China | Raffaello Pantucci

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China and Central Asia – UK Policy Options

Posted: May 24, 2023 in UK Parliament
Tags: Central Asia, China, China and central asia, China-Central Asia, Kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Submitted testimony for a UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on policy towards Central Asia. Chose to focus on China, and draws on impressions from a lot of recent regional travel in particular.

China and Central Asia – UK Policy Options

Raffaello Pantucci is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore and a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. He is the co-author of Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire (Oxford University Press, April 2022) which draws on over a decade’s research and travel around Eurasia including repeated visits to all five of the Central Asian countries, Xinjiang, wider China, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran and Pakistan.

A good starting point for contemporary China’s relations with Central Asia is 1994 when then-Premier Li Peng visited the region stopping at all of the capitals except for Dushanbe which was at the time suffering from a brutal civil war. During the visit, he highlighted two key themes – building new ‘silk roads’ to encourage trade and connectivity, while on the other hand worrying about separatist and terrorist groups that China saw as gathering in the region to threaten Beijing.

In 2001, China joined hands with all of the Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan to create the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Building on the success of the Shanghai Five grouping – which sought to delineate and stabilize the new border regions that China had inherited following the collapse of the Soviet Union (with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) – the SCO expanded to bring in Uzbekistan. Whilst Chinese leaders spoke repeatedly about their hopes for the Organization to develop a cultural, political and economic identity, the first moves and structures to come to life focused on countering terrorism. A long-standing theme of common concern and interest amongst all members (the late 1990s were a period of some violence in the region), it is worth noting that the SCO was born three short months before the September 11, 2001 terror attacks which emanated from across the border in Afghanistan.

Track forwards 20 years and in 2013, President Xi Jinping used Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan as the place where he announced the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’, the first of a pair of speeches which acted as the kick-off of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While focused on economic development and prosperity, the BRI has at its conceptual core the idea that development will lead to stability, a salve to the problems of separatism, terrorism and extremism.

These two themes – worrying about extremism/terrorism and development leading to stability are key to understanding China’s interests in Central Asia. Bordering Xinjiang, one of China’s most sensitive regions, much of Beijing’s thinking towards Central Asia is shaped by events in Xinjiang or more clearly directed by authorities (or companies) in the region. China has undertaken numerous ‘develop the west’ domestic strategies over the past decades which have sought to increase development and stability in China’s western regions (Xinjiang). The most recent came in the wake of the 2009 riots in Xinjiang which led to at least 200 deaths in clashes between Uyghur and Han, and led to a huge internal economic boost to Xinjiang. This economic push has of course been paired with a constant and tightening security grip (which has in fact undermined some of the economic goals, something local officials and companies complain about). But all of this will only succeed if there is a stable and prosperous neighbourhood for Xinjiang to share a border with. The reality is that the region is as land-locked as any of the Central Asian powers that it borders.

This helps explain the connectivity narrative around the BRI that was born in the region. In trying to seek to open Xinjiang up to become a gateway for Eurasia, China needed to build roads, rail, pipelines and more. This would not only open up routes into and beyond the region, but also help tap the region’s rich natural resources which would help satisfy China’s inexhaustible domestic demand. It would also help alleviate Beijing’s concerns about the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ whereby a considerable part of China’s imported oil flows through the potentially precarious (and US-influenced) Malacca Straits.

But to simply see China’s interests in Central Asia through natural resources misses the bigger picture, where Chinese firms and interests can be found across Central Asian societies. Chinese firms are working in numerous sectors and are seen across the region as the biggest potential (or actual) investors. China is increasingly the region’s largest trading partner, as well as a critical route to international markets. It is worth reflecting the transformation that this is for the region, where during Li Peng’s visit, the vision was for hydrocarbons to flow from Central Asia (Turkmen fields) across China to Japan, the then-booming Asian economy. At the time, markets in western China were often filled with goods coming from the former Soviet space rather than the other way around. In 30 years, this flow has entirely reversed and more.

It is also useful to remember that the private sector is an important driver of Chinese interests in the region. Whilst there is a habit in western capitals to see China as a monolith, this is not the case and in particular in the economic sector where public and private players exist. Chinese Central Asian economic engagement is often as influenced by the state-owned sector as it is the private sector. For example, TikTok is a dominant market player, as are local Alibaba fronts targeting the local e-commerce markets. Huawei, ZTE, Oppo and Xiaomi are important players in the telco sector, and Chinese electric cars can increasingly be seen on the roads in Central Asian capitals. The point is that while state driven enterprise is important, there is a large private sector that also plays a role – which includes everything from internationally recognized brands like those listed, to smaller scale Chinese entrepreneurs seeking opportunity.

Domestic security concerns also remain important to Beijing, and in recent times the perception is that these problems are worsening in the wider region. Whilst China has not reported any violence within Xinjiang that they would associate with terrorism since February 2017, they have continued to advance policies towards Uyghur and other minorities in Xinjiang in advance of what they term ‘counter-extremism’. These concerns exist across the border in Central Asia as well, where China regularly lobbies and works with local authorities to pursue groups or individuals of concern. In Afghanistan a cadre of Uyghur militants operating under the name the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) continue to operate, while the Islamic State group’s affiliate in Afghanistan (Islamic State of Khorasan Province, ISKP) has recently started to articulate a strong anti-Chinese sentiment highlighting in particular the plight of Uyghurs within Xinjiang. Further down in Pakistan, an even wider range of groups has started to articulate anger towards China (though more often than not, related to domestic issues rather than Xinjiang). Suffice to say, China sees a region to its west which is replete with potential risks and threats which they can tie to domestic terrorism concerns.

Beijing has also sought to advance a ‘soft power’ push into the region. This has been driven by Confucius and other educational Institutes, scholarships at multiple levels, advancing Chinese messaging through local media, lobbying local elites and driving home narratives of economic opportunity amongst the local populations. Driven both by Beijing and companies working in the region, the push is in part a recognition of the deep levels of Sinophobia that exist. These are often based on little more than racial prejudices, but they have a practical effect on the ability of Chinese firms to operate in the region. In Kazakhstan, major land deals had to be conducted discretely after large-scale public protest led to the government having to reconsider its plans. In Kyrgyzstan, a large logistics centre was abandoned when local protests escalated to the point that the company decided it was not worth the trouble. And there are many other examples.

This has created a strange tension in the region, where the discussion is often of China as the coming power and major investor, yet on the ground not many Chinese can be found. In part this is a choice – they recognize the Sinophobia they can face and simply stay discrete, or in some cases, companies simply tell their people to stay in compounds out of the public eye. But it is also sometimes driven by local authorities who find themselves under pressure to keep a reign on Chinese presence and pass laws seeking to ensure high percentages of ‘local content’ in any project implemented in Central Asia by Chinese firms.

It is worth pausing a moment to drill down a bit into China’s individual relations with each country, as while China engages with the region as a grouping – through a C5+ format that has become a vogue around the region – it also has clearly distinct policies towards each country. These very brief summaries serve to highlight a few key points.

Kazakhstan – was always seen as the backbone of China’s relations with the region, something that helps explain the fact it was the first country President Xi visited post-COVID. The foundation of the relationship is energy, but China has deep interests in other mineral resources in the country (uranium and copper to name two), while also worked on numerous infrastructure projects. The region was home to large Uyghur diaspora and dissident groups in the 1990s, though these were largely dealt with through bilateral security engagement. Beijing had always seen the country as amongst the most dependable in the region, though this was somewhat shattered by the trouble in the country in January 2022.

Kyrgyzstan – has largely been seen as a conduit for products elsewhere. Chinese firms have worked considerably on the country’s infrastructure, often through linked loans from national policy banks. The country has also been site of numerous terrorist attacks on Chinese nationals, including the murder of diplomats, officials, businessmen and in May 2016 a car bombing at the Embassy in Bishkek. There are deep tensions towards China in the country, though recently Beijing appears to have finally found a way through building a long-delayed train route through the country which would link China to Uzbekistan more directly (and then potentially onwards towards Caspian routes).

Tajikistan – came later as an economic partner with China given its relatively limited opportunities and small population. Chinese companies have been present and built some infrastructure, but more recently the push has been on the security side with China seeking to bolster Tajik capability at its border with Afghanistan. The country is less wealthy and has a smaller population than its neighbours and any infrastructure in the country is complicated by its exceptionally rugged geography.

Turkmenistan – China has in essence one interest in Turkmenistan and that is its gas. An early investor in the country, Chinese oil majors were willing to essentially do whatever the Turkmen wanted to secure access to the gas. This worked well, but has now set up a situation that is slightly awkward for Ashgabat whereby they are almost entirely dependent on one customer. They have sought consequently to diversify in all other directions, but find them challenging to achieve. Outside this, China does play a role in the Turkmen economy more widely, but the country’s wealth means it is able to pick and choose what it wants making it challenging for Chinese firms.

Uzbekistan – until the passing of first President Karimov, Uzbekistan was as closed to China as it was to everyone else. The subsequent opening up has been reflected in a surge of Chinese interest and activity, though this has not entirely overtaken Russian and Turkish investment. As the region’s most densely populated country, and traditional heart of the region, Uzbekistan is an interesting opportunity for Chinese traders, investors and businessmen which was on a rapid growth trajectory before the pandemic.

To turn instead to a few key issues that are worth considering when looking at the region and China against the wider backdrop of UK interests.

Afghanistan – the Wakhan Corridor that provides China’s direct link to Afghanistan is bordered on the north by Tajikistan and on the south by Pakistan. Consequently, Afghanistan is worth considering in China’s calculations. So far, Beijing has not filled the vacuum as was widely speculated following the Taliban takeover of Kabul. Rather China has trodden carefully, while its entrepreneurial cadre has leapt at the potential opportunities. Beijing engages Central Asia on Afghanistan, through involvement in various groupings including the SCO, regional Special Representative formats, as well as being willing to at least rhetorically support Central Asian narratives towards the region. In Tajikistan, China has developed one of its few overseas security bases – run by the People’s Armed Police (PAP) in Shaimak, along the country’s border with Afghanistan. The intention of this is to help China keep its own eyes on the potential problems that might overspill from Tajikistan. But overall, China has actually stayed relatively back from stepping into the mire in Afghanistan, preferring to instead try to keep a security buffer and engage with Central Asia (and anyone else interested) in trying to ensure the current situation does not de-stabilize further. What is important for the UK to note is that while China is a player in Afghanistan, it is still a relatively timid one, something Central Asians see as well.

