Archive for the ‘Oriental Morning Post’ Category

China Should Develop its Role in Afghanistan

Posted: June 12, 2012 in Oriental Morning Post
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Another new article pegged to the recent events in Beijing, this time focused on the China-Afghanistan relationship for a Chinese paper that I sometimes write for, 东方早报 (Oriental Morning Post). I try to offer some tangible ideas for what China could do. I should point out that this was written prior to the events last week, so some of the ideas that I mention seem to have been part of the subsequent agreements. Not sure I can take credit, but hopefully these things will feed the general conversation in China subsequent to last week’s announcements. I have pasted the full english text below the Chinese, and would point out that the last paragraph in English didn’t make the Chinese version. I have also saved readers here of seeing the picture of me that they included in the Chinese version, to see that go to the link in the title to the article.

中国如何在阿富汗更有作为
作者 潘睿凡   发表于2012-06-12 03:05

上合组织北京峰会上周决定以观察员国的身份接纳阿富汗。
潘睿凡
上海社科院访问学者

　　上合组织北京峰会上周决定以观察员国的身份接纳阿富汗，中国与该国总理卡尔扎伊在单独双边会谈中签署了战略协议，透露出中国愿意在邻国的未来中发挥更大的作用。不过，中国眼下在阿富汗并非主要玩家，这一点在我不久前遍访喀布尔，不断询问中国在阿富汗的利益及其影响力时，屡次得以显现。目前阿富汗人主要的注意力都集中在美国2014年从阿富汗的撤军，及其对于该国未来的意义。

实际上，在阿富汗很难见到中国存在的证据。当2008年阿富汗安全局势恶化以后，很多曾经充斥当地市场以及开餐馆的中国商人关门回国了。留下来的中国人如同其他当地的外国人一样保持低调，躲在高墙以及安全人员的保卫之下。但是在战略层面上，中国却十分显眼，刚赢得了艾娜克（位于喀布尔东南）铜矿的开采合同，以及在阿姆河（阿富汗北部）一处气田的开发权。

从这些大合同中，我们可以看见中国如何能够在这个国家扮演更大和更积极角色。

艾娜克铜矿位于贫穷的洛加尔省，铜矿的开采及其他相关基础设施项目建设（如铁路、公路、发电厂、煤矿坑以及学校等）将创造更多的就业和商业机会，惠及该地区。

在阿姆河天然气田项目上，由于中石油同意以十分优惠的条件与阿富汗政府一道开发，当地的分析人士认为这折射出中石油对该地区未来石油项目开发的兴趣。这被视为中国在阿富汗的长期利益。在政治层面上，将阿富汗提升至上合组织内部“观察员国”身份的决定也显示出中国推动的区域组织正在对阿富汗的未来做出积极的承诺。

不过，在和阿富汗官员、政客以及当地人交流时，他们理解的却不是这个道理。相反，他们指出了中国将大量的援助与投资投向了巴基斯坦，而非他们，并且相信中国更青睐巴基斯坦，而非阿富汗。此外，对于阿富汗开通瓦罕走廊的长期请求，因为对该项目所进行的无止境的可行性研究而被忽略，这被视为是中国的一大策略。更为明显的是，在新疆的答普塔尔（音译，Daptar，中阿边境最后一座中国的小镇），喀喇昆仑山高速路穿过这座小城，通过Kunjerab哨口连接巴基斯坦，而通往阿富汗的道路却依然是尘土飞扬。阿富汗人觉得自己错过了与中国这个经济巨人进行贸易而潜藏的巨大利益，还觉得这是被故意切断的。

在许多方面，中国的观点是容易理解的。阿富汗目前面临安全问题，开放边境可能将其问题直接引入中国。但是，问题在于，除了上文提到的几个大项目之外，似乎再没什么证据显示中国在如何对待阿富汗及如何着手应对2014年美军撤出后的局面问题上存在更长远的大战略。

喀布尔的民众不断追问中国对于阿富汗的策略是什么，大多数人的结论是，没有人在这个问题上有着清晰的思考。

这是一个问题，因为阿富汗的局势会对中亚和南亚产生直接影响。从与阿富汗接壤的杜尚别（塔吉克斯坦首都）及塔什干（乌兹别克斯坦首都）的官员和专家们的谈话中，可以感受到他们对2014年的不确定性极为担忧。而塔吉克斯坦与乌兹别克斯坦的不稳定与不确定性又会波及整个中亚地区，进而波及中国新疆，影响中国在中亚地区的投资。往南看，如果阿富汗变成一个乱摊子，巴基斯坦也会遭殃，中国在巴利益也将进一步受到直接影响，中国已经承接的通过巴基斯坦直达波斯湾海域的大型项目也难以独善其身。

喀布尔内部的期望值并不高。他们并不是期望中国会派遣军队保卫其安全，或是中国会突然到来，取代美国成为主导玩家。相反，他们期望中国可以阐释一个更为清晰的阿富汗战略：努力通过大量战略性经济投资推动当地的稳定和安全。眼下的这些投资在当地被视为有“寄生性”，而哪些努力可以实现稳定仍模糊不清。

这是世界上的一个长久以来充斥着不安全的“大锅炉”，与中国相邻，中国在那里也有着显而易见的战略利益。将阿富汗正式纳入上合组织可以看作一个良好的开始，而中阿战略协议的达成进一步释放出中国愿意参与邻国未来建设的信号。不过，现在是中国明确自己的阿富汗战略，并做出对于该国安全、繁荣与稳定的未来更加明显承诺的时候了。

这一战略可以通过一系列方式得以实现：首先，中国政府可以帮助解决中冶集团(MCC)眼下在当地遇到的麻烦，并让项目进行起来。这将意味着帮助阿富汗政府解决一些官僚问题，而北京方面的集中关注可能有助于这一进程的加速。第二，中国可以更多聚焦于将阿富汗的基础设施（能源线、管道、公路和铁路）与地区网络连接起来——这将有助于阿富汗融入地区发展之中。第三，中-巴-阿三边会谈应该扩展至将除了外交官之外的更多行为体纳入其中，包括国有企业和经济部门。这将有助于把相关行为体聚集到一块儿，共同讨论发展，促进更大的地区融合。第四，中国应该引导上合组织朝着更加积极应对毒品问题的方向迈进。眼下，该组织谈得多，而做得少。在边境监控上加大力度，为阿富汗农民提供除了种植毒品作物之外的其他选择，都是中国引导下的上合组织可以聚焦的项目，这些都将有助于阿富汗逐步摆脱对毒品种植的依赖。（张娟 译）

录入编辑：李琪

China Should Develop its role in Afghanistan

This week’s decision by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to make Afghanistan an observer member and President Karzai’s separate bilateral meeting to sign a strategic agreement with China are signals that China is eager to play a greater role in Afghanistan’s future. However, while these high level actions are positive demonstrations of intent by Beijing, China needs to be sure to follow through if it is to be seen to be playing a greater role in stabilizing its neighbour after the American withdrawal in 2014. Currently, China is not a major player in Afghanistan. A fact that was repeatedly made clear as I went around Kabul asking about China’s interests and influence in the country. Afghans would clearly like to see China play a role, but from what they can see at the moment, China is instead focused on taking Afghanistan’s natural resources while others guarantee security and work to stabilize the country.

