other side of Tajikistan, in the Badakhshan region, continues, and there has also been recent large-scale public unrest in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Yet, Russia has been able to offer security support only in Kazakhstan, and even then in a limited way.

It is worth noting that China has not stepped into any of these issues. Beijing has little appetite to get stuck in such messy conflicts, recognising that it will struggle to try to resolve them, and will most likely only make enemies in the process. China would rather wait it out and let history take its course. But it will be increasingly difficult to adopt this passive stance as it becomes the biggest economic power across the region.

Few in the region will deny Russia’s importance, but many have become wary of Moscow in the aftermath of Mr Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. There has been notable diplomatic pushback across Central Asia, and a growing sense of a need to develop other options, including building up ties with China.

A vacuum is developing – one which, logically, China can fill. Russia’s war in Ukraine is dismantling Moscow’s credibility and strength across the Eurasian heartland, and China is currently the most obvious beneficiary.

But Beijing has not chosen to do much with its growing clout.

Going forward, evading that responsibility might no longer be possible.

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, and the author of Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire (Oxford University Press, April 2022)

China and Russia to showcase alternative world order at SCO Summit

Posted: October 3, 2022 in Nikkei Asia Review
Tags: Afghanistan, Central Asia, China, Russia, SCO

Almost caught up on re-publishing my writing here after a long period of delay, this time a piece for Nikkei Asian Review on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit pointing to the optics of the session as one of the key attractions to some of the members.

China and Russia to showcase alternative world order at SCO Summit

Samarkand gathering demonstrates sanctioned states still have allies of substance

*Xi Jinping is set to attend as he makes his first international trip since the beginning of the COVID pandemic. © AP*

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and author of “Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire.” (Oxford University Press)

As the West advances a world order constructed around institutional structures developed after World War II, those leading the charge against the West are embracing their own institutions to demonstrate their options.

This week, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will hold its annual heads of state summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, bringing together Russia, China, Iran and a host of other nations. The narrative these countries want to advance is that there is another order out there beyond the Western-imposed one, as thin as it often seems on closer inspection.

This year’s summit is attracting more interest than previously as Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to attend as he makes his first international trip since the beginning of the COVID pandemic. The fact that he has chosen Central Asia and an SCO heads of state summit to do this, even before confirmation of his third term as Communist Party leader at the party’s congress next month, is a reflection of the importance of the SCO to Beijing.

The exact agenda of the summit is still being set, but it is likely that Afghanistan, new members and connectivity will be key items.

Afghanistan has been a perennial issue on which the SCO has failed to deliver. With the full accession of Iran to the group next year, Afghanistan will be almost entirely engulfed geographically by full SCO members, save for uncompromisingly neutral Turkmenistan, but Iran has been joining SCO summits for a while and Turkmenistan will be there this year too.

Taliban fighters in Kabul celebrate the first anniversary of the withdrawal of U.S.-led troops on Aug. 31: Afghanistan has been a perennial issue on which the SCO has failed to deliver. © AP

Notwithstanding the bloc’s clear interest in resolving Afghanistan’s long-standing issues, the organization has done nothing to help it, nor has it come together effectively to deal with the problems emanating from the country.

It is unlikely we will see much material progress this time either amid continuing uncertainty about the longer-term viability of the Taliban authorities, as well as concerns about their mixed attempts to rein in militant groups.

The answer from Uzbekistan’s perspective has been to seek ways of trying to engage with the new Taliban authorities. It has been keen for some time to push a narrative of greater connectivity across Eurasia.

Rather than simply piggyback on China’s Belt and Road Initiative vision, Tashkent has sought to instead cultivate a vision of connectivity between Central and South Asia, to both tap markets and seek escape from the region’s landlocked nature.

But these practical issues are side stories to the main narrative that will emerge from the Samarkand summit.

Attendees are expected to include the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Mongolia, Iran and Belarus, which are each seeking to highlight their inclusion and links to the SCO. Rumors suggest Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may appear too.

In joining with the leaders of existing members Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan and China, they will be part of a constellation of powers that for various reasons, and to different degrees, have tensions with the West.

For all of these powers, there is a pleasing visual utility to being present at a colloquium of such stature, representing at least a third of the world’s population and with no Westerners present. They can all show that notwithstanding the sanctions or sanctimony thrown at them by the West, they have allies of substance who welcome them with open arms.

There is no doubt that the SCO is nowhere near capable of competing with entities like the Group of Seven, NATO or the EU, but this is not the point. The organization is one that marches to its own beat, has only grown in its 20-plus years and continues to enlarge the volume of topics that it engages on.

It has helped normalize China’s role as a major player on the Eurasian continent while also providing an opportunity for Chinese diplomats, officials and business executives to engage regularly at multiple levels with their neighbors and a growing range of countries. Even supposed Western allies like India and Turkey see value in showing up for the meetings to soak in a non-Western-led order that they can appreciate being involved in.

There is no doubt that the members have little trust in one another, and the international order they are building is flawed. But at the same time, the interesting question is whether this matters to them.

The optics are good enough as the summitry gets positive play in other parts of the world. The event presents the impression, with some apparent foundation, that the democratic order advanced by the West is not the only achievable structure out there.

Raffaello Pantucci

Latest book

Email Subscription

Twitter

Published In

Where are you?

Archives