A longer piece for my institutional home in Singapore RSIS and our quarterly journal Counter Terrorism Trends and Analyses (CTTA), this one exploring the great power conflict and terrorism nexus in Africa. The focus is mostly on Russia, but China gets a brief mention too. Am continuing to do a lot of work on the confluence of the two issues which are at the heart of the big geopolitical questions we are seeing play out at the moment.
Counter Terrorism Meets Great Power Conflict in Africa
In parts of the world, there is a growing confluence between terrorist threats and great power conflict. Nowhere has this been clearer than in Africa, where a growing Russian presence under the auspices of counter terrorism is steadily pushing out western forces in an ever-expanding space. The danger for the longer term is that as counter terrorism becomes a proxy for conflict between great powers, attention on such security threats slips under the radar, leaving space for them to grow and multiply further.
Introduction
In December 2021, the political directors of the “Small Group of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS” – an offshoot of the larger Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS which was formed in September 2014 to defeat the terrorist group – met in Belgium to discuss the state of the conflict against the Islamic State (IS).[1] Amongst other announcements to emerge from the session, an “Africa Focus Group” was formed to permit the coalition to “undertake civilian capacity-building programs to help address the ISIS threat across Africa”.[2] The Coalition’s decision to focus on Africa followed a growing pattern of threat assessments which pointed to the continent as the new heart of the IS threat. According to the Global Terrorism Index, in 2021, almost 50 per cent (around 3,461) of the deaths attributed to IS worldwide took place in sub-Saharan Africa.[3] Yet, there has since been a steady retreat by Western counter terrorism forces across Africa as alliances are tested, and a growing Russian presence in Africa pushes the terrorist threat into becoming a strand of the wider geopolitical clashes buffeting the world.
2021 proved to be a particularly challenging year for Western efforts to counter terrorism in Africa. In May, Mali suffered its second coup in a year, leading to a breakdown in relations between Paris – a key player across the Sahelian, mostly Francophone, region – and Bamako. Both France and the United States temporarily suspended aid, only to restart it later in the year. By February 2022, however, Paris concluded the relationship was entirely broken and decided to close down the longstanding Operation Barkhane, which had started in 2013 as part of an effort to counter the growing violent Islamist threat that had almost enveloped the country.
Key behind this French decision was a growing frustration in Paris at the government in Bamako’s unwillingness to fulfil its commitments to the international community,[4] as well as their growing reliance on the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner. In announcing his forces’ withdrawal, President Emmanuel Macron of France stated that Wagner was “arriving in Mali with predatory intentions”. He went on to condemn the Russian presence in Libya and Central African Republic and their alleged “awful abuses against the civilian population”.[5]
The Russian Dimension
Wagner’s presence in Africa is part of a much wider Russian push into the continent which stretches back two decades. In the mid-2000s, Moscow sought to reinvigorate its relationships around Africa as part of an attempt to return the country to the global status that it held during the Soviet era. A major early focus was South Africa, where many of the African National Congress (ANC) party leadership had strong links to Russia through training they had undergone in the country during the period of anti-apartheid struggle.[6] However, it was after the first Russian invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea in 2014 that relations with Africa accelerated, particularly in the security domain. During 2015-2019, Russia signed some 19 government-to-government military agreements in Africa, mostly focused on arms sales.[7]
Wagner, or Russian PMCs more generally, are the latest expression of this Russian push, though it is one that has (until recently) been denied by the Kremlin and its associates. According to research by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., Russian PMCs are identifiable in an African context going back to 2016. The growing relationship was brought into a clearer public focus in October 2019, when Moscow held a Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi where 43 heads of states were hosted by President Vladimir Putin at an event that was heavily focused on Russian defence cooperation and military sales with the continent.[8] Throughout this period, Wagner forces were identified as present across the region, playing roles in conflicts in Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Central African Republic and Mali. In most conflicts, the role was supportive of local authorities and focused on a counter terrorism mission.