There is very little visible evidence of Chinese presence in the country. Many Chinese traders who used to populate the markets or run restaurants closed down and returned home in 2008 as the security situation deteriorated. Those that are left keep a low profile, like most foreigners in the country, reduced to hiding behind high walls and security teams. But at a strategic economic level, China is very visible, winning large contracts to mine for copper in Aynak (southeast of Kabul) and a contract to open a gas field in Amu Darya (in the north of the country).

And in these large contracts we can see how China could play a bigger and more positive role in the country. Aynak sits in Logar province, an underdeveloped region that would benefit from the jobs and opportunity the copper mine and other infrastructure (trains, roads, a power station, coal mine and local schools) that come with the project would bring. And analysts spoken to on the ground believe that the very favorable terms that CNPC agreed to develop the gas field with the Afghan government in Amu Darya are a sign of CNPC’s desire for future oil projects in the region. This is interpreted as a long-term interest in Afghanistan. And at a political level, this week’s announcements in Beijing at the SCO Summit are a sign that the regional body is paying attention to Afghanistan, while the signing of an agreement between Afghanistan and China are a show of the bilateral relationship.

But when talking to officials, politicians and locals in Afghanistan this sense is not what is being understood. Instead people point to the large amounts of aid and investment that China puts into Pakistan rather than them and believe that China prefers Pakistan over Afghanistan. Furthermore, the long-standing requests for the Wakhan Corridor to be opened have been answered with a lengthy feasibility study into whether the project can be done. This is seen as a Chinese strategy of simply sealing off Afghanistan from China and letting it resolve its security problems by itself. Something even more visible on the ground in Daptar in Xinjiang (the last border town before Afghanistan in China), where the Karakoram Highway sweeps magnificently through the village and on to the Kunjerab Pass with Pakistan while the road to Afghanistan remains a closed dusty track. Afghanistan feels it is missing out on the potential trade benefits with the Chinese economic giant and feels like it is being purposely cut off.

And in many ways this Chinese perspective is easy to understand. Afghanistan is currently a security problem and opening the border might let trouble flow directly into China. But the problem is that aside from the big projects mentioned earlier, there is little evidence of a larger Chinese strategy of what to do with Afghanistan and what to be preparing for after 2014 and the American withdrawal. In Kabul people kept asking what the Chinese strategy was for Afghanistan, with most concluding that there was no clear thinking going into this subject.

This is a problem, as what happens in Afghanistan will have a direct impact on Central and South Asia. Talking to officials and local experts in Dushanbe and Tashkent, who sit on the border with Afghanistan, there is a high level of concern about what 2014 means. And instability and uncertainty in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is something that will impact the entire Central Asian region and therefore Xinjiang, as well as Chinese investments in throughout region. Looking south: Pakistan will also suffer if Afghanistan falls into chaos, something that will further have direct impact on Chinese interests in the country, but also the great projects that China has undertaken to connect itself to the warm waters of the Gulf through Pakistan.

Expectations in Kabul are not very high. The hope is not that China will deploy forces to guarantee security or that China will suddenly come and replace America as the main player in the nation. Instead, the hope is that China will instead enunciate a clearer strategy towards the nation that ties in efforts to improve stability and security with large strategic economic investments. Currently on the ground the investments are seen as holding pieces of territory without investing in them, while what efforts towards stability are either invisible or considered irrelevant. And at a political level, while the brokering of a China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral was an interesting and positive development, it is unclear that it has changed much on the ground.

All of this in a region of the world that has long been a cauldron of insecurity and which is adjacent to China and in which China has quite obvious strategic interests. The decision to bring Afghanistan further into the SCO framework is a good start and the strategic agreement a further signal of China’s willingness to participate in the country’s future, but the time has come for China to clearly enunciate its strategy towards Afghanistan and to make a more visible commitment towards the country’s secure, prosperous and stable future.

This could come in a number of different ways: first, China could help companies like MCC resolve their current difficulties on the ground and get projects going. This would require helping the Afghan government resolve some bureaucratic issues, but focused attention from Beijing might help speed this process up. Secondly, China could focus more attention on getting Afghanistan’s infrastructure (energy lines, pipelines, roads, trains) connected to regional networks – this will help bind the country into its region and help development. Thirdly, the China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral format should be expanded to bring more actors to the table beyond diplomats, like state owned companies and economic ministries. This will help bring relevant actors to the table to discuss development together and help foster greater regional integration. And fourthly, China should help steer the SCO in the direction of more active counter-narcotics work. Currently, the organization talks about the problem a lot without doing much visibly. Encouraging greater border surveillance, stopping the flows of precursor drugs into the country and offering farmers alternatives to growing drug crops are all projects that the SCO could focus on with Chinese leadership and would help Afghanistan move beyond reliance on this crop.

But the most significant move that China could make is to ensure that it makes further visible progress in its relationship on the ground with Afghanistan before the American withdrawal in 2014. It is understandable that China wants to wait to see what the environment looks like post-2014; but at the same time, whatever the scenario post-2014, Afghanistan will still be next door to China. So waiting is somewhat unnecessary and is only going to delay development in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s future is clearly going to be both important and to some degree tied to China’s. China is in a position to play a very positive role in fostering a peaceful future for the nation, starting work on it now is something that will only reap dividends.

The Dangers on the Path of Being a Large Power

Posted: February 8, 2012 in Oriental Morning Post
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A new article in today’s 东方早报 (Oriental Morning Post), a daily paper in China that I write a semi-regular column for. This was intended to come out last week talking a bit about China’s growing problems with citizens abroad and the dangerous places they are, and was meant to be pegged to the kidnapping the workers in Sudan, but it took a bit longer than expected. Consequently, there is no mention of the Syrian veto, which I might have added some comment on. Maybe a short piece later this week on that topic. But in the meantime, I have pasted the English I submitted below, and the Mandarin version below that. The title of this post is the title they ended up going with.

Why Do They Hate Us?

This has been a busy week for Chinese concerns abroad. In Egypt a group of 25 men were kidnapped and then released as part of a local dispute, while in Norway a court case was concluded in which the plotters had, amongst other targets, discussed aiming at the Chinese Embassy in Oslo, and in Sudan a group of 29 Sinohydro employees languish in custody under the “protection” of rebels. Chinese citizens and interests seem to increasingly be coming under target abroad, an unavoidable reality that offers China a moment to finally come out from its shell and become an active player in global affairs.