Russia – there is a long-standing misreading of a regional division of labour around Central Asia between China and Russia. The myth says that China does the economics while Russia does security. Quite aside from the illogical nature of this calculation, the reality is that both are engaged in both sectors (and more). This does in some cases lead to competition, but for the most part, they seem happy to operate in parallel. During President Xi’s recent visit to Moscow, this comity was emphasized when they stated that they planned to coordinate their activities in Central Asia to a greater degree going forwards. The canard of seeking fissures between the two in Central Asia misses the wider problem that this growing proximity presents to Central Asia which finds itself operating in an increasingly limited geopolitical space. Central Asian strategists love to talk about their countries ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy which is able to balance people off each other, and play them against each other for their gain. But this strategic approach becomes highly challenging when your two biggest neighbours and partners are increasingly in lock-step with each other (even though recently, the balance of economics in the region has swung slightly back in Russia’s favour). The region will never be able to entirely reject China and Russia, but it is eager to develop options. What is important for the UK to note is that looking at the region as the place where China and Russia disagree is a waste of time which misses the real impact that Beijing and Moscow’s growing strategic alignment has on the region.

Uyghurs – unfortunately, the plight of Uyghurs in Xinjiang is not something that animates much policy discussion in Central Asia. While pockets of public support can be found, and at a government level behind closed doors people will often sympathise, the reality is that there is little interest or appetite to confront China on this issue. There have been some practical steps taken by the Kazakh authorities to get better treatment for ethnic Kazakhs caught up in the camps system, as well as work on individual cases, but this has not extended to wider condemnation. For many in the region, the Uyghurs living in China are simply citizens living under a different regime, and having to bear the consequences of that. This is important as lobbying at an official level for the region to condemn China on the issue is unlikely to generate any positive response, and is instead likely to simply close doors. This does not necessarily entirely preclude discrete support in some way, but it would be a challenging goal to achieve. At the same time, it is worth considering the ramifications of the Xinjiang and Uyghur related sanctions that have been passed in the US and Europe which may have a direct impact on Central Asian businesses (or UK investments in the region).

UK options

There is a great deal that the UK could do in Central Asia. As a country with high ‘soft power’ status across the region, strong business links, as well as one of only a few to have diplomatic representation in all five, the UK could gain a good return on investment were the region to garner more focused and consistent high-level diplomatic attention.

When thinking about China in this context, however, three areas are worth considering for UK policymakers:

First – engage with the reality of China as a player in Central Asia. This even means engaging with Chinese projects when they are being advanced. This does not necessarily mean working directly with the Chinese firms (though this might also be an option), but to instead work with locals to ensure that they are maximizing their benefits and seeing what ancillary projects could be done which would support local development.

Second – help foster a greater Central Asian collective narrative and policy development. One positive development of recent times has been a growing shift towards greater discussion in Central Asia of working together. While there are still deep issues and tensions between the five countries, there is also a clear effort being made to work together. This is in part a recognition of their difficult geographical realities of being between the Scylla and Charybdis of China and Russia (and Iran/Afghanistan), but also as this is now more possible given the passing of the first generation of leaders whose personal animosities sometimes kept relations between countries on ice. The UK should seek to find ways of supporting the fostering of a greater Central Asian policy identity as a way of empowering the region to manage its own affairs and through that become a critical western ally.

Third – the war in Russia has complicated routes north (though also increased regional economic dependence on Russia), while routes across Afghanistan remain limited and China is only just opening up again post-COVID. There has been a recent revival in attention towards trans-Caspian routes. While energy pipelines may be difficult to realize, expanding goods capability through strengthening of ports, rail and road links, and more creates a new route for Central Asia to Europe. Clearly this is also a route that China will be interested in, and is in fact already exploring supporting in various ways (the Kyrgyz railway for example). The route, however, would likely benefit Central Asia as much as China.

Finally, there is a need more widely for London to consider the Eurasian heartland to a greater degree in its strategic thinking. The recent Integrated Review (IR) Refresh made limited mention of Central Asia, and did not particularly consider in much detail the wide physical geographical space between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific at which Central Asia sits at the heart. When thinking in geostrategic terms it seems strange to omit such a large part of the globe, especially as it is one where the two key strategic adversaries repeatedly mentioned in the IR have increased their presence and attention. Numerous threats (from geopolitical adversaries to terrorist threats) intersect in this region, and Central Asia stands out as a region which could play an important supportive role in managing these issues. To generate true strategic advantage, the UK should focus a greater degree of attention onto Central Asia.

Take the Xi-Putin Relationship at Face Value

Posted: May 11, 2023 in Diplomat
Tags: China, China and the world, China-Russia, Russia

A brief piece for the Diplomat trying to temper down some of the China-Russia hype and hysteria and just call the relationship what it is. A topic doubtless to return to.

Take the Xi-Putin Relationship at Face Value

China and Russia are not in lockstep across the board, but they are clearly in strategic alignment at a global level.

*Credit: Russian Presidential Press and Information Service*

There is an almost hysterical need to find fissures in the Sino-Russian relationship. Yet, the most obvious thing to come out from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow was the fact that both he and President Vladimir Putin want to highlight to the world how close they are. No one forced Xi to go to Moscow, and Putin chose to make this a high-profile state visit. Their warm words to each other overheard as they left dinner may have seemed staged, but at the same time were unnecessary unless the point was to emphasize partnership. The endless search for gaps misses this clear strategic alignment which should be taken and reacted to at face value.

The narrative of underlying disagreement and dislike between Beijing and Moscow is likely born from the same place that the Cold War Two concept emerges from. During the first Cold War, China and Russia were at odds beneath their common Communist spirit, and the U.S. demonstrated impressive diplomatic deft in focusing on this to pull them apart. The times have changed, however, and the key thing now holding China and Russia together is an antipathy toward the West.

It is abundantly clear that there are disagreements between Moscow and Beijing at every level. India, for example, is a power that has a strong relationship with Moscow, but a violent one with China. The Russian intelligence service continues to detain scientists they claim are selling their country out to China. Shortly before Xi’s visit a group of Chinese miners were murdered in the Central African Republic, with the Chinese leader pledging their murders would be avenged. A rumor rattling around the Chinese internet was that they had been executed by Russian Wagner forces. All of this serves to show competing geopolitical interests as well as bilateral paranoia at a public level and within their respective security apparatuses.

Similarly, the economic sphere is riven with contradictions. No big gas deal has yet been signed – likely evidence of China deciding to play hardball on negotiations now that they have the upper hand and more options at hand (as well as the fact that to rebuild the infrastructure within Russia to shift European-facing gas to Asia will take some time). Yet at the same time, Moscow is clearly looking to sell more to China and Beijing is buying. Within the private sector, some Chinese firms see the evacuation of Western brands from Russia as a great market opportunity, while at the same time large tech firms like Huawei or Alibaba are pulling people out or suspending investments. Opportunity and fear of secondary sanctions are often wrapped up together.

But in focusing on all of these contradictions, we are missing that this is often the nature of international relations. To paraphrase British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston: Countries have interests, not friendships. The transatlantic alliance may have NATO binding it together, but is equally riven with contradiction and disagreement – Turkey’s role in the negotiations around Finnish and Swedish membership has highlighted this. European and American companies usually compete on the international stage and within each other’s markets, while the authorities seek to protect their own national firms. And it is worth remembering that we are only two short decades since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq – a war that tore at the fabric of the transatlantic alliance.

It is hard to understand why we cannot then see this echoed in the China-Russia relationship. Both have problems, disagreements, and contradictions with each other, and yet their leaders are happy to grandstand together on the world stage.

The overarching issues they wanted highlighted during this encounter was their proximity and the fact that they are both pushing forward the development of a non-Western led order (made up of institutions like BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and more). At an individual level, Beijing struck its pose as the peacemaker seeking to help resolve the Ukraine war (building on its success in the Middle East between Riyadh and Tehran), while Moscow got high level support on the global stage.

We have yet to see Beijing’s support go beyond this to actually arming Russia with the lethal hardware that they want to fight in Ukraine. And we have yet to see Moscow try to force Beijing to do something they do not want to do in advance of Russia’s interests.

The final point to make is that while it may be clear that Beijing increasingly has the whip hand in the relationship, this does not in itself necessarily mean anything. Growing Russian dependence on China does not hand all the chips to Beijing, but merely strengthens China’s hand in individual negotiations and potentially weakens Russian domestic capability in the longer run. This does not, however, lock Moscow into doing whatever Beijing wants. China has a few other “allies” in its immediate neighborhood where on paper it also has the “whip hand” – Pakistan, North Korea, and Myanmar – and in each case, Beijing struggles to get them to do what China might want. In fact, these countries have a tendency to do what they want rather than what China tells them to do, which sometimes actually appear to go against Beijing’s interests.

The West should take the Sino-Russian relationship at face value, focus less on how to pull the two apart and instead de-hyphenate them in their strategic thinking. They are not in lockstep across the board, but they are clearly in strategic alignment at a global level. Focusing on the relationship in this way will help identify where the differences mean one cares less than the other and therefore is a place where thinking of them as a union would be a distraction. It might also then offer some ideas as to where actually the differences in opinion matter on the ground, rather than seeking ones where little strategic advantage can be leveraged between Beijing and Moscow.

China’s Saudi-Iran deal is a clear victory in its global push to be a force for peace

Posted: May 7, 2023 in South China Morning Post
Tags: China, China and the world, China-Middle East, iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia

Another article for South China Morning Post from a month or so back looking at how China’s role on the world stage is changing and its impact. A topic for lots of research and thinking in the future.

China’s Saudi-Iran deal is a clear victory in its global push to be a force for peace

It remains to be seen how much China will enforce the agreement, given its dislike of confrontation, but that matters less than others engaging with Beijing.
The world order is shifting and the West needs to find a better way to answer the offer Beijing is putting on the table than simply dismissing it.

President Xi Jinping is greeted by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after his arrival in Riyadh on December 8, 2022. China’s recent rise in engagement with the Middle East is part of a larger diplomatic push to portray itself as a force for peace. Photo: Saudi Press Agency via AP

Beijing deserves credit for seizing the opportunity to support Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. While it is premature to say China has displaced the United States in the Middle East through this deal, coming amid reports that President Xi Jinping is to meet both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin, it does highlight the appeal of Beijing’s approach to foreign policy to a wider audience than is sometimes appreciated in the US or Europe.