It has not always worked, with Mozambique proving an example of where the local IS affiliate was seemingly able to push Wagner out of the country.[9] More worrying, however, has been evidence of Wagner‘s involvement in reported human rights abuses and massacres, issues that are likely to only inflame the tensions which underpin the narratives that foster extremism in the first place.[10]
Western Cooperation and Challenges
For local leaders, Russia’s willingness to provide uncritical support is attractive. This, alongside active disinformation campaigns which seek to play on local tensions with former European colonisers[11] as well as cultivate local figures to help lay the groundwork for Russia’s arrival,[12] have created a context where Russia is seen as a positive alternative to Western partners. Part of the problem for Western countries, however, is that there is often a poor track record of their own efforts in countering terrorism across the region. This can be seen through two metrics: first, the unintended consequence of working through and building up local security forces; and second, through the bitter reality that terrorist groups in the region have been able to expand considerably in the past decade. For example, rather than shrinking, IS has only grown across the continent, while two of Al-Qaeda (AQ)’s most effective remaining affiliates – Al-Shabaab in East Africa and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in North Africa – have continued to thrive.
One of the major pillars of Western counter terrorism efforts in Africa has been to develop local forces who are then able to help lead the local efforts at countering terrorist group expansion. This has, unfortunately, generated some unintended consequences. For example, Africa has seen 12 coup d’états since 2020.[13] Many (if not all) have been led by officers who had been through training programmes guided by the US (or allied) military under the aegis of counter terrorism cooperation.[14] In a particularly awkward moment, in September 2021, soldiers being trained under such a programme in Guinea left their US Green Beret trainers to participate in the overthrow of the authorities in the capital Conakry.[15] In Somalia, the special force developed by the US to counter Al-Shabaab and IS became so entangled in local politics that it had to suspend its counter terrorism activities.[16] In both cases, the core counter terrorism goals for which the forces were initially assembled were clearly impacted, even if only temporarily.
Another problem is that local forces do not always follow the rules of engagement or practise behaviour that their Western supporters would like or train them for. A recent grim Reuters investigation uncovered massive human rights abuses by Nigerian military forces in their conflict against militants in the northeast of the country.[17] Earlier reports in Kenya linked the elite Western-supported anti-terrorism force to numerous extrajudicial killings.[18] One such murder that was never resolved was the shooting of extremist cleric Mohammed Rogo, a senior figure in East African jihadist circles with close links to Al-Shabaab and AQ networks around the region. Shot in his car in September 2012, his murder led to widespread violence and radicalisation but was never formally solved.[19] His image continues to feature prominently in extremist material emanating from both IS- and AQ-linked groups across East Africa.
Growth of Extremist Groups
The most obvious expression of failure, however, has been the growth of extremist groups in Africa. During the pandemic, for example, Africa was one of the few places where terrorist threats and violence actually increased.[20] The Islamic State of Western Africa Province (ISWAP) has, in particular, shown itself to be a highly successful organisation which has displaced the AQ-aligned Boko Haram as the preeminent extremist group in the Lake Chad basin.[21] Groups operating in the Sahel linked to both IS- and AQ-backed groups in the region have increasingly expanded their presence south, reaching into countries previously untouched by such problems, like Benin and Togo.
On the opposite end of the continent, Al-Shabaab continues to be highly resilient, substantial and ambitious in the face of repeated campaigns against it.[22] Threat groups in Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have all adopted IS messaging and links highlighting the group’s ideological expansion across the continent. Some of these links appear to be supported by money flowing between them,[23] while in other cases there is clear frustration by the African affiliates that they are not able to get the attention of the core IS leadership.[24]
Evolving CT Support
All of this has taken place against a context in which Western forces have continued to seek deployments and play roles in countering terrorist groups in the continent. It is consequently not entirely surprising (notwithstanding clear disinformation campaigns and likely corrupt practices by Russian actors) to find that local authorities find Western support efforts ineffective and are willing to explore other alternatives like those offered by Russia. The answer to this so far by Western governments has been to try to call out Russian efforts, but also to withdraw and seek to support more local initiatives to undertake counter terrorism efforts in the region.