None of the scenarios listed above is particularly new. We have seen numerous Chinese workers and citizens toiling in foreign lands get into trouble before now. One need only look back last year to the over 30,000 Chinese workers who had to be evacuated from the chaos in Libya, and the thousands of others rescued from Egypt and Tunisia. In part this is the result of the fact that Chinese workers are increasingly finding themselves going to more dangerous parts of the world to dig for resources or build infrastructure and in part it is because there are simply so many Chinese workers now being sent all around the world. But in addition, it is because people now realize that snatching Chinese citizens is something that will guarantee getting attention.

This is the darker side of becoming a global power. Becoming the world’s second largest nation by GDP is something to be proud of, but it is also going to attract a certain amount of unwanted attention. This comes from people who are angry and feel they are missing out, people who are looking for a quick buck and see that China is now flush with money (and therefore see Chinese workers as rich pickings), but also people who have causes that they want global attention for. It used to be that if you wanted to get headlines for your cause, you had to snatch a group of westerners (look at the unknown numbers of Europeans being held by al Qaeda linked groups and criminal networks in North Africa) – nowadays, it is clear that Chinese workers will guarantee you the same sort of attention.

In something of a self-propagating cycle, this increased attention comes in part as a result of increased Chinese government efforts to go in and save citizens that have gotten into trouble in dark corners of the globe. Since the workers were snatched in Sudan the story has been front-page news in China, forcing pressure on the Chinese government to go and do something about it. Teams have been dispatched by Beijing while news outlets churn out news and Weibo is full of people discussing the fate of the group and evaluating the government’s response. All of which is having the effect of bringing attention to the group in Sudan who had kidnapped the Sinohydro workers, which is exactly what they wanted.

The Chinese officials that have been sent out to resolve this issue will find themselves being involved in a local conversation that China has been part of for a while. For selfish reasons of investment protection, China has long played a constructive role in trying to bring resolution to Sudan’s problems, and these previously nurtured contacts will no doubt help bring this latest situation to a close. And this reality highlights the very shifting nature of China’s role in the world and the long cherished “non interference principle.” Clearly the time has not come for China to start to gallop around the world asserting itself, but the time is happening that China is being forced to play a role in world affairs if only to protect its increasingly broad and diverse interests.

China is now seen as a global power. This reality has two results that come with it: a domestic audience who increasingly feel as though their government should be doing more to advance and protect their interests in the world, and a certain amount of antagonism globally, as China becomes part of the “resented face of globalization” as one American academic put it a couple of years ago. All of which requires China to be actively engaged in international affairs to ensure that their interests and people can be protected globally.

None of this is to call for China to start actively interfering in others affairs, but clearly a deeper understanding and engagement of the world is important. Rapid response teams need to be developed that are attuned to local issues that can be deployed to help citizens in distress and local embassies need to ensure that they have a good sense of how many citizens are actually in their area. One problem to have emerged from the Arab Spring last year was a sense that Chinese ministries had no clear idea of how many citizens were actually working in some of these countries – getting a grasp on this is important in figuring out how to prepare. In addition, China needs to build on its already positive forward posture taken with the anti-piracy missions off Somalia and its activity in peacekeeping operations globally to establish a more cooperative approach to its involvement in international missions to address global problems. China clearly benefits from aspects of the security umbrella that the United States and other western powers project, contributing more to these efforts is something that would be in everyone’s interests.

But there is a deeper psychological aspect to this question. Not the argument that China should do more in the world (the debate that China is a “global free-rider is an old one), but the fact that Chinese citizens are now starting to find themselves edging around the incomprehensible global dilemma “why do they hate us?” In the wake of September 11, 2001, American’s woke up to this and realized that there were people in the world who deeply resented the path their nation was taking. This was a shock to a country that had always viewed its role in international affairs as essentially benign and positive. And in China now we are starting to see the contours of this same debate. As China ascends, no matter how hard it tries to remain a benign force, it will find itself taking sides and those on the other side will resent China as a result. This will have a knock-on effect that can be very hard to predict, but will leave some Chinese citizens wondering what it is they have done to deserve this. Unfortunately, this is a reality of the world that we live in where there are winners and losers and those on the bottom will use any means they can to get at those at the top.

潘睿凡 2012－02－08 03：24
随着中国的崛起，无论它怎样努力地保持低姿态，它还是会发现，总有人站在其对立面。
潘睿凡　　国际激进主义研究　　中心研究员

随着中国的崛起，无论它怎样努力地保持低姿态，它还是会发现，总有人站在其对立面。

过去的一周对中国而言是充满海外担忧的一周。25名中国人在埃及无辜被绑架，只是因为当地人之间的一场争端。与此同时，挪威一地方法院对策划袭击中国驻奥斯陆大使馆一案进行了结案审理。在苏丹，29名中国水电公司工人被当地反政府武装绑架。中国公民和利益似乎逐渐成为海外袭击目标，这种不可避免的现实趋势使得中国不得不反省是否应跳出约束，在全球事务中表现更积极的一面。

上述事件并非新事。我们目睹过多次中国工人和公民在海外陷入这样的麻烦，在去年中国政府成功解救回国的3万多名中国工人中，大部分身陷利比亚国内动乱，还有数千名其他中国工人在埃及和突尼斯骚乱中获救。背后的事实是，一方面，大量的中国工人因为中国“走出去”战略而被派赴海外，另一方面，有人意识到，绑架中国公民肯定会引起更多关注。

这是成长为全球大国的黑暗一面。GDP增长为世界第二大经济体是值得骄傲的事情，但这同时也会招致“额外”的关注。这些“额外”关注可能来自于那些生气的、感到被遗忘的人，那些想通过劫持有钱的中国公民而一举发财的人，也可能来自于那些想获得全球关注的人。在过去，激进组织如果想成为国际头条，他们会绑架西方人（比如与基地有关的组织和南非犯罪网络曾经绑架过不明数量的欧洲人）。而现在，显然绑架中国工人铁定能获取这种关注。

这种效应是中国政府救援本国海外公民努力的一个副产品。问题在于，救援力度越大，绑架中国公民引起关注的可能性就越大。当中国工人在苏丹被绑架，消息上了中国报纸的头条，这会施压政府去采取一些行动。北京派出了工作组，而新闻和微博平台充满人们对被绑工人命运和政府回应的讨论。这对绑架者来说，正是他们想要的。