As far as can be understood, China came into the process for the Saudi-Iranian deal relatively late. Iraq and Oman also played an important brokering role, one that both Tehran and Riyadh actively sought out as they attempted to tone down their tensions. Even so, it is clear that Beijing played an important role in clearing the final hurdles to the agreement and reportedly offered some critical backstops and guarantees.

It remains to be seen how much Beijing will act as an enforcer and whether it will step in to chide either side if they fail to live up to their responsibilities within this framework. Similarly, we will have to wait and see what, if any, tangible deliverables China can obtain in its attempts to mediate between Putin and Zelensky.

But in many ways, from a Chinese perspective, these details are less significant at this point. This is part of a wider push since the end of China’s zero-Covid policy, one which demonstrates an alternative international order that Beijing can offer. Xi’s travel itinerary since last September has included attending a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Uzbekistan, the Group of 20 summit in Jakarta, the Apec forum in Bangkok and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in Riyadh.

These are all platforms where the West has less of a presence and where China gets a warmer reception. They are also replete with powers that appreciate Beijing’s less-judgmental approach to international affairs and how they behave at home. Some also see China as a rich potential investor and important economic partner, which blunts their desire to take a confrontational approach.

At the same time, Chinese diplomacy seeks to push a narrative of positive engagement on the world stage. The publication of the Global Security Initiative white paper in English was an illustration of what a Chinese-led security order might look like.

While China’s peace proposals for Ukraine have received a mixed reaction in the West, they are a way for Beijing to highlight that, unlike other members of the UN Security Council, it is offering peaceful options to end the war in Ukraine. The fact that Xi is now stepping in to engage suggests that Beijing thinks it already has something agreed that will be presented. The clear narrative will be China as peacemaker.

One can be sceptical about how long such moves by Beijing on the big strategic questions of our time might last. A key problem when trying to mediate between two sides is that, when they breach agreements, they need to be held to account or told to do things they do not want to do or hear. These are difficult conversations that Beijing is not usually eager to hold. Peace agreements that need to be enforced can lead to tensions.

In many ways, though, this does not matter. The fact that all these powers are willing and eager to engage with Beijing and use China as an interlocutor is a reflection of China’s growing soft power on the world stage.

It is not necessarily that China is adored or that any of these powers really think this is the end of their problems. It is more that China is stepping in and offering something different. Given the intractable nature of the problems, this is positive messaging that is welcome in a world that appears to be increasingly moving towards a bipolar geopolitical conflict.

It is also further evidence, if any was needed, that the West will find it difficult to paint the struggle it sees itself locked into against China, Russia and Iran through the current binary lens. The reality is that other countries have agency and, as we are increasingly seeing, China does too.

The world order might not have been transformed, but it is shifting. The West needs to find a better way to answer the offer Beijing is putting on the table than simply dismissing it. The deep scepticism many Chinese efforts receive is understandable, but it misses the reality that this is not how the rest of the world always sees things.

Elsewhere, people will look at China’s proposals and its attempts at mediation as evidence of Beijing offering something new which, while not perfect, is at least not simply stoking the flames of conflict. Whether this narrative will hold remains to be seen, but the immediate narrative victory has clearly been won.

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London and a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore

Counter Terrorism Meets Great Power Conflict in Africa

Posted: May 6, 2023 in RSIS
Tags: Africa, China, great power conflict, Russia, terrorism

A longer piece for my institutional home in Singapore RSIS and our quarterly journal Counter Terrorism Trends and Analyses (CTTA), this one exploring the great power conflict and terrorism nexus in Africa. The focus is mostly on Russia, but China gets a brief mention too. Am continuing to do a lot of work on the confluence of the two issues which are at the heart of the big geopolitical questions we are seeing play out at the moment.

Counter Terrorism Meets Great Power Conflict in Africa

In parts of the world, there is a growing confluence between terrorist threats and great power conflict. Nowhere has this been clearer than in Africa, where a growing Russian presence under the auspices of counter terrorism is steadily pushing out western forces in an ever-expanding space. The danger for the longer term is that as counter terrorism becomes a proxy for conflict between great powers, attention on such security threats slips under the radar, leaving space for them to grow and multiply further.

Introduction

In December 2021, the political directors of the “Small Group of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS” – an offshoot of the larger Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS which was formed in September 2014 to defeat the terrorist group – met in Belgium to discuss the state of the conflict against the Islamic State (IS).[1] Amongst other announcements to emerge from the session, an “Africa Focus Group” was formed to permit the coalition to “undertake civilian capacity-building programs to help address the ISIS threat across Africa”.[2] The Coalition’s decision to focus on Africa followed a growing pattern of threat assessments which pointed to the continent as the new heart of the IS threat. According to the Global Terrorism Index, in 2021, almost 50 per cent (around 3,461) of the deaths attributed to IS worldwide took place in sub-Saharan Africa.[3] Yet, there has since been a steady retreat by Western counter terrorism forces across Africa as alliances are tested, and a growing Russian presence in Africa pushes the terrorist threat into becoming a strand of the wider geopolitical clashes buffeting the world.

2021 proved to be a particularly challenging year for Western efforts to counter terrorism in Africa. In May, Mali suffered its second coup in a year, leading to a breakdown in relations between Paris – a key player across the Sahelian, mostly Francophone, region – and Bamako. Both France and the United States temporarily suspended aid, only to restart it later in the year. By February 2022, however, Paris concluded the relationship was entirely broken and decided to close down the longstanding Operation Barkhane, which had started in 2013 as part of an effort to counter the growing violent Islamist threat that had almost enveloped the country.

Key behind this French decision was a growing frustration in Paris at the government in Bamako’s unwillingness to fulfil its commitments to the international community,[4] as well as their growing reliance on the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner. In announcing his forces’ withdrawal, President Emmanuel Macron of France stated that Wagner was “arriving in Mali with predatory intentions”. He went on to condemn the Russian presence in Libya and Central African Republic and their alleged “awful abuses against the civilian population”.[5]

The Russian Dimension

Wagner’s presence in Africa is part of a much wider Russian push into the continent which stretches back two decades. In the mid-2000s, Moscow sought to reinvigorate its relationships around Africa as part of an attempt to return the country to the global status that it held during the Soviet era. A major early focus was South Africa, where many of the African National Congress (ANC) party leadership had strong links to Russia through training they had undergone in the country during the period of anti-apartheid struggle.[6] However, it was after the first Russian invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea in 2014 that relations with Africa accelerated, particularly in the security domain. During 2015-2019, Russia signed some 19 government-to-government military agreements in Africa, mostly focused on arms sales.[7]

Wagner, or Russian PMCs more generally, are the latest expression of this Russian push, though it is one that has (until recently) been denied by the Kremlin and its associates. According to research by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., Russian PMCs are identifiable in an African context going back to 2016. The growing relationship was brought into a clearer public focus in October 2019, when Moscow held a Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi where 43 heads of states were hosted by President Vladimir Putin at an event that was heavily focused on Russian defence cooperation and military sales with the continent.[8] Throughout this period, Wagner forces were identified as present across the region, playing roles in conflicts in Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Central African Republic and Mali. In most conflicts, the role was supportive of local authorities and focused on a counter terrorism mission.

It has not always worked, with Mozambique proving an example of where the local IS affiliate was seemingly able to push Wagner out of the country.[9] More worrying, however, has been evidence of Wagner‘s involvement in reported human rights abuses and massacres, issues that are likely to only inflame the tensions which underpin the narratives that foster extremism in the first place.[10]

Western Cooperation and Challenges

For local leaders, Russia’s willingness to provide uncritical support is attractive. This, alongside active disinformation campaigns which seek to play on local tensions with former European colonisers[11] as well as cultivate local figures to help lay the groundwork for Russia’s arrival,[12] have created a context where Russia is seen as a positive alternative to Western partners. Part of the problem for Western countries, however, is that there is often a poor track record of their own efforts in countering terrorism across the region. This can be seen through two metrics: first, the unintended consequence of working through and building up local security forces; and second, through the bitter reality that terrorist groups in the region have been able to expand considerably in the past decade. For example, rather than shrinking, IS has only grown across the continent, while two of Al-Qaeda (AQ)’s most effective remaining affiliates – Al-Shabaab in East Africa and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in North Africa – have continued to thrive.

One of the major pillars of Western counter terrorism efforts in Africa has been to develop local forces who are then able to help lead the local efforts at countering terrorist group expansion. This has, unfortunately, generated some unintended consequences. For example, Africa has seen 12 coup d’états since 2020.[13] Many (if not all) have been led by officers who had been through training programmes guided by the US (or allied) military under the aegis of counter terrorism cooperation.[14] In a particularly awkward moment, in September 2021, soldiers being trained under such a programme in Guinea left their US Green Beret trainers to participate in the overthrow of the authorities in the capital Conakry.[15] In Somalia, the special force developed by the US to counter Al-Shabaab and IS became so entangled in local politics that it had to suspend its counter terrorism activities.[16] In both cases, the core counter terrorism goals for which the forces were initially assembled were clearly impacted, even if only temporarily.

Another problem is that local forces do not always follow the rules of engagement or practise behaviour that their Western supporters would like or train them for. A recent grim Reuters investigation uncovered massive human rights abuses by Nigerian military forces in their conflict against militants in the northeast of the country.[17] Earlier reports in Kenya linked the elite Western-supported anti-terrorism force to numerous extrajudicial killings.[18] One such murder that was never resolved was the shooting of extremist cleric Mohammed Rogo, a senior figure in East African jihadist circles with close links to Al-Shabaab and AQ networks around the region. Shot in his car in September 2012, his murder led to widespread violence and radicalisation but was never formally solved.[19] His image continues to feature prominently in extremist material emanating from both IS- and AQ-linked groups across East Africa.

Growth of Extremist Groups

The most obvious expression of failure, however, has been the growth of extremist groups in Africa. During the pandemic, for example, Africa was one of the few places where terrorist threats and violence actually increased.[20] The Islamic State of Western Africa Province (ISWAP) has, in particular, shown itself to be a highly successful organisation which has displaced the AQ-aligned Boko Haram as the preeminent extremist group in the Lake Chad basin.[21] Groups operating in the Sahel linked to both IS- and AQ-backed groups in the region have increasingly expanded their presence south, reaching into countries previously untouched by such problems, like Benin and Togo.