For example, following the collective withdrawal from operations in Mali by Western forces, the decision was made to support the Accra agreement, which called for regional powers using structures like the G5 grouping and ECOWAS (with African Union support) to take a leadership role in working with the Malian authorities to deal with the threats they face.[25] This partner-led effort is at the core of the current US thinking, which seeks to encourage local forces to take on the militant groups, with the US and other allies playing a supportive role in the background.
This has not, however, stopped Western forces continuing to take a proactive kinetic role where required. The recent death of IS in Somalia leader Bilal al-Sudani in a US special forces raid highlighted this, and his death is merely the latest in a long list of kinetic actions that the US in particular has taken across the continent to deal with specific menaces.[26] France has continued to undertake such missions too – for example, the killing of Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) leader Adnan Abou Walid al Sahraoui, even as French forces withdrew from Mali.[27] Such strikes demonstrate a capability by Western forces to reach in and strike individuals of concern, even as the wider operating environment becomes complicated. Whether this overwatch capability can be maintained as forces withdraw further will have to be seen.
However, it is clear that this targeted kinetic capability and local security development is unlikely to eradicate terrorism on the continent. The deep-seated issues that foster an environment in which extremist groups can grow goes far deeper. In part to answer this, there has been an increasing push to increase aid and support to Africa. Over time, billions of dollars have been spent on the continent, and this has been further boosted. The US has promised a new fund of some US$2 billion this year,[28] while the EU has offered hundreds of millions through different funds (for example, a €100 million fund to support teachers,[29] a €175 million for humanitarian aid in Central and West Africa,[30] and an additional €25.5 million in humanitarian aid in January 2023[31]), as well as a promise of a whopping €150 billion in investment over seven years at the EU-Africa Summit in February 2022.[32]
At the same time, there has been an effort to push a narrative of trying to help Africa stand up and develop by itself and not simply be an aid recipient – something reflected in US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s January 2023 10-day visit to Africa, which sought to highlight the ambition with which the United States wanted to engage with the continent.[33]
Jostle For Geopolitical Influence
The driver of this engagement, however, is not counter terrorism (even though the aid may help to deal with some of the underlying development issues which underpin radicalisation), but rather a range of issues from migration (in a European-specific context), to wider geopolitical plays against China and Russia. Both powers are perceived to be increasingly competing for influence in Africa, using a mix of hard security, investment, aid, development and wider support. This plays against the wider context of geopolitical competition between the West and China-Russia. China, in particular, has offered billions to a variety of African countries in terms of infrastructure investments and opportunities. Russia has contributed less in these terms, but has sought to offer some non-military support in the form of food or hydrocarbons.
Whilst there is little evidence of the two directly cooperating in Africa, it is clear that both China and Russia have identified counter terrorism as an issue through which they can engage with Africa to Western detriment and ultimately their own benefit. Whilst Moscow’s activities have already been highlighted, China has sought to displace the US from key counter terrorism bases in Kenya[34] as well as spoken at a United Nations (UN) level against sanctions placed on African countries dealing with terrorist threats.[35] This has translated into support for China and Russia in other UN votes, for example, on issues surrounding Xinjiang or Ukraine. Highlighting how much geopolitics has started to become entangled with local issues, the South African Development Community (SADC), made up of 16 nations, actively condemned US legislation that sought to counter Russian malign influence in Africa.[36] Counter terrorism, it appears, has become a tool of great power conflict in Africa.
Outlook
The specific impact on Western counter terrorism efforts continues. The current focus of attention is Burkina Faso, which, following a coup last year, has appeared to follow the path already taken by neighbouring Mali and turned on France as a counter terrorism partner. This led to a decision by Paris to close down its counter terrorism operation there as well.[37] Again, similar to developments in Mali,[38] this was preceded by an active Russian disinformation campaign as well as consistent rumours of Wagner deployment.[39] It is not clear that this is going to happen, but there has been a noticeable volume of statements from the government in Ouagadougou that the relationship with Moscow has been strengthening. Should Wagner, the private military firm, be deployed, it will be widely interpreted as further evidence of Western loss and Russian gain, with little focus actually paid to the terrorist threat which underpins the security attention in the first place.