被派去解决问题的中国官员将会发现自己置身于关于当地事务的对话中。出于保护投资的原因，中国长久以来在苏丹的问题中扮演一个致力于带来解决方案的建设性角色，先前中国与苏丹的那些合同毫无疑问可让绑架事件告一段落。这个事实显示了中国在世界上作用的实质在发生变化。中国显然还未到四处“展示肌肉”的时候，但如果只是为了保护其日益增长多样化的海外利益，中国已经到了不得不在全球事务中发挥作用的时候。

中国目前已经被视为一个全球性的大国。这将引起两方面的反应：一方面，国内有更多的呼声，要求政府进一步保障和发展中国的海外利益；另一方面，则是在国际上，树大招风，中国可能被当作“全球化中令人讨厌的面孔”（某位美国学者在几年前的评价），激发国际上某种程度的敌对态度。为应对这些情况，中国需要更加积极地投身于国际事务之中，从而保证它的利益，保护其国民在世界各地不受侵犯。

但是，在开始积极行动之前，中国必须要对当前世界有更深入的了解，需要设立一些“快速反应小组”以协调地方事务，而地方官员也要实事求是深入了解本地实情。在“阿拉伯之春”系列事件中暴露出的一个问题是：当时中国有关部门无法在第一时间精确统计在那些中东国家中工作的中国工人数目——而这对于应急预案的提前制定具有重要意义。另外，中国应该进一步发挥它在国际维和以及打击索马里海盗等行动中的积极态度，从而能够在解决全球问题方面进行更广泛的合作，发挥更具建设性的作用。在目前美国等西方国家所主导的国际安全体系下，中国已经成为某种程度上的受益者，如果它能更多地做出一些贡献，那必将更有益。

但这个问题也另外有着深刻的心理因素。且不提“在世界上发挥更多的作用”这类话题（“中国在全球搭顺风车”，这已经是老生常谈），而现在的实际情况就是，中国人发现他们正逐渐陷入这样一种难以理解的窘境——“他们为什么不喜欢我们？” 回头看看2001年的美国，到9月11日那天他们才恍然发现，原来这世上竟有人是如此地憎恨其“美式道路”。这令一个一直自豪于自己善意积极之国际角色的国家大为震惊。而在中国，我们已经依稀看到了相似的问题轮廓。随着中国的崛起，无论它怎样努力地保持低姿态，它还是会发现，总有人站在其对立面。这将引发哪些间接后果，也许现在还难以预料，但这肯定会让一些中国人心生疑惑——我们哪里做错了？而这个世界的残酷现实就是：这世上，有人输、有人赢，那些最底下的人势必会用尽一切手段来找你的麻烦。（白澜 译）

Middle East Challenges Facing China in 2012

Posted: January 10, 2012 in Oriental Morning Post
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A new article for 东房早报 (the Oriental Morning Post) the Chinese newspaper I sometimes contribute to about what China faces with regards the Middle East and the fall-out from the so-called Arab Spring of last year. I have also been doing a few media appearances, including being quoted in an article for Voice of America about recent troubles in Xinjiang and Chinese cultural influence in Kyrgyzstan for Eurasianet. Also, my recent piece for HSToday about Lone Wolves has been reproduced in a few places, including this digested version of it for a specialist site.

The article can be found here, and below is the English I submitted and under that is the text in Chinese for those able to read it and compare the differences.

China and the Arab Spring

This has been the year of great drama in the Arab world. Old certainties were pushed aside as Hosni Mubarak was reduced from Pharaoh to an old man being wheeled into a courtroom on a bed and the defiant Muammar Gadaffi was stripped and shot while hiding in a sewer. A new world order is being shaped, but what remains unclear is what exactly China’s role in this order will be.

At a conference in May this year, a Chinese friend angrily berated the government for being so slow to respond to events in Libya. While he was impressed by the rapidity with which they had been able to evacuate the 35,000 or so Chinese workers in the country, he was distinctly unimpressed by how long it had taken the government to reach out and make contact with the rebels.

And even once China did make contact with rebels, stories were also to emerge that China was maintaining contact with the old Gadhafi regime. In one widely reported case that was subsequently admitted by the government, documents obtained by the press showed that Chinese arms manufacturers were holding discussions with the Gadhafi regime as late as July 16, 2011 to provide supplies for the Colonel’s forces. This taking place a month after Beijing had hosted NTC leader Mahmoud Jibril to discuss China’s interests in Libya.

On the one hand, being friendly with both sides is something that is a strategically safe bet. By keeping everyone happy, you are able to theoretically focus on your interests and not become involved in local rivalries. But on the other hand, this can leave you in a situation where you are seen to be supporting an unpopular regime. Something highlighted when a friend from Beirut reported in response to a question about how China was perceived by the “Arab street” during this time, that China was not seen in a very positive light. Protesters taking up against regimes like Mubarak’s or Gadhafi’s were noticing that the regime had received weapons and equipment from China. They also did not appreciate the sense that it was a result of Chinese foot-dragging that the United Nations did not become involved sooner.

All of which illustrates quite tidily the problem that China faces when looking at how to react to the Arab Spring. The long-standing non-interference principle dictates that China cannot take an active role in getting involved in other nation’s internal problems. But this is a stand that will protect it from becoming entangled in situations like Iraq, but at the same time, it means that when an unhappy populace rises up against its leadership, it is equally likely that China will find itself backing the wrong side in the local public mind.

The problem for China with the non-interference principle is that sometimes in not choosing, China has made a decision or can be interpreted as making a choice. So when China chooses to avoid supporting sanctions through an abstention, it is in fact tacitly agreeing with the sanctions and therefore supporting the side that would want the sanctions. But it is doing this in a grudging fashion that suggests that in fact it disagrees with the idea of imposing the sanctions. Currently this is most visible in Iran and Syria where the Chinese government’s ongoing refusal to support strengthened sanctions against either country is something that is blocking the west from advancing sanctions themselves. The problem for China is that while at the moment this can seem a safe bet given the fact that it is not only China that is blocking sanctions, in the longer run it could leave China in an awkward situation should the regime be replaced.

Let us look for example at Syria, the off-shoot of the Arab Spring that is most likely to dominate news cycles in the next year. After a refusal to support UN resolutions condemning Bashar al-Assad’s regime, China ended the year by supporting a Russian proposal that in equal measure apportioned blame for the current trouble on the rebels and government. Earlier shifts only came after the Arab League had moved to condemn the regime in Damascus – theoretically reflecting a broader regional condemnation and therefore a regional consensus that China could agree with and therefore be seen as part of the mainstream.

This is a careful approach that is designed to give the appearance of not supporting oppression while at the same time not advocating regime change. Instead, the desire is to project a vision of China that is supportive of whomever is in charge, irrespective of their political leanings. The logic is that once the dust settles, China can sweep in with its deep pockets and focus on its interests and avoid having to choose sides. And certainly for some in Libya this is the case: as Abdul Rahman Busin, a spokesman for the NTC put it, “we all need to remember that China is a superpower. We all rely on products that come from China. We would have hoped they would have been on our side….but if it is the interests of the Libyan people to deal with China, then we will deal with China. It is very expensive and time consuming trying to settle old scores.”