On the opposite end of the continent, Al-Shabaab continues to be highly resilient, substantial and ambitious in the face of repeated campaigns against it.[22] Threat groups in Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have all adopted IS messaging and links highlighting the group’s ideological expansion across the continent. Some of these links appear to be supported by money flowing between them,[23] while in other cases there is clear frustration by the African affiliates that they are not able to get the attention of the core IS leadership.[24]

Evolving CT Support

All of this has taken place against a context in which Western forces have continued to seek deployments and play roles in countering terrorist groups in the continent. It is consequently not entirely surprising (notwithstanding clear disinformation campaigns and likely corrupt practices by Russian actors) to find that local authorities find Western support efforts ineffective and are willing to explore other alternatives like those offered by Russia. The answer to this so far by Western governments has been to try to call out Russian efforts, but also to withdraw and seek to support more local initiatives to undertake counter terrorism efforts in the region.

For example, following the collective withdrawal from operations in Mali by Western forces, the decision was made to support the Accra agreement, which called for regional powers using structures like the G5 grouping and ECOWAS (with African Union support) to take a leadership role in working with the Malian authorities to deal with the threats they face.[25] This partner-led effort is at the core of the current US thinking, which seeks to encourage local forces to take on the militant groups, with the US and other allies playing a supportive role in the background.

This has not, however, stopped Western forces continuing to take a proactive kinetic role where required. The recent death of IS in Somalia leader Bilal al-Sudani in a US special forces raid highlighted this, and his death is merely the latest in a long list of kinetic actions that the US in particular has taken across the continent to deal with specific menaces.[26] France has continued to undertake such missions too – for example, the killing of Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) leader Adnan Abou Walid al Sahraoui, even as French forces withdrew from Mali.[27] Such strikes demonstrate a capability by Western forces to reach in and strike individuals of concern, even as the wider operating environment becomes complicated. Whether this overwatch capability can be maintained as forces withdraw further will have to be seen.

However, it is clear that this targeted kinetic capability and local security development is unlikely to eradicate terrorism on the continent. The deep-seated issues that foster an environment in which extremist groups can grow goes far deeper. In part to answer this, there has been an increasing push to increase aid and support to Africa. Over time, billions of dollars have been spent on the continent, and this has been further boosted. The US has promised a new fund of some US$2 billion this year,[28] while the EU has offered hundreds of millions through different funds (for example, a €100 million fund to support teachers,[29] a €175 million for humanitarian aid in Central and West Africa,[30] and an additional €25.5 million in humanitarian aid in January 2023[31]), as well as a promise of a whopping €150 billion in investment over seven years at the EU-Africa Summit in February 2022.[32]

At the same time, there has been an effort to push a narrative of trying to help Africa stand up and develop by itself and not simply be an aid recipient – something reflected in US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s January 2023 10-day visit to Africa, which sought to highlight the ambition with which the United States wanted to engage with the continent.[33]

Jostle For Geopolitical Influence

The driver of this engagement, however, is not counter terrorism (even though the aid may help to deal with some of the underlying development issues which underpin radicalisation), but rather a range of issues from migration (in a European-specific context), to wider geopolitical plays against China and Russia. Both powers are perceived to be increasingly competing for influence in Africa, using a mix of hard security, investment, aid, development and wider support. This plays against the wider context of geopolitical competition between the West and China-Russia. China, in particular, has offered billions to a variety of African countries in terms of infrastructure investments and opportunities. Russia has contributed less in these terms, but has sought to offer some non-military support in the form of food or hydrocarbons.

Whilst there is little evidence of the two directly cooperating in Africa, it is clear that both China and Russia have identified counter terrorism as an issue through which they can engage with Africa to Western detriment and ultimately their own benefit. Whilst Moscow’s activities have already been highlighted, China has sought to displace the US from key counter terrorism bases in Kenya[34] as well as spoken at a United Nations (UN) level against sanctions placed on African countries dealing with terrorist threats.[35] This has translated into support for China and Russia in other UN votes, for example, on issues surrounding Xinjiang or Ukraine. Highlighting how much geopolitics has started to become entangled with local issues, the South African Development Community (SADC), made up of 16 nations, actively condemned US legislation that sought to counter Russian malign influence in Africa.[36] Counter terrorism, it appears, has become a tool of great power conflict in Africa.

Outlook

The specific impact on Western counter terrorism efforts continues. The current focus of attention is Burkina Faso, which, following a coup last year, has appeared to follow the path already taken by neighbouring Mali and turned on France as a counter terrorism partner. This led to a decision by Paris to close down its counter terrorism operation there as well.[37] Again, similar to developments in Mali,[38] this was preceded by an active Russian disinformation campaign as well as consistent rumours of Wagner deployment.[39] It is not clear that this is going to happen, but there has been a noticeable volume of statements from the government in Ouagadougou that the relationship with Moscow has been strengthening. Should Wagner, the private military firm, be deployed, it will be widely interpreted as further evidence of Western loss and Russian gain, with little focus actually paid to the terrorist threat which underpins the security attention in the first place.

This is likely to be the most damaging effect of the growing focus on African terrorism through the lens of great power politics. The attention on the actual threat will likely fall to the wayside as powers compete for influence or seek to keep each other out. This could create a space in which groups can develop further or, as has been seen in the context of some Russian deployments, problems actually get worse. And while thus far, most Africa groups appear quite regionally focused, the danger is that over time, a capability and space could develop into which more dangerous outward-facing groups could establish themselves.

About the Author

Raffaello Pantucci is a Senior Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at israffaello@ntu.edu.sg

Thumbnail photo by Pawel Janiak on Unsplash

Citations

[1] “Political Directors Small Group Meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS,” Media Note, US Department of State, December 3, 2021 https://www.state.gov/political-directors-small-group-meeting-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-daesh-isis/.

[2] Ibid.

[3] “Global Terrorism Index 2022,” Institute for Economics and Peace, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022.

[4] “Joint Declaration on the Fight Against the Terrorist Threat and the Support to Peace and Security in the Sahel and West Africa,” Elysée, February 17, 2022, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/02/17/joint-declaration-on-the-fight-against-the-terrorist-threat.

[5] “Macron Warns of ‘Predatory’ Russian Mercenaries in Mali,” France24, February 17, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220217-macron-warns-of-predatory-russian-mercenaries-in-mali.

[6] Paul Stronski, “Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_Paul_Stronski_-_Russia-Africa-v31.pdf.

[7] Federica Saini Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, Commercial Concessions, Rights Violations, and Counterinsurgency Failure,” Brookings Institution, February 8, 2022,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/.

[8] Henry Foy, “Russia Turns on the Charm at First Africa Summit,” The Financial Times, October 24, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/b042bd8e-f648-11e9-9ef3-eca8fc8f2d65.

[9] “Moscow Remains Involved in Cabo Delgado Despite Wagner’s Exit,” Africa Intelligence, February 2, 2021, https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2021/12/02/moscow-remains-involved-in-cabo-delgado-despite-wagner-s-exit,109708624-gra.

[10] “Wagner Group Operations in Africa,” ACLED, August 30, 2022, https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/.

[11] Grigor Atanesian, “Russia in Africa: How Disinformation Operations Target the Continent,” BBC, February 1, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64451376.

[12] Benjamin Roger and Mathieu Olivier, “Wagner in Mali: An Exclusive Investigation Into Putin’s Mercenaries,” The Africa Report, February 18, 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/178331/wagner-in-mali-an-exclusive-investigation-into-putins-mercenaries/.

[13] Peter Mwai, “Are Military Takeovers On the Rise in Africa?” BBC, January 4, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600.

[14] Michael M. Phillips, “In Africa, US Trained Militaries Are Ousting Civilian Governments in Coups,” The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-africa-u-s-trained-militaries-are-ousting-civilian-governments-in-coups-11649505601.

[15] Delan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, “US Forces Were Training the Guinean Soldiers Who Took Off to Stage a Coup,” The New York Times, September 10, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/africa/guinea-coup-americans.html.

[16] Michael M. Phillips, “Caught in a Political Crossfire, US Trained Somali Commandos Suspend Fight Against Islamic State,” The Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/caught-in-a-political-crossfire-u-s-trained-somali-commandos-suspend-fight-against-islamic-state-11639145293.

[17] “Nightmare in Nigeria,” Reuters, December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/section/nigeria-military/.

[18] “We’re Tired of Taking You to the Court: Human Rights Abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit,” Open Society Justice Initiative, November 20, 2013, https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/were-tired-taking-you-court-human-rights-abuses-kenyas-anti-terrorism-police-unit.

[19] Joseph Akwiri, “Kenyan Cleric Shot Dead, Sparks Riots in Mombasa,” Reuters, August 27, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-riots-idUSBRE87Q0UP20120827.

[20] “Political Violence: January 1 – December 31, 2020,” Review, Chicago Project on Security & Threats, March 2021.

[21] Maman Inoua Elhadji Mahamadou Amadou and Vincent Foucher, “Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin: The Bakura Faction and its Resistance to the Rationalisation of Jihad,” SWP Policy Brief, December 2022, https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA_PB_Foucher_ElHadji_Bakura_EN.pdf

[22] There is, however, some hope seen by analysts in the current anti-Shabaab push by the authorities. Stig Jarle Hansen, “Can Somalia’s New Offensive Defeat Al-Shabaab?” CTC Sentinel Vol. 16, No.1 (2023), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/can-somalias-new-offensive-defeat-al-shabaab/.

[23] “IS in Somalia ‘Letter’ Discusses Sending Funds to Other Branches,” BBC, January 27, 2023, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c2041zu6.

[24] A letter emerged in 2022 which seemed to suggest that the ISWAP head had been sending communications to ISIS core as early as 2017 and receiving no reply.

[25] “Joint Declaration on the Fight Against the Terrorist Threat and the Support to Peace and Security in the Sahel and West Africa,” Elysée, February 17, 2022, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/02/17/joint-declaration-on-the-fight-against-the-terrorist-threat.

[26] Cecilia Macaulay, “Bilal al-Sudani: US Forces Kill Islamic State Somalia Leader in Cave Complex,” BBC, January 27, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64423598.

[27] “French Troops Kill Leader of Islamic State Group in Sahel, Macron Says,” France24, September 16, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210915-french-troops-neutralise-leader-of-islamic-state-in-the-greater-sahara-macron-says.

[28] “United States to Provide $2 Billion in Humanitarian Assistance for the People of Africa,” USAID Office of Press Relations, December 15, 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/dec-15-2022-united-states-provide-2-billion-humanitarian-assistance-people-africa.