This is likely to be the most damaging effect of the growing focus on African terrorism through the lens of great power politics. The attention on the actual threat will likely fall to the wayside as powers compete for influence or seek to keep each other out. This could create a space in which groups can develop further or, as has been seen in the context of some Russian deployments, problems actually get worse. And while thus far, most Africa groups appear quite regionally focused, the danger is that over time, a capability and space could develop into which more dangerous outward-facing groups could establish themselves.
About the Author
Raffaello Pantucci is a Senior Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at israffaello@ntu.edu.sg
Thumbnail photo by Pawel Janiak on Unsplash
Citations
[1] “Political Directors Small Group Meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS,” Media Note, US Department of State, December 3, 2021 https://www.state.gov/political-directors-small-group-meeting-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-daesh-isis/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] “Global Terrorism Index 2022,” Institute for Economics and Peace, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022.
[4] “Joint Declaration on the Fight Against the Terrorist Threat and the Support to Peace and Security in the Sahel and West Africa,” Elysée, February 17, 2022, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/02/17/joint-declaration-on-the-fight-against-the-terrorist-threat.
[5] “Macron Warns of ‘Predatory’ Russian Mercenaries in Mali,” France24, February 17, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220217-macron-warns-of-predatory-russian-mercenaries-in-mali.
[6] Paul Stronski, “Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_Paul_Stronski_-_Russia-Africa-v31.pdf.
[7] Federica Saini Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, Commercial Concessions, Rights Violations, and Counterinsurgency Failure,” Brookings Institution, February 8, 2022,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/.
[8] Henry Foy, “Russia Turns on the Charm at First Africa Summit,” The Financial Times, October 24, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/b042bd8e-f648-11e9-9ef3-eca8fc8f2d65.
[9] “Moscow Remains Involved in Cabo Delgado Despite Wagner’s Exit,” Africa Intelligence, February 2, 2021, https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2021/12/02/moscow-remains-involved-in-cabo-delgado-despite-wagner-s-exit,109708624-gra.
[10] “Wagner Group Operations in Africa,” ACLED, August 30, 2022, https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/.
[11] Grigor Atanesian, “Russia in Africa: How Disinformation Operations Target the Continent,” BBC, February 1, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64451376.
[12] Benjamin Roger and Mathieu Olivier, “Wagner in Mali: An Exclusive Investigation Into Putin’s Mercenaries,” The Africa Report, February 18, 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/178331/wagner-in-mali-an-exclusive-investigation-into-putins-mercenaries/.
[13] Peter Mwai, “Are Military Takeovers On the Rise in Africa?” BBC, January 4, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600.
[14] Michael M. Phillips, “In Africa, US Trained Militaries Are Ousting Civilian Governments in Coups,” The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-africa-u-s-trained-militaries-are-ousting-civilian-governments-in-coups-11649505601.
[15] Delan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, “US Forces Were Training the Guinean Soldiers Who Took Off to Stage a Coup,” The New York Times, September 10, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/africa/guinea-coup-americans.html.
[16] Michael M. Phillips, “Caught in a Political Crossfire, US Trained Somali Commandos Suspend Fight Against Islamic State,” The Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/caught-in-a-political-crossfire-u-s-trained-somali-commandos-suspend-fight-against-islamic-state-11639145293.
[17] “Nightmare in Nigeria,” Reuters, December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/section/nigeria-military/.
[18] “We’re Tired of Taking You to the Court: Human Rights Abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit,” Open Society Justice Initiative, November 20, 2013, https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/were-tired-taking-you-court-human-rights-abuses-kenyas-anti-terrorism-police-unit.
[19] Joseph Akwiri, “Kenyan Cleric Shot Dead, Sparks Riots in Mombasa,” Reuters, August 27, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-riots-idUSBRE87Q0UP20120827.
[20] “Political Violence: January 1 – December 31, 2020,” Review, Chicago Project on Security & Threats, March 2021.