But what does this say of China as a global power? Part of the reason why European forces engaged in Libya was a recognition that they had until then been supporting an oppressive regime and that it was a stain on Europe’s character. Once Gadhafi started to talk about going from house to house wiping out dissidents, it became clear that Europe was on the wrong side and leaders moved swiftly to get UN authorization to protect Misrata and Benghazi. While the decision to impose a no-fly zone was one that was contentious within Europe – Germany chose to abstain from the resolution – the end result was that the no-fly zone was voted for and imposed. This led to subsequent events and Gadhafi’s toppling.

China’s decision to sit, with Germany and others, in the abstention box, was ultimately neither here nor there. By refusing to take a position, China ultimately did take a position since it did nothing to try to stop the no-fly zone from being imposed. As a result, China ended up supporting what took place in Libya without accruing any of the international credibility that accompanied the vote. Instead, China was seen as being uncertain whether it really was a good idea to save the floundering rebellion and unaware of the consequences of its decision-making in the UNSC.

The question that China needs to confront in this coming year is what kind of an international player it is going to be. In this past year, it has shown that it is an international player – operations off Somalia show a capacity to conduct operations within an international framework (something already shown in the many peacekeeping operations China participates in), voting on sanctions against Libya shows it can choose sides when it wants to, the 10th year anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) show that it can create a regional security framework, and its work in Sudan helped ensure that the partion of the country was a largely peaceful event. The world knows that China has deep pockets and impressive capabilities to develop infrastructure, but the question is what sort of a leadership role is China going to take in the new world order.

Nowhere will this test become clearer in this coming year than in Iran and Syria – two countries long at odds with the western world and ruled by regimes of dubious legitimacy. This year it seems possible that we will finally reach a climax on both. For Iran, the signals that it is nearing capability to build nuclear devices are becoming ever clearer, while for Syria it seems likely that the Assad regime will eventually succumb to pressure and either crack-down more heavily and violently in a way that the international community cannot deny or simply collapse. And these late echoes of this past year’s Arab Spring will have a direct impact on China’s interests, something that China would do well to try to get ahead of rather than subsequently follow.

Up until now, China has been able to sit back and watch world events happen while it hedges by making friends with both sides. This is something that has been made possible by the willingness of western powers to step in and take leadership roles to make situations develop in positive directions. But in the coming year, austerity and domestic elections will become the priority concerns, meaning that China might find that its previous cover is blown. 2012 marks a new leadership direction in Beijing – let us hope that this leadership includes a more proactive stance in international affairs. The world is crying out for greater Chinese leadership; let the next generation of leaders be those to take China onto the world stage.

2012年中国面临的中东挑战

过去的一年是阿拉伯世界经历大变局的一年：穆巴拉克从“法老”变成了躺在床上被推进法庭的老头；从来不可一世的卡扎菲躲进了下水道，并在毙命前被羞辱……过去的一套法则被颠覆，新的世界秩序正被重塑，但中国在这一秩序中究竟将扮演怎样的角色还远不清楚。

比如，尽管中国政府从利比亚撤离35000多人的速度和能力令世人印象深刻，不过，中国政府向利比亚反对派伸出橄榄枝的步伐却没那么快。

一方面，“两头不得罪”在战略上是安全的。从理论上讲，让所有人都高兴，可以让人能够专注于自身利益，而不必卷入地区冲突之中。但另一方面，这种做法可能置人于一种不利的境地。

以上这些都非常清楚地展现了中国在思考如何应对“阿拉伯之春”的问题时所面临的困扰。长期秉持的“不干涉原则”限定了中国不可能积极地介入其他国家的内部问题。

“不干涉原则”给中国带来的问题还在于，“不选择”有时候也表明中国已经做出了决定，或可能被认为是做出了选择。所以，当中国选择通过弃权来避免支持对某国进行制裁时，表示它心照不宣地对制裁采取了赞成的立场，由此事实上也就支持了想要推行制裁的一方。而以不情愿的方式采取行动，则暗示其不赞成采取制裁。眼下，这一点最显著地体现在伊朗和叙利亚事件上，中国政府拒绝支持对任何一国实施进一步的制裁，这阻碍了西方推进制裁的脚步。

让我们以叙利亚为例。在新的一年里，这一场“阿拉伯之春”的独幕戏最有可能占据新闻头条。中国拒绝支持谴责大马士革阿萨德政权的相关决议，并在2011年年底前对俄罗斯的提议——将叙利亚出现乱局的责任分摊到反对派和政府身上，各打五十大板——表达了支持。这是一种谨慎的处理方式，表明中国一方面不支持压迫人民的做法，与此同时，也不主张政权更替。当然，对于利比亚的某些人而言，这的确如此，如同利比亚全国过渡委员会发言人Abdul-Rahman Busin所言：“我们都需要记住，中国是一个超级大国。我们都依赖来自中国的产品。我们希望他们能够站在我们一边……但如果与中国打交道符合利比亚人民的利益，我们将和中国打交道。力图解决过去的矛盾既耗费资本，又浪费时间。”

过去的一年，中国已经展现了国际大国的形象：索马里海域的巡航行动显示了中国具有在国际框架下执行（军事）任务的能力（这在中国参与的多项维和行动中同样得以展示）；在利比亚制裁决议上投赞成票表明必要时中国能够“选边站”；上合组织成立十周年展示了中国具有创建地区安全框架的能力；在苏丹开展的外交工作确保了该国的分而治之得以和平进行……全世界都知道了中国拥有巨大的财富和惊人的基建能力，但问题是新世界秩序之下，中国将扮演怎样的领导角色。

新的一年里，没有什么比伊朗和叙利亚事件更能明晰地考验中国在国际角色扮演上的选择。这一年里，两起事件似乎都可能达到顶点。就伊朗而言，越发逼近制造核武器能力的信号已然清晰；而在叙利亚，阿萨德政权可能将最终迫于压力，或发起更大程度和更为暴力的镇压行动，或轰然倒台。刚刚过去的2011年“阿拉伯之春”的回响对中国外交将产生直接的影响，中国会竭力提前采取行动，而不是在事后再跟着形势走。

直至目前，通过与两边交朋友，中国得以能够“袖手旁观”且静观世界风云变幻。但这种局面得以可能的前提是西方强国愿意介入和发挥领导作用以推动局势向积极方向发展的情况之下。

在新的一年里，经济拮据和国内选举将成为各主要强国的首要关切，这意味着，中国可能发现这些之前的掩护已经不复存在。

2012年对于中国而言，将开启新的篇章，全世界迫切需要中国发挥更大的领导作用，期待中国在国际事务中采取更加积极的立场。

（张娟 译）

“全世界都知道了中国拥有巨大的财富和惊人的基建能力，但问题是新世界秩序之下，中国将扮演怎样的领导角色。

2012年对于中国而言，将开启新的篇章，全世界迫切需要中国发挥更大的领导作用，期待中国在国际事务中采取更加积极的立场。”

UK Riots and Libya

Posted: August 29, 2011 in Oriental Morning Post
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Had a pause in short article writing of late as have been bogged down with larger commitments. However, in the meantime, wrote a couple of short op-eds for what is becoming a regular column for 东方早报 (Oriental Morning Post) touching upon the riots in the UK and the taking of Tripoli last week (with retrospect there are aspects of the UK one that I am less happy about). The English I submitted is below, and before it a link to the Chinese. More longer pieces in the pipeline on terrorism and China.