[29] “Quality Education in Africa: EU Launches €100 million Regional Teachers’ Initiative,” EU Commission Press Release, January 26, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_288.

[30] “EU Announces €175 Million in Humanitarian Aid for West and Central Africa,” EU Commission Press Release, January 27, 2022, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-announces-eu175-million-eu-humanitarian-aid-west-and-central-africa-2022-01-27_en.

[31] “Humanitarian Aid: EU Allocates Additional €25.5 Million in African Countries,” EU Commission Press Release, January 12, 2023, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/humanitarian-aid-eu-allocates-additional-eu255-million-african-countries-2023-01-12_en.

[32] Kingsley Ighobor, “EU-AU Summit 2022: The EU Wants to Be Africa’s Friend in Need – And Indeed,” UN Africa Renewal, March 21, 2022, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/eu-au-summit-2022-eu-wants-be-africa%E2%80%99s-friend-need%E2%80%94and-indeed.

[33] Edward A. Burrier, “Four Takeaways from Treasury Secretary Yellen’s Trip to Africa,” United States Institute for Peace, February 1, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/02/four-takeaways-treasury-secretary-yellens-trip-africa.

[34] Michael M. Phillips, “Fears of Losing Out to China Put US Under Pressure Over Kenya Base,” The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/fears-of-losing-out-to-china-put-u-s-under-pressure-over-kenya-base-11675313752.

[35] “Remarks by Ambassador Zhang Jun, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, At the Security Council High-Level Debate on ‘Counter Terrorism in Africa’,” Chinese Mission to the United Nations, November 10, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202211/t20221112_10973113.html.

[36] “SADC Protests New US Law on Africa-Russia Relations,” The Citizen, August 19, 2022, https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/sadc-protests-new-us-law-on-africa-russia-relations-3919698.

[37] Cecilia Macaulay and Joseph Winter, “Burkina Faso Unrest: France Agrees to Pull Its Troops Out,” BBC, January 26, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64397730.

[38] Benjamin Roger and Mathieu Olivier, “Wagner in Mali: An Exclusive Investigation Into Putin’s Mercenaries,” Africa Report, February 18, 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/178331/wagner-in-mali-an-exclusive-investigation-into-putins-mercenaries/.

[39] Sam Mednick, “Russian Role in Burkina Faso Crisis Comes Under Scrutiny,” Associated Press, October 18, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-africa-france-west-a6384d7134e8688c367a68721f657857.

Power imbalance in China-Iran relations on full display during Raisi’s Beijing trip

Posted: May 3, 2023 in South China Morning Post
Tags: China, China and the world, China-iran, China-Russia-Iran, iran

Have not been posting here for some time, keeping busy with projects elsewhere, so a few pieces to catch up on. First up, something for the South China Morning Post from all the way back in February looking at when Iranian President Raisi visited Beijing. As it turned out, a prelude to the Chinese supported Iran-Saudi deal.

Power imbalance in China-Iran relations on full display during Raisi’s Beijing trip

Sanctioned and isolated, Tehran has less to offer Beijing than Moscow, which can at least boast a powerful military and global presenceWithin Iran, there is also wariness of Chinese investment, and not even shared concerns about Afghanistan have helped to spur cooperation

There is a third leg in the alliance of powers against which the West is facing off that has always seemed a little wobblier than the other two. The China-Russia relationship is as tight as ever, and the Russia-Iran link is only hardening as Tehran steps up its military support to Moscow.

The China-Iran link, however, seems more troubled. Last week’s visit by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Beijing has been sold as an opportunity to bolster cooperation, but even with a high-profile boost, it is unlikely to come anywhere close to the strength of the other two.

China needs Iran even less than it needs Russia. Moscow is, in fact, an important partner for Beijing. Putting to one side the complicated and often contradictory economic relationship, which is clearly shifting ever more firmly in China’s favour, Russia is a United Nations Security Council member and a nuclear power whose army is able to increasingly command global presence.

It may have made a major strategic blunder in its invasion of Ukraine, but it remains a significant player on the world stage and serves an important role for Beijing.

In contrast, Iran is a heavily sanctioned and isolated power that produces little that Beijing immediately needs. Its rich hydrocarbon supplies are of interest to China, as is its large consumer population and open market for outside infrastructure investors. But these are all things that China can also find elsewhere.

Iran does not sit at the heart of any international structures that are useful to China’s efforts to blunt the growing push by the West to isolate Beijing on the world stage. In fact, Iran is desperately keen to join Chinese structures – like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – to demonstrate that it still has important allies.

Nowhere has this relatively limited dependence been on greater display than after President Xi Jinping visited the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Riyadh late last year. A joint communique issued after the summit highlighted GCC members’ concerns about Iranian behaviour in shared waters.

The statement generated public rebukes of China by Tehran. At the same time, these were very carefully delivered by the Iranian government as the country still wants to develop a better relationship with China.

The much-vaunted 25-year strategic cooperation deal valued in the hundreds of billions that was signed between the two countries in 2021 was meant to lead to huge levels of investment, and while it has led to some reported projects, it is moving slowly. China continues to import Iranian oil – and not much else – though often reportedly routing the oil via United Arab Emirates or Malaysia to mask its origin.

Chinese firms are still hesitant to operate in Iran due to a fear of secondary sanctions. At the time of the visit, the Iranian press was reporting that Iranian companies had restarted work on the Yadavaran oilfield which had initially been awarded to Sinopec but which they had suspended work on six years ago.

There is considerable resistance to China on the ground in Iran as well. In the wake of the announcement of the 25-year strategic partnership deal, a version of the document was leaked online, leading to a number of senior figures speaking out against it.

Former president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, previously an eager ally of China’s when in power, expressed concern as part of his lobbying to return to power, recognising the public sentiment against the deal, while other senior leaders highlighted the plight of Uygurs as something the authorities should focus on with China.

Even more recently, a prominent Iranian think tank close to the government published a report which outlined concerns about Chinese “debt trap” diplomacy, drawing on studies of Chinese-supported projects in other locations coming to conclusions which it specifically linked to potential projects signed under the 25-year deal.

Iran also fits awkwardly into a number of other Chinese relationships on the world stage. Xi’s visit to Riyadh was part of a much larger effort by Beijing in the Middle East, and part of a strong push by Saudi Arabia to expand its influence around Asia. Similarly, Israel is an important partner for Beijing – though one whose loyalties to Washington complicate things.

Both Israel and Saudi Arabia are implacable adversaries of Iran, and locked into confrontation with it in various locations around the world. Israel, in particular, has shown itself capable of reaching deep into Iran to go after specific individuals or targets.

Finally, there is the reality of Afghanistan, a country that physically separates China from Iran and is currently governed by the relatively unstable Taliban authorities. While the two countries have engaged on the topic and share very similar concerns, there is little evidence of cooperation between the two.

In fact, the Taliban is often keen to highlight Iranian firms as alternatives to Chinese ones in their pursuit of external investment in the country. In other words, the one place where Chinese and Iranian direct interests collide, the two are in competition.

The reality is that the China-Iran relationship is as unbalanced as the China-Russia one, though the dependency from Iran’s direction is far more substantial. Moscow is as needy of Beijing, but in many ways has more cards that are useful to China. This power dynamic was on prominent display during this week’s visit, which was high on rhetoric with the substance still to be delivered.

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London and a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore

China’s embrace of Russia is mostly for show

Posted: February 28, 2023 in Nikkei Asia Review
Tags: China, China-Russia, Russia

A new column for Nikkei Asia Review looking at the China-Russia relationship. Was initially drafted ahead of Wang Yi’s visit, but then pivoted a bit to reflect it, though nothing during the visit particularly surprised. Doubtless this will be a major talking point this year.

China’s embrace of Russia is mostly for show

Rhetoric about close ties is not translating into cooperation on tangible goals

*Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meet via video link on Dec. 30, 2022: The problem for Russia is that its dependence on China keeps getting deeper. © Xinhua/AP*

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and author of “Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire.”

This week’s visit to Moscow by Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, just ahead of the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, highlights the closeness of the two powers.

But grand rhetoric about the strength the relationship and revived U.S. assertions that Beijing is considering upgrading the quality of its military support to Moscow are overshadowing the day-to-day reality that China and Russia are on very different tracks.

Beijing has been coy about the invitation extended by Russian President Vladimir Putin in a year-end call with Xi Jinping for the Chinese leader to pay a visit this spring, although it was reiterated by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late January.

While Beijing may not want to appear to commit yet as to when Xi will visit Moscow, he and Putin are due to meet midyear at a Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders’ summit to be held in India and again in Durban, South Africa, at a BRICS summit in August.

In the meantime, China has continued to make it clear that its relationship with Russia is important. Visiting Moscow earlier this month, Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu said, “China is willing to work with Russia to implement the important consensus reached by the two heads of state and to promote new progress in bilateral relations in the new year.”

Doubtlessly, throughout the year we will continue to hear affirmations of the two nations’ friendship. This is likely to continue to be reflected in military exercises, which are increasingly held with other nations as well.

Chinese and Russian vessels are now engaged with South African counterparts in a large-scale, 10-day naval exercise off KwaZulu-Natal province that began on Friday.

Moscow and Beijing are happy to mutually antagonize others with these activities. Last December, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno expressed “severe concerns” over frequent joint air force activities by Russia and China near Japanese airspace. The two have undertaken similar exercises regularly around South Korean airspace and conducted joint exercises with Iranian forces.

Yet if one digs deeper, there is little evidence of significant cooperation that might advance more tangible goals, despite U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s claims about Chinese support for Russia’s war effort.

For example, the growing volume of Russian troops and mercenaries in Africa seems to be doing little to help protect the many Chinese businessmen who keep getting kidnapped by militant groups. In Tajikistan, both Moscow and Beijing have military posts near the Afghan frontier but they do not work together and the Russians reportedly have complained that the Chinese there do not even communicate with them.

At the same time, Russian counterintelligence continues to detain senior scientists for alleged selling sensitive technology to China. Last June, for example, physicist Dmitry Kolker was detained on charges of suspected treason involving collaboration with China.

A similar pattern can be found at an economic level.

Both sides champion the fact that bilateral trade rose 29.3% last year to reach $190 billion. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in January that Moscow is looking forward this year to finding ways of harmonizing China’s Belt and Road Initiative with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Russian central bankers are proud too of their shift away from Western currencies to the yuan.