[21] Maman Inoua Elhadji Mahamadou Amadou and Vincent Foucher, “Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin: The Bakura Faction and its Resistance to the Rationalisation of Jihad,” SWP Policy Brief, December 2022, https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA_PB_Foucher_ElHadji_Bakura_EN.pdf
[22] There is, however, some hope seen by analysts in the current anti-Shabaab push by the authorities. Stig Jarle Hansen, “Can Somalia’s New Offensive Defeat Al-Shabaab?” CTC Sentinel Vol. 16, No.1 (2023), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/can-somalias-new-offensive-defeat-al-shabaab/.
[23] “IS in Somalia ‘Letter’ Discusses Sending Funds to Other Branches,” BBC, January 27, 2023, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c2041zu6.
[24] A letter emerged in 2022 which seemed to suggest that the ISWAP head had been sending communications to ISIS core as early as 2017 and receiving no reply.
[25] “Joint Declaration on the Fight Against the Terrorist Threat and the Support to Peace and Security in the Sahel and West Africa,” Elysée, February 17, 2022, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/02/17/joint-declaration-on-the-fight-against-the-terrorist-threat.
[26] Cecilia Macaulay, “Bilal al-Sudani: US Forces Kill Islamic State Somalia Leader in Cave Complex,” BBC, January 27, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64423598.
[27] “French Troops Kill Leader of Islamic State Group in Sahel, Macron Says,” France24, September 16, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210915-french-troops-neutralise-leader-of-islamic-state-in-the-greater-sahara-macron-says.
[28] “United States to Provide $2 Billion in Humanitarian Assistance for the People of Africa,” USAID Office of Press Relations, December 15, 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/dec-15-2022-united-states-provide-2-billion-humanitarian-assistance-people-africa.
[29] “Quality Education in Africa: EU Launches €100 million Regional Teachers’ Initiative,” EU Commission Press Release, January 26, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_288.
[30] “EU Announces €175 Million in Humanitarian Aid for West and Central Africa,” EU Commission Press Release, January 27, 2022, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-announces-eu175-million-eu-humanitarian-aid-west-and-central-africa-2022-01-27_en.
[31] “Humanitarian Aid: EU Allocates Additional €25.5 Million in African Countries,” EU Commission Press Release, January 12, 2023, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/humanitarian-aid-eu-allocates-additional-eu255-million-african-countries-2023-01-12_en.
[32] Kingsley Ighobor, “EU-AU Summit 2022: The EU Wants to Be Africa’s Friend in Need – And Indeed,” UN Africa Renewal, March 21, 2022, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/eu-au-summit-2022-eu-wants-be-africa%E2%80%99s-friend-need%E2%80%94and-indeed.
[33] Edward A. Burrier, “Four Takeaways from Treasury Secretary Yellen’s Trip to Africa,” United States Institute for Peace, February 1, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/02/four-takeaways-treasury-secretary-yellens-trip-africa.
[34] Michael M. Phillips, “Fears of Losing Out to China Put US Under Pressure Over Kenya Base,” The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/fears-of-losing-out-to-china-put-u-s-under-pressure-over-kenya-base-11675313752.
[35] “Remarks by Ambassador Zhang Jun, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, At the Security Council High-Level Debate on ‘Counter Terrorism in Africa’,” Chinese Mission to the United Nations, November 10, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202211/t20221112_10973113.html.
[36] “SADC Protests New US Law on Africa-Russia Relations,” The Citizen, August 19, 2022, https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/sadc-protests-new-us-law-on-africa-russia-relations-3919698.
[37] Cecilia Macaulay and Joseph Winter, “Burkina Faso Unrest: France Agrees to Pull Its Troops Out,” BBC, January 26, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64397730.
[38] Benjamin Roger and Mathieu Olivier, “Wagner in Mali: An Exclusive Investigation Into Putin’s Mercenaries,” Africa Report, February 18, 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/178331/wagner-in-mali-an-exclusive-investigation-into-putins-mercenaries/.
[39] Sam Mednick, “Russian Role in Burkina Faso Crisis Comes Under Scrutiny,” Associated Press, October 18, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-africa-france-west-a6384d7134e8688c367a68721f657857.
Raffaello Pantucci 