Lessons from Libya (In Chinese)

This week’s take-over of Tripoli by the rebel forces opposed to General Gadaffi has stirred a mixture of emotions. In the first place, there is a certain gratefulness that events in Libya are moving towards some sort of resolution. But while some in Europe are proud of the role that they played in ousting him from his position in power, there is an underlying sense of concern about what happens next. Nevertheless, it now seems clear that his time in charge of Libya is up and there are some lessons that can be usefully drawn from the experience of ousting him.

First of all, NATO, the EU and the US should be careful to celebrate this victory as their own. While it seems doubtful that the rebels would have done so well without their support, the fact remains that NATO was running out of ammunition and there is a growing uncertainty in Europe about what they are doing in Libya. There is also still no clear sense that Europe went into Libya with any sort of a clear strategy. All of this is a reflection of weakness rather than success.

Secondly, success in intervening here does not mean NATO now has to (or wants to) intervene in Syria. This is not hypocritical or evidence of double standards. The reality is that you can only become involved where you can make a difference and where you have support. No one liked Gadaffi so support was easy to find, and support came in the form of low-risk airstrikes in support of rebels that shielded NATO from too many casualties on the ground. All easily manageable. Syria, however, would be a very different proposition – quite aside from having a different capacity to respond (Syria is a longtime supporter of militant groups outside its borders), there is nowhere near the consensus in the international community. And of course there is the reality that NATO forces are now stretched over two battlefields (and subsidiary operations in Cote d’Ivoire and Iraq).

The point is that the reality on the ground is different. To call this hypocritical is simplistic and somehow assumes that we live in a world where absolute and universal rules apply. The world is complex and requires different responses that are often dictated by capacity. A one-size fits all policy in international relations is a recipe for disaster.

Thirdly, UN sanctions and resolutions do not equal armed intervention. In this case, it now seems clear that NATO, the EU and the US decided to take the initial sanctions against Gadaffi to their furthest possible point. This meant in the first place to protect Misrata and the other parts of the country Gadaffi had said he was going to crush, and secondly to support a rebellion to oust a leader who had mismanaged his country for four decades. This is a specific set of reactions to a specific situation. In other instances where sanctions have been imposed nothing has followed – for example, Iran, where the EU and US continue to push sanctions – there has been no subsequent military intervention. This means that we need not fear that sanctions against the Syrian regime would necessarily lead to conflict on the ground.

Chinese friends I have spoken to express a great sense of confusion over what the EU and US think they are doing in Libya. They see vast amounts of money being spent with no clear outcome. They worry precedents are being set in international policy that may lead to other problems down the line. While some of these concerns are well placed (going in with no apparent plan as NATO did is certainly not sound policy), the overarching point that they are missing is that a bad dictator has been removed from power and is no longer destroying his own country. In time a new democratically elected government will emerge that will mean that Libya is finally able to interact with the world on its own terms. This is an outcome that is in everyone’s favor. What this does not mean is that this is going to be the strategy that will be pursued in every situation.

Anarchy in Europe (In Chinese)

Britain ablaze, Greece on strike, and lunatics planting bombs and shooting people in Oslo – Europe seems an increasingly dangerous and chaotic place. But what is behind this growing anarchy, and why it is suddenly expressing itself with such fury now?

There are a number of reasons: from social disaffection and anger, to economic hardship and disenfranchisement, to a general anger at elites that it is no longer felt represent the public. It is not, as some have suggested, all a cause and effect from the economic crisis, but rather it is a complex set of issues that all feed off each other to create a multiplier effect that explodes in the violence that we can still see on London’s streets today.

To start with my hometown, London: the trouble there started off as a peaceful public protest in a community with tense relations between police and locals after police shot and killed a young man. This event appears to have been hijacked by local youths and petty criminals who used this as a pretext to launch a violent assault on city centers taking advantage of the opportunity to loot and steal as much as they could. This in turn inspired other communities to launch copycat efforts around the country and the end result has been chaos in major British cities.

It is far too early to say exactly why this has all taken place, but a part of it is clearly anger is directed at ruling elites that are perceived have no connection to the community. Similar, but much less violent expressions of displeasure were seen last year during protests linked to the government decision to charge for university places. This group has moved beyond an expression of political anger to wanton destruction. But nonetheless one of the direct causes of the current trouble are local tensions between police and the community.

This anger at elites is further reflected in the current protests and strikes across Europe, including the months long sit-ins taking place in Spain and the repeated stoppages in Greece and Italy. In all these nations, the publics are tired of listening to politicians that they do not feel represent them. Many young feel that they simply do not have a place in society or cannot get good jobs and end up migrating elsewhere to seek their fortunes. In an ironic twist, in Belgium, the situation has gotten so bad that the nation has not had an elected government for over a year – instead a technocratic administration has managed the nation. In the capital where the EU has its bureaucratic heart, the local government has very little credibility with its domestic audience.

On the more dangerous end of the scale are individuals like Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian self-styled crusader who was so angered at his government’s allowing of Muslim immigrants into the nation that he decided to punish the ruling party. Using a massive car bomb in the city center followed by a shooting of a group of young aspirant politicians, Breivik’s act was in retaliation for what he sees as the conquering of Europe by Muslims and the fact that no-one in Europe is doing anything about it. He particularly blamed the ruling Labor Party in Norway for letting this happen, and consequently targeted them for punishment in late July of this year.

The running thread through all of this is mistrust in government – something that is going to be further accentuated as economies collapse and debt numbers go through the roof. European publics have already stopped voting in elections in ever increasing numbers, now they are turning to other ways of expressing their distaste in their governments. There are clear lessons here for government’s about the importance of finding ways to connect with their publics.