Yet the reality is that much of the growth in trade volumes in 2022 came in crude oil and coal sales where China took advantage of discounted supplies from Russia, which has been faced with a shrinking pool of customers.

Chinese companies continue to express concern about how they can keep up purchases of Russian energy and to seek new ways to protect themselves from sanctions while also worrying about insurance coverage. And while there is growing evidence that Chinese companies are still selling high technology products like microchips to Moscow, the companies doing this are often either hiding their tracks or have publicly withdrawn from the Russia.

Lenovo and Xiaomi, which both were major players in the Russian tech market before the war, quietly scaled back operations dramatically last year. Huawei Technologies moved many staff to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan while closing some units. And Russian consumers seeking to use UnionPay cards to replace the Visa, American Express or Mastercard credit cards that no longer work increasingly find the Chinese cards do not function either.

*Russian consumers seeking to use UnionPay credit cards to replace Visa or Mastercard increasingly find the Chinese cards do not function either. © Imaginechina/AP*

Of course, this does not mean that Chinese products are disappearing from Russia. In reality, Chinese products are increasingly present but often arrive indirectly which can raise costs for consumers. The trade in non-sanctioned goods is likely to increase with the opening of two new bridges across the Amur River.

The problem for Russia is that its dependence on China keeps getting deeper. For now, China may be providing a lifeline, but there is high risk to this position as well.

In trading the dollar for the yuan, the Russian central bank is binding itself to a currency which is tightly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and is answerable to its needs. Opening Russia’s markets to greater Chinese penetration is only going to emasculate the domestic economy and make it harder for local competitors to survive.

For all the lofty rhetoric, there continues to be a disparity in the China-Russia relationship. Despite frequent demonstrations of affection, there are distinct limits to this partnership.

China still reluctant to use its power and influence in Eurasia, despite crises in Ukraine and Afghanistan

Posted: February 26, 2023 in South China Morning Post
Tags: Afghanistan, China, China and the world, China-Eurasia, Ukraine

Another piece from last month, this time for the South China Morning Post, exploring China’s continuing reticence to put itself forwards as a player in international affairs. Stands in contrast to their recent peace push on Ukraine, but then there is a difference between the surface and behind the scenes view in Beijing.

China still reluctant to use its power and influence in Eurasia, despite crises in Ukraine and Afghanistan

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Afghanistan’s instability are blockages to Beijing’s vision for Eurasia, but it has done little to fix either
In the decade since the belt and road was first discussed, China has become a major player in the region, yet it appears unwilling to step in to help resolve conflicts

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Afghanistan’s instability are blockages to Beijing’s vision for Eurasia, but it has done little to fix eitherIn the decade since the belt and road was first discussed, China has become a major player in the region, yet it appears unwilling to step in to help resolve conflicts

This year marks the first decade of the Belt and Road Initiative. While the vision might have evolved from the speeches President Xi Jinping gave in Astana and Jakarta in 2013, it remains a key concept that has been enshrined in Communist Party doctrine. The territory it started marching across has changed dramatically, but what has not yet changed is China’s willingness to step into a leadership role within this space.

Most glaringly, this is visible in the two major conflicts that now dominate the Eurasian heartland where the initiative was launched. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year has upended the regional and global order, while the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in mid-2021 has left an unstable state at the heart of the Eurasian land mass.

Together, these countries and their troubles present a major strategic blockage for China’s wider vision. However, there has been little evidence of Beijing seeking to fix either.

In fact, China seems set on simply letting both clashes play themselves out while offering platitudes in public which serve to suggest Beijing might seek to do something. In both contexts, China is a logical option to play a role in trying to resolve matters, and those on the ground are keenly aware of this.

Before the Russian invasion, China was Ukraine’s most important trading partner and a growing investor. The Belt and Road Initiative swept across Eurasia and saw Ukraine as a key link between Europe and Asia. With infrastructure and raw materials, technologically savvy and an underdeveloped economy on the European Union’s borders – it was a highly attractive prospect for Chinese investors.

Russia’s war has stymied these dreams while also posing a major threat to planned investments by Chinese firms in Belarus. Chinese companies and banks had intended the country to become a way station for products coming from China into Europe’s wealthy markets. But projects now sit idle while investors try to figure out how to adapt to the new reality.

In Afghanistan, China has long been the country’s wealthiest neighbour, with both Beijing and the Taliban government eager to find ways of encouraging Chinese investment. Neither has found that easy, though the Taliban appears to be following the path of the previous government after it signed a contract with a China National Petroleum Corporation subsidiary to exploit oilfields in the north of the country earlier this month.

CNPC had previously signed an agreement with the Afghan republic government in 2012 to extract oil from the same area, but that failed to live up to expectations. Other projects remain in the discussion phase, with growing appeals from the Taliban for Chinese firms to start to deliver.

But while it remains to be seen if the project lives up to its promise, the investment has shown that China is still in a position to play an important role. This is true in other parts of Eurasia, too.

The announcement that a Chinese firm could step in to develop Tehran’s international airport follows Beijing’s willingness to purchase Russian energy. China increasingly seems willing to serve as an economic backstop to countries being sanctioned by the West, and in so doing it can strengthen its position as a critical player across Eurasia.

However, there has been little evidence of China using this influence to seek to resolve problems or step in to advise leaders. Notwithstanding the rhetoric about wanting a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine and statements about respecting national sovereignty, there is no evidence that Beijing has sought to restrain Moscow.

Vague comments about not wanting nuclear conflict or wider instability are hardly attempts to steer Russian President Vladimir Putin in a particular direction, but are merely statements of fact. Nevertheless, Ukraine continues to hope that Beijing might step in to mediate.

In Afghanistan, China has found it as hard as everyone else to engage the Taliban. The recent oil project was driven by the company rather than the state. In fact, not long before the contract was signed, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned nationals in the country to consider leaving given the deteriorating security situation, highlighted by an attack on a Chinese-owned hotel in Kabul.

Economic activity in Afghanistan has, for the most part, been driven by the private sector. China has provided some aid, but it has not stepped into the economic void.

This is the critical point. China is clearly viewed as a significant player, yet it remains unwilling to step into the fray. From a Chinese perspective, this is just an extension of Beijing’s principle of non-interference but, in reality, it means that one of Eurasia’s mightiest rising powers is failing to play a leadership role in its own backyard.

A decade on from the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has risen to become a major player in Eurasia. But it has yet to do much with this power and influence, choosing instead to focus on the United States and Taiwan, and simply assuming a watching brief over the growing instability. The vision of the belt and road, at least for others, was for the initiative’s sweep across Eurasia to increase China’s influence. That has yet to translate into reality.

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London and a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore

2023 outlook: Central Asia is not out of the woods yet

Posted: January 23, 2023 in Nikkei Asia Review
Tags: Afghanistan, Central Asia, China, Russia, Ukraine

A final column for last year, this time a forward look at Central Asia in 2023 for Nikkei Asia Review, repeats the same format last year. The last one became somewhat obsolete quickly in large part because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It remains to be seen how this one will play out.

2023 outlook: Central Asia is not out of the woods yet

Spillover effects from Ukraine and Afghanistan, so far limited, still pose risk

*Vladimir Putin met with other presidents at the Central Asia-Russia summit in Astana on Oct. 14: Central Asia will continue to find Moscow a complicated partner. © Reuters*

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and author of “Sinostan: China’s Inadvertent Empire.”

It has been a tumultuous year for Central Asia. It started with large-scale internal violence and is ending with talk of a formal alliance between the region’s two most powerful players, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Yet uncertainty remains on the horizon for the coming year, with the potential for violence to boil over, geopolitics to come crashing down around regional states or internal pressures to escalate once again.

The biggest question that still hangs in the balance is what will happen next in fellow former Soviet republic Ukraine. With little sign of an end to its conflict with Russia in sight, Central Asia will continue to find Moscow a complicated partner with which to engage over the coming year.

So far, gloomy economic predictions offered in the immediate wake of Russia’s invasion have not played out.

Higher energy prices have meant increased revenues for energy-rich Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Rather than falling as expected, remittances from Central Asian migrant workers in Russia have risen, thanks to a surge in demand for labor, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Meanwhile, Russian and Belarusian companies seeking to get around Western sanctions have set up operations in the region, as have some Western companies exiting Russia.

These trends helped prompt the EBRD to raise its 2022 gross domestic product growth forecast for the region to 4.3% in September from just 1.1% in May. It also adjusted its 2023 outlook to 4.9% from 4.7%.

It remains to be seen whether these trends can hold.

Europe’s desire to get access to Central Asian energy was on clear display during European Council President Charles Michel’s visit to the region in October. But the same fundamental problems that have long held up trans-Caspian energy routes persist and are unlikely to be resolved in the near future.

Other world leaders are courting the region, too, with Chinese President Xi Jinping choosing Central Asia for his post-COVID return to the international stage, a stream of U.S. officials coming through and Russian President Vladimir Putin taking advantage of some of the few doors around still open to him.

Xi Jinping and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana on Sept. 14: The Chinese president chose Central Asia for his post-COVID return to the international stage. (Handout photo from press service of the president of Kazakhstan) © Reuters

But despite the surge of attention and economic resilience so far, the Ukraine conflict could still carry major downsides for Central Asia.

The Russian economy could still implode, or the geopolitical balance that Central Asia has managed to strike could suddenly shift.

There has also been little international condemnation or fallout from the instability seen earlier this year in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the continuing crackdown in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan region or violent border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The general attitude taken by outside powers, including the usually accusatory Western ones, is to simply move past these issues, hoping the governments will be able to handle them.

But the raft of incidents this year exposed a dangerous risk. The large-scale violence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was a shock to most observers. While things appear to have settled down, the unrest underscored that there are potential issues bubbling under the surface, even in the region’s traditionally more stable countries, which could lead to widespread problems.

What other surprises lie beneath the surface is of course unknown. Few, for example, would confidently speculate about what exactly is going on in Turkmenistan.

A more clear and present danger can be found across the border in Afghanistan, where the Taliban continue to exert a weak grip on power. The Islamist regime may face no direct and obvious challenger, but it is clearly unable to enforce its mandate very far.

This has particular repercussions for Central Asia, due to the continuing threat of Islamic State Khorasan as it broadcasts threats in regional languages and seeks recruits from its outposts in Afghanistan.

Led mostly by Uzbekistan, Central Asia has sought to answer Afghanistan’s problems with a push for connectivity with South Asia, but the cost of realizing this dream is prohibitively high for the countries involved to absorb themselves. International finance could help, but Taliban rule continues to pose a threat to project completion.

So far, much external engagement with the region has focused on security support for mitigating potential problems from Afghanistan, rather than large-scale transformative investment.

China remains an important partner, and the end of zero COVID might bring new economic exchanges, but it is unlikely that Beijing will be willing to expend much to realize Central-South Asian connectivity dreams.

Meanwhile, although Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have started to make a show of strengthening their promising partnership, Putin’s proposal to join with the two Central Asian states in a “natural gas union” has not been flatly rejected.

There is a long history of grand Central Asian visions that have not managed to catch on, so it remains to be seen how these trends will play out.

The fallout from Ukraine has so far not been as bad as initially expected. And while Afghanistan remains a problem, the spillover has been limited so far.

Yet the downside risk in both cases for Central Asia remains high. The new year looks to be a challenging one.

Why Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s hopes of using China as hedge against Russia could be doomed

Posted: January 20, 2023 in South China Morning Post
Tags: Central Asia, China, China-Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Russia-Central Asia, Uzbekistan

More from late last year, this time trying to dig into the narrative that emerged of Kazakhstan in particular seeking to use China as a counter-weight to Moscow for the South China Morning Post.

Why Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s hopes of using China as a hedge against Russia could be doomed

Central Asia’s increasingly tense relations with Russia have made closer ties with China attractive, but achieving that is not without its problems.

Far from Beijing proving a hedge against Moscow, the opportunities on offer in Russia might simply increase the competition for China’s attention.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) walks alongside Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Uzbekistan on September 16. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have welcomed China’s interest in Central Asia, but that interest has been complicated by the pandemic and geopolitical concerns. Photo: EPA-EFE

Uzbekistan has in many ways always been the heart of Central Asia. It might be dwarfed in hydrocarbon wealth and physical size by Kazakhstan, but its other attributes give it influence. Yet, China does not have the same sort of commanding position within the country as it has with Kazakhstan.

There are numerous reasons for this, from local hesitance to problems in China, but collectively they illustrate the trouble Central Asia faces as it seeks to use Beijing as a hedge against Moscow, with whom relations have grown increasingly testy.

The difference in how Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan see their relationships with the two capitals was most clearly seen in the past few weeks. They both abstained from a vote against Russia on Ukraine at the United Nations, while they voted against a UN resolution seeking a debate on Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang.

Both have been appalled by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While some individuals within the countries might hold some moral objections towards what China is doing in Xinjiang, they largely see this as a domestic issue within China.

There is no doubt some element of hard geopolitics has also played into their thinking. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have expressed reservations about Russia’s actions in Ukraine publicly before and are concerned about the clear evidence of Russian weakening.

They seek new partners to help stabilise their increasingly tormented neighbourhood. Their embrace of President Xi Jinping’s visit to the region in September underlines their eager eagerness for more Chinese investment.

But at the same time, both are aware of the complications of increasing their dependence on China. This came into view during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Uzbek traders report that during the height of the pandemic, the costs of containers going through China to Uzbekistan rose by at least five times. While they have since gone down, they remain more expensive than they were pre-pandemic. The growth of traffic through the region to Russia helps keep them high alongside complications on the Chinese side.

At the same time, routes into China have only recently reopened, even though opening them was a focus of regular lobbying during the pandemic as landlocked Central Asians sought to get goods out and in.

The problems went beyond goods at borders. According to Uzbek data, the pandemic led to an abrupt drop in the number of new companies being created in Uzbekistan with Chinese investment. The numbers have started to rise again but are far below pre-pandemic levels.

China has retained its trade primacy in Uzbekistan, though the numbers are lower than before the pandemic and dipped substantially in 2020. All of this comes on top of Chinese companies in Uzbekistan being seen as behaving in ways that will keep local authorities happy but do not always actually deliver.

For example, media reports and experts on the ground suggest there has been a steady growth in recent years of Chinese companies opening factories in Uzbekistan. This is something the authorities welcome, eager to turn the country into a manufacturing hub. Yet at the same time, it is not clear how much these factories are actually manufacturing rather than serving as assembly plants.

The reasons for this from a Chinese perspective are logical – it is often not clear the local market will be able to absorb the volume more active plants could produce. However, the consequences are a smaller level of local capacity building.

It also means it can often be quicker and cheaper to simply import the desired piece of machinery directly from China rather than purchase it from the local manufacturing plant. The factory is going to have to wait for the parts from China and then take time to assemble the product in Uzbekistan. Once you factor order book backlogs on top of this, it can become quite a long wait. These problems are not exclusive to Uzbekistan. Import-export firms across the region have noted the trade problems with China during the pandemic, and the unpredictability these have injected into an economic relationship both sides assumed would simply continue to boom.

This reality lurks in the shadows of the push to warmly embrace Xi. Both Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made it clear they welcomed and sought a closer relationship with China. Kazakh officials behind the scenes were ecstatic about Xi’s comments about being willing to defend their national sovereignty, interpreting it as a protective clause should Moscow’s revanchist eye fall on their territory.

Yet the reality is that China is unlikely to play that role or do much to prioritise trade with the region. This reticence will emerge elsewhere as well, leading to frustration on the ground.

This might eventually turn in an even more complicated direction as Beijing leverages the surge of hydrocarbons and other opportunities that will present themselves as Moscow seeks new markets, against the same purchases and opportunities they see in Central Asia. Far from Beijing proving a hedge against Moscow, Russia might in the end simply increase the competition for China’s attention.

Raffaello Pantucci is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London and a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore

Inheriting the Storm: Beijing’s Difficult New Relationship with Kabul

Posted: January 11, 2023 in Diplomat
Tags: Afghanistan, China, China-Afghanistan, China-Taliban, Taliban, TIP, Uyghurs

Longer piece in The Diplomat last month taking a wide ranging look at China’s relationship with the Taliban. Since then there have been even more developments which hopefully should be covered in coming pieces. So keep coming back for more!

Inheriting the Storm: Beijing’s Difficult new Relationship with Kabul

Far from inheriting an opportunity, China finds itself encumbered with an ever-expanding roster of problems in Afghanistan, which it is showing little interest in trying to resolve or own.

*Taliban guards stand guard in Mes Aynak valley, some 40 kilometers (25 miles), southwest of Kabul, Afghanistan, Saturday 30 October, 2021. AP Photo, Ahmad Halabisaz*

The Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021 left China with a dilemma. Not only did Beijing now share a border with a country ruled by a group considered a terrorist pariah by much of the world, but China was also the closest strategic ally of the Taliban’s principal supporter in the international arena, Pakistan. As the rest of the world withdrew from Afghanistan, Beijing suddenly found itself in an influential position by default, juggling a number of key relationships without having the shield of U.S. hard power to ultimately hide behind.

In many ways, the image of a sea receding from shore is a useful analogy. While the United States and its allies were present in Afghanistan bolstering the Republic government, a sea washed over Afghanistan that hid a number of issues. As the U.S. and its allies left, this tide retreated, exposing brutal realities on the ground. Among those was the fact that China has no real choice but to engage with Afghanistan given its geographical position and its security concerns on the ground.

Yet this reality has had a remarkably limited effect on China’s actual activity in Afghanistan and the wider region. In many ways, Beijing has sought to continue the relatively limited engagement efforts that were being undertaken prior to the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban. The oft quoted narrative of a Chinese surge was overplayed.

Prior to the collapse of the Republic, Beijing was a partner of the Afghan government, exploring economic opportunities as well as addressing key security concerns. They also explored working with other countries in Afghanistan (like the United States, India, or European powers), and followed through on some limited programming. China was a provider of vaccines and other COVID-19 management tools and had participated in the many different regional engagements that sought to help Afghanistan, including creating specific trilateral formats bringing together Afghan and Pakistani officials. Following the collapse of the Republic government, the level of activity at an official level has stayed similar, though changed to adapt to the new authorities in Kabul.

In security terms, China cooperated closely with the Republic on Uyghur militants Beijing saw gathering in Afghanistan. They are still trying to build this relationship with the Taliban.

The closing months of the Republic were confusing in this regard.The Republic’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) moved definitively against China by detaining a network of Chinese intelligence agents active in the capital in December 2020. Both Beijing and Kabul worked closely together to keep the story out of the public domain, with then-Vice President (and former NDS chief) Amrullah Saleh tasked to manage the relationship by President Ashraf Ghani.

By early 2021, the relationship had been built up again to the point that Saleh was attending events at the Chinese embassy and praising what China was doing in Xinjiang, while at the same time highlighting through social media the links between Uyghur militants and the Taliban (something the U.S. government had sought to break by delisting the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, ETIM, as a terrorist organization in November 2020).

But as the year went on, the relationship between Beijing and Kabul broke down, with the Afghan side refusing to turn over militant Uyghurs it had caught (as Kabul had done previously).Confirmation of this came in the news that when the Taliban swept through, releasing prisoners in Republic custody, a number of Uyghurs prisoners were among those released. Exactly what led to the rupture is unclear, with stories circulating about the proximity of the Republic government to India, unfulfilled information exchange requests, or something financial.

What exactly happened is still unclear. But as the Taliban swept across the country in 2021, China seemed to increasingly pull back from the Republic government and showed itself even more willing to engage with the Taliban. Beijing even hosted top Taliban figure Mullah Baradar and a delegation in Tianjin, where they met with Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in July 2021. Still, Beijing was careful to continue to maintain the appearance of good relations with the Republic. Shortly before the Taliban’s visit, Chinese leaderXi Jinping spoke by telephone with Afghan President Ghani, likely in part to smooth relations. But it was clear that by this point, relations between the Republic and China were in a difficult place.

By late summer of 2021, Beijing had read the runes and concluded that no matter what happened, the Taliban were going to take some degree of power in Kabul, and this mandated establishing closer links. That approach set a path that Beijing was able to take advantage of when the Republic government finally fell and the Taliban took over.

In the wake of the precipitous U.S. and NATO withdrawal, the public discourse around China in Afghanistan went into overdrive. The chaotic nature of the withdrawal fit with a wider narrative –fanned by Beijing (and Moscow, too) – of Western decline. China’s geographical proximity, engagement with the Taliban, as well as longstanding history of announced (if unfulfilled) investments inAfghanistan all fed a narrative of Beijing stepping in to fill a vacuum left by the United States. People saw the reports of vast untapped mineral wealth and assumed the insatiable Chinese industrial machine would be eager to consume it.