Enter the Dragon to save the Euro

Posted: July 10, 2011 in Oriental Morning Post
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Not the actual title of my latest article for Oriental Morning Post (东方早报), but instead the title of an article in the Telegraph that quoted my recent ISN piece. Wen’s trip to Europe also elicited an interview with Reuters, which they used a small quote from that was picked up in a variety of places. In any case, here is the link to the Dongfang Zaobao piece (in Chinese), and below is the text I drafted in English.

—

Premier Wen Jiabao returns from his latest European trip with a raft of new deals and contracts with old European friends. In contracts geared to bring benefits to both sides, Premier Wen’s trip led to the signing of deals worth $15 billion in Germany (part of which was a purchase of some 88 Airbus planes), $4 billion in the UK and $1.8 billion in Hungary. He also announced the establishment of $2.8 billion fund to support cooperation between Small to Medium sized Enterprises (SME) in China and Germany and a special loan of $1.4 billion to support similar relations between Chinese and Hungarian firms. But while these deals show the strength of the Sino-European relationship, the fact that they are the big issues to come away from Premier Wen’s trip to Europe shows the relatively immaturity of the EU-China relationship. This is not a “strategic partnership” with any depth.

The blame for this is two-fold. On the one hand, Europe has not managed to clarify its decision-making processes yet. The selection of Herman van Rompuy as President of the EU and Catherine Ashton as Foreign Minister was a conscious choice by the member states of the European Union to maintain authority over Brussels, the traditional seat of power in the EU. Neither are known as being aggressive leaders, and the member states have continued to use Brussels when it is useful and ignore it when it is not. The result has been to confuse matters with outside partners uncertain of whether they should focus their efforts on the member states or Brussels when they are looking for a partner to talk to in Europe.

But at the same time, China remains a hesitant actor on the world stage. Unless dealing with obvious trade or economic questions or issues that are seen as “core interests,” China is not a very certain actor in international relations. The traditional policy is one of “non-interference”: but as a Chinese colleague put it to me the other day this can also mean, “not doing anything.” The end result is that as China’s interests in the world are expanding, its capacity and ambition to do anything have not matched this growth. This has led to trips like this latest one to Europe, where big trade deals have been signed while there has been little serious discussion about anything else.

This is unfortunate, as both China and Europe share interests in the world beyond trade. To look at Libya, both suffered greatly as a result of Colonel Gadaffi’s slow strangling of his nation and the subsequent chaos that it caused. China lost unknown billions in investment and had to suddenly evacuate tens of thousands of citizens. Europe had to evacuate less people, but nevertheless lost a major energy supplier and an equally substantial investment. While now there is some divergence on how to address the problems that the chaos in Libya has thrown up, there is clearly a joint interest in making things better and in establishing ways that such situations can be avoided in the future.

And beyond Africa, both China and Europe clearly have a keen interest in making sure that things in Afghanistan and Pakistan calm down considerably from their current tense tempo. While clearly it is the US that is the lead actor in AfPak at the moment, both China and Europe have active interests in ensuring stability prevails and some discussion of what they want to do there in the longer term might be a good idea. And it is not only geopolitical questions that are important: climate change remains an crucial issue to both, but aside from discussions of developing green technologies, there was surprisingly little conversation between China and her European interlocutors on this topic this time around.

All of this is a missed opportunity, as clearly China is coming to a period of reconsidering its position in the world, while Europe is figuring out how to do more with fewer assets. A moment that would lend itself to more comprehensive consultations between Chinese and European leaders than the trade and economics show that just took place.

The point is simple: trade between nations will always take place. In a globalized world, men will always sell things to each other across borders. If we want to make this into a truly “strategic partnership” however, then we need to deepen the seriousness of our discussions beyond this realm. In this way, the EU-China relationship can live up to its long-missed potential.

Is the war over?

Posted: May 3, 2011 in Oriental Morning Post
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My first contribution to the ongoing hyper-covered story – this one for the Oriental Morning Post. Some more bits on this forthcoming. For the whole thing in Mandarin see here (have also pasted it below including images).

Is the War Over?

The death of Osama bin Laden is unlikely to make any major difference in the immediate war on terrorism, but nonetheless it is a big psychological victory for the United States. Historians will look back at this moment as a major marker in the conflict against Al Qaeda and her affiliates, and it is likely the beginning of a long trajectory by which the group slowly fades as the global force that it previously was. Coming almost ten years after Al Qaeda burst into the world’s collective consciousness, this is a significant moment that closes an important chapter in recent history.

The immediate impact to China of this event is going to be limited – but it is going to mark a shift in America’s involvement in South Asia and this will have major longer-term repercussions for the region.

The relief at his death was tangible in Washington, where less than an hour after the news had broken, crowds gathered outside the White House waving flags and singing the national anthem. President Obama spoke of “the death of bin Laden” as the “most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat Al Qaeda.” And for the large industry of commentators, thinkers and security officials that had been trying to track him down or read what his next move was going to be, this is indeed an important moment. At a personal level, as someone who has been following his movement as a researcher for many years, it feels like something important has indeed taken place. Some certainty that progress is being made by the forces trying to defeat Al Qaeda. Nonetheless, concerns remain about what this means in practical terms.

Osama bin Laden first founded Al Qaeda in the wake of his experiences as a young man fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. A young idealist who gave up a life as a Saudi prince to live the life of a travelling holy warrior, he decided that victory against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was not enough. Instead, he wanted to push on and defeat the other great power of the day America, showing the power of God’s message. And so he launched a global jihad against America and her allies, creating in Sudan, Afghanistan and finally Pakistan a set of mobile training camps were other holy warriors could come and train with him before being sent back to carry out their deadly trade wherever they were able.

And initially, the organization Al Qaeda (whose name translates as “The Base”) was directly ruled and controlled by this man. He was closely involved with the plotting of the organization’s first attacks: the 1998 double bombings of US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania that killed some 200 people; the 2000 attack on a US battleship off Yemen that resulted 19 deaths; and the 2001 attack on New York and Washington that led to some 3,000 deaths. It was this last attack that brought him to global attention, leading to American invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq and an explosion globally of interest in his extremist message of imposing Islamic shariah law violently around the world.

But this reaction also forced him to go underground. Reports to emerge from his inner circle show that he may not have been expecting the sort of reaction that his attacks got, and as a result his role as an operational manager for the group seems to have gone down as he withdrew into hiding.

Instead, the direct operational role of plotting terrorist attacks to advance his ideas has been taken up by many middle managers in his organization that have plotted and carried out numerous attacks around the world in his name. Plots in London, Istanbul, Tunisia, Bali, and across Afghanistan and Pakistan can all be linked to the group he founded. In addition to this, the message that he proclaimed found a resonance amongst other terrorist networks in different parts of the globe. Groups in North Africa, Somalia and Yemen all claimed some part of his message and started to publish messages in which they directly praised and thanked him for his leadership. And beyond these organized groups, young overexcited men and women seeking meaning in their lives found his message of global anti-Americanism appealing and tried to carry out actions in its name.