Yet in reality these narratives were vastly overblown. China had long been a frustrating partner economically for the Afghan Republic. Deals had been signed, but no progress had been made. Chinese contractors came and worked on infrastructure projects, but little of the money was actually Chinese; rather it was World Bank or other international financial institution projects with the Chinese simply serving as contractors. Trade was underwhelming, and Beijing seemed unwilling to really find ways of tyingAfghanistan into Xi’s connectivity vision, the Belt and Road Initiative. Once the pandemic broke out, China did step in and provide some medical aid, which was welcomed in the beleaguered country, but this was offset by the sudden closure of the Chinese market to Afghanistan.

On the security side, Beijing and the Republic had a fairly easy relationship. The Republic authorities were quite happy to arrest and turn over any Uyghur militants China sought, as they were for the most part fighting for, or allied with, the Taliban. At the same time, they were willing to accept the fact that China maintained a connection to the Taliban, though frustrations did seep through. Reports that the Chinese, at various points, had supplied arms to the Taliban naturally caused tensions, but the Republic government always saw a greater upside in trying to engage withChina economically than become distracted by this frustration, which was not perceived as a strategic issue.

The Republic continually sought to keep China onside. For example, the Republic did not follow the United States in denying the existence of and delisting ETIM, a closing act by the Trump administration to destabilize things with China. Instead, senior Republic officials continued to refer to the group by the name ETIM and highlighted the links between the Taliban and Uyghur militants. They also seemed willing to defend publicly China’s mass detentions and surveillance in Xinjiang, in stark contrast to the narrative Washington was pushing.

The most complicated part of the relationship was Beijing’s ties with Pakistan. Here, Kabul repeatedly hoped that China would use its influence in Islamabad to try and advance concerns they had. Yet, there was little evidence of this happening. While China did establish a trilateral foreign ministerial format between Kabul, Islamabad, and Beijing, as well as use its influence in Islamabad to bring the Taliban and Pakistanis to the table with Kabul at various moments, none of this was able to change the conflict on the ground. And notwithstanding cooperation on counterterrorism questions related to Uyghurs, there was a shadow of paranoia across China’s engagement with the Republic’s security apparatus, thanks to the latter’s deep relationship with the United States.

Afghans were often frustrated by the China-Pakistan EconomicCorridor (CPEC). They pointed out that while China talked about the Belt and Road in Afghanistan, very little was actually forthcoming, in contrast to the billions pumped into Pakistan. Trying to allay this, in 2019, China pushed the idea of encouraging greater cross-border trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan through the establishment of better facilities and refrigeration points for fruits to go back and forth across the border. This fit into a wider pattern of trying to link the CPEC to Afghanistan, an approach that usually found hostility in Islamabad alongside innumerable practical problems on the ground.

The arrival of the Taliban in Kabul changed the dynamic between Kabul and Islamabad (and Beijing), though not necessarily as much as might have been expected. Relations between the Taliban and Islamabad have proven to be as fractious as they were between the Republic and Islamabad. For China, having long cultivated a relationship with the Taliban, it was easy for Beijing to continue operating in Kabul after they took over. The Chinese embassy did not evacuate in the face of the takeover, though they warnedChinese nationals to find ways out of the country or stay in secure locations. Chinese businesspeople in the city reportedly fended for themselves, while the embassy at one point was reduced to calling on Western support to evacuate citizens as their own plans failed.

But once the hump of the takeover was done, China quickly slipped into a strong public support mode, concluding that the Republic was done and Beijing needed to rapidly establish a relationship with the new authorities. Foreign Minister Wang Yi was an active figure on the regional conference circuit, using every opportunity to push for sanctions relief for the new government while his officials regularly taunted Americans over the failure in Afghanistan.

They were also quick to rekindle the formats that Beijing had established between the Republic and Islamabad, as well as try to find ways of engaging with the Taliban through the many regional formats that have developed over the years around the country. The trilateral ministerial engagement was restarted, and Beijing has reportedly also brought together senior intelligence figures from Afghanistan and Pakistan to discuss problems.

On the economic front, they restarted the “pine nut air corridor” that had been established under the Republic. The corridor sought to quickly bring Afghan pine nuts to the Chinese market, and the government helped make sure they were immediately promoted and sold on high-profile online influencer channels. Aid came in to support the ongoing fight against COVID-19. During the winter of2021, the Xinjiang regional government gave just under $50 million in supplies and aid to the authorities in the neighboring Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, and Baghlan.

By November 2022, Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Wang Yu highlighted how his country had given “300 million RMB in emergency aid to Afghanistan and continued to complete 1 billion RMB in bilateral aid.” He also confirmed that as of December 1, zero tariffs would be levied on 98 percent of products from Afghanistan being sold to China. Afghan carpets were on display at the China International Import Expo (CIIE) this year.

But big ticket deals have moved much slower, if at all. While China National Petroleum Corporation and Metallurgical Group Corp, the two firms responsible for the biggest projects in Afghanistan – an oil concession in the Amu Darya region in the north and the Mes Aynak copper mine in Logar – have re-engaged with the Taliban authorities, there is little evidence they are moving quickly forward. In an apparent demonstration of a total lack of awareness of the nature of the project (or the earlier signed contract), the Taliban authorities in early November announced that the Mes Aynak project would need more electricity. This highlighted a larger problem that Chinese operators find on the ground, which isa counterpart in the Taliban that lacks much expertise to manage large projects.

The economic problems resonate across the border in Pakistan, too. In an attempt to save money, Pakistan took advantage of the low cost of Afghan coal and the fact that Afghan coal miners lack export options and increased its purchases. But once the story got out that Pakistan was taking advantage of Afghanistan’s problems, the authorities in Kabul hiked up the price of coal. This, however, blew back on the Chinese power companies working in Pakistan, which had arrived as part of CPEC and had long purchased cheapAfghan coal. They complained to the Taliban and continue to lobby to get them to lower the prices once again. Chinese coal miner Chinalco has even started to engage with the Taliban to explore opportunities in the country to get a direct Chinese hand into the industry.

Looking beyond the economy, however, China’s biggest concern about the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the growing militant nexus that sees China as an important adversary. This has been seen most sharply in Pakistan, where there has been a notable expansion of groups targeting Chinese interests. From being mostly targeted by Baloch or Sindhi separatists, Chinese in Pakistan now find themselves under fire from networks linked to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as rumors of Uyghur militants within the country working with local partners.

The murder of the Karachi University Confucius Institute director by a female suicide bomber dispatched by the Majeed Brigade in April 2022 crossed a new Rubicon as it showed the Baloch groups were broadening out their range of targets from CPEC-specific projects to any Chinese in the country. A number of Chinese nationals evacuated Pakistan afterward.

It seems to be no coincidence that the surge in violence against Chinese nationals happened alongside the Taliban takeover (though it had already been building for some time). At a practical level, the takeover released a vast amount of weaponry left behind by the Afghan National Army and its Western allies, but it also strengthened a number of militant groups, like the TTP or Baloch organizations, that are increasingly targeting Chinese interests in Pakistan and often have bases in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) has put out far more anti-Chinese propaganda than any other organization. It dispatched a suicide bomber who claimed to be aUyghur against a Shia mosque in Kunduz in October last year. In claiming the attack, ISKP specifically referenced Beijing’s close relationship with the Taliban as a motivating factor.

All of this adds up to a deeply worrying threat picture for China. While previously Beijing could somewhat hide behind others (the United States), it is now seen as the big power in the region, and it is finding itself facing all of the problems that come with that label.

Additionally, China has not been able to establish the same sort of security relationship with the Taliban as it had with the Republic. While China has repeatedly demanded that the Taliban do something about Uyghur militants, thus far all the Taliban seem to have done is move them from one part of the country to another, from Badakhshan to provinces in Afghanistan’s interior. There have been reports that the Haqqani-linked parts of the Taliban government have worked to support Chinese aims, but there are no reports of people being captured and repatriated, as happened routinely under the Republic.

In a demonstration perhaps of how comfortable he was in Afghanistan, Abdul Haq, the leader of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP, the name the Uyghur militant group often referred to as ETIM gives itself) released a video of himself talking to a large crowd of followers and their children celebrating Eid 2022 in Afghanistan. As of now, it does not seem as though there is any appetite in the Taliban government to turn over their close allies.

And the reality is that Beijing is not entirely committed either. All of the big economic talk has not resulted in the investment theTaliban desperately want. Rather, there has been a surge of entrepreneurial Chinese businesspeople into Afghanistan, spotting opportunities posed by a nearby country where, broadly stated, violence suddenly diminished and where there were lots of potential mining and other opportunities. Such Chinese entrepreneurs as a group are a hardy bunch. Their risk threshold is much higher than others (witness the challenging parts of Africa where numerous Chinese firms have decided to go). None of what has been seen in Afghanistan seems to be state directed, but rather is pushed by individuals, small companies, and in some cases regional state-owned enterprises. Beijing itself is barely involved, except in allowing permission for individuals to travel and for the potential material to return home.

But even these entrepreneurs find themselves frustrated, with reports that some early investors have already decided it is impossible to do business in Afghanistan and packed up to go home, writing off their large early investments.

The Chinese embassy in Kabul has avoided these negative stories, and instead championed positive ones – like the multi-modal train and truck route that was opened up between Afghanistan and Zhejiang. Home to the massive international trading market at Yiwu, Zhejiang has long been a place where Afghan business people go. Opening up the route was entirely the product of smart Afghans and some folk in Zhejiang, rather than anything coordinated or concocted by Beijing.

This is the reality of the current relationship between China and Afghanistan. While Beijing continues to talk up its positive acts in the country, it has in fact done very little in practical terms. What Chinese activity is taking place on the ground is often driven by private enterprise, and there is a growing level of frustration in Kabul about the slow pace of bigger projects that could have a more substantial impact on the Afghan economy. On the Chinese side, there is frustration about the Taliban’s inability to deliver on outcomes and an awareness that Afghanistan’s problems are already starting to export themselves around the region.

Far from inheriting an opportunity, China finds itself encumbered with an ever expanding roster of problems in Afghanistan which it is showing little interest in trying to resolve. The Taliban remain a frustrating partner, while Pakistan continues to be a source of concern that struggles with security at home while cozying up toChina’s adversary the United States. Never comfortable in an outright leadership role, China finds itself walking a dangerous tightrope in a region where its actual leverage and capability to achieve goals is limited.

Raffaello Pantucci

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