No matter how decreased his role as an operational leader was, however, his role as a figurehead for Al Qaeda and for the global Islamist movement was significant. His regular recorded messages from what we now know was a compound in Abbottabad were waited for with baited breath and listened to attentively by followers around the world. His continuing concealed existence was a symbol to radicals that the war was ongoing and that victory was maybe possible. And his death within this context is important both for those who are fighting for him and against him. This is a war of ideas and he was the lead messenger for the other side.

Of course, Al Qaeda’s many affiliate groups will use this as an opportunity to strike back at the west. Cells connected to the core network operating out of Afghanistan and Pakistan will no doubt take this as a sign to attempt to launch attacks globally. And beyond this immediate reaction, in the medium-term we will continue to see regional groups from North Africa, Somalia and Yemen attempting to launch deadly strikes from their bases. Already this year we have seen numerous deadly attacks around the world and it is likely that they will continue. The war will go on.

But nevertheless, an important leader has been killed by what was an audacious and verifiable strike by American forces in Pakistan. This shows that the west is able to strike successfully and is indeed fighting a war in which it is slowly grinding its enemy Al Qaeda down, something that makes people fighting for Al Qaeda’s ideas on the ground increasingly question what they are doing. In much the same way that the civil unrest in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya confused Al Qaeda since it showed that people could overthrow long-term dictators using public protest and did not have to resort to mass murder as Osama bin Laden and his friends called for, his death must make them wonder about what their prospects of victory are. No matter what is said, his death will help lower Al Qaeda’s global appeal to some degree.

The significance of all of this to China is somewhat low in the short term. China was, and is, seen as a second tier target by the group. But in the long term this signifies that American attention and involvement in Afghanistan and South Asia is going to decrease. President Obama had been looking for a way to get out of the wars he inherited since he came into office and this will now give him a clear signal that he accelerate this process. Ten years on from Al Qaeda’s most successful strike against the west in September 2001, the United States government has the lead plotter Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Guantanamo and has now killed the ideological head of the group. While American security planners know this is not the end of Islamist inspired terrorism against them, politicians know that the problem will now slowly be relegated into second place in the public’s attention. And this means that a process that had already started with President Obama’s surge in Afghanistan last year will continue as the President tries to extricate his nation from the religiously fuelled civil wars that are causing so much misery in South Asia.

The danger to China comes in the details of how the assassination strike was carried out. Early news reports indicate that the operation was conducted by American forces with limited Pakistani knowledge or awareness, something that is unsurprising from the perspective of the current high tensions between Pakistan and the United States. But it also seems as though Osama was living in a rather obvious compound not far from the capital, under conditions that seem like they should have been noted at the nearby military bases. The suggestion therefore is that the Pakistani government is still not tackling the beast of radicalism within its country effectively, and this means that a terrorist haven of some sort still exists on China’s borders.

This is of course something that also remains an American and western problem. In the past few years, we have seen a number of large-scale and high profile plots be organized and directed from Pakistan and in the wake of Osama’s death these will continue. Clearly, American and NATO security forces in Afghanistan will need to continue to fight on the ground to make sure these plots are not able to succeed and until Afghanistan can at last become a safe and stable country from where such plots cannot be organized. But the death of Osama means that the heart of the issue from a western public’s perspective has been removed and Al Qaeda will increasingly be spoken of in the past tense. Politicians will focus on it less and the public will generally move onto worrying about other threats – unless, that is, there is another attack in America that is larger or on the same scale as 9/11.

The result will be a continuing de-escalation of American and NATO presence in Afghanistan. Some presence will remain to make sure plots that are still being organized are disrupted before they can reach western shores, but the overall presence will go down. This means that it will be increasingly up to those in the region to try to address the long-term strategic issue of Pakistan as a center of extremism and as a nuclear-armed state with individuals in positions of influence who still seem in some ways sympathetic towards extremists that have supported international terrorists.

Osama bin Laden’s death is an important marker in the conflict against violent Islamist extremism, but it is not the end. It is, however, going to seen by historians as one of the steps along the path to the end.

战争结束了吗 

 作者 潘睿凡   发表于2011-05-03 02:54

乌萨马·本·拉丹的死并不见得会为目前的反恐之战带来什么重大变化。

　　潘睿凡

英国伦敦激进主义化研究

国际中心副研究员

“基地”组织的许多分支将会以此为契机展开对西方的全球反攻。此外在中期预测上，我们也将继续看到来自北方、索马里和也门的区域性恐怖组织从他们的基地发起死亡攻击。今年全球各地也已经发生了多起恐怖袭击事件，而且他们仍可能继续。战争将会持续。

在获悉本·拉丹被击毙的消息之后，美国朝野对反恐战争是否结束持不同的态度。政治漫画网

　　乌萨马·本·拉丹的死并不见得会为目前的反恐之战带来什么重大变化，尽管如此，这对于美国仍可称作一次心理上的伟大胜利。这很可能会成为一个转折点，“基地”组织的势力将逐步衰弱并最终销声匿迹。当历史学家们书写反恐战争史的时候，这也将成为“9·11”事件发生近十年以来重要的一笔。

此事件对于中国的直接影响十分有限。但美国在取得这一成果后必然会对其在南亚的介入策略做出一定调整，因而这对于此区域的长期影响不可忽视。

在华盛顿，拉丹的死讯明显地令大家感到欢欣鼓舞。消息传来不到一个小时，就有人群聚集在白宫外，挥舞着旗帜并大唱国歌。奥巴马总统也称“拉丹死讯”是“目前我国在打击‘基地’组织的努力中最卓著的成就”。而对于大批的评论家、智库学者以及长期以来一直致力于追逐和捕捉拉丹动向的安全官员们来讲，这的确是个重要的时刻。从他们的个人角度来看，他们多年来为之努力奋斗的目标终于实现。这标志着反恐斗争的确取得了一定程度的进展。但是，对于这一事件的实际意义，大家还存有许多担忧。

“基地”组织是年轻时的本·拉丹在阿富汗反对苏军入侵时建立的。那时这个年轻的理想主义者放弃了自己在沙特的王子生活而成为一名战士，他认定，在阿富汗战胜苏军还不够，他还将继续下去并击败世界上的其他强权——美国，从而传递神的讯息。于是他发动了一场全球范围的伊斯兰圣战，以美国及其盟友为目标，在苏丹、阿富汗和巴基斯坦建立起一系列移动训练营，在那里其他的圣战战士得到训练，随后被送回去进行他们的死亡事业。

起初，“基地”组织由他直接管理和控制。该组织的前几次攻击他都亲自参与谋划：1998年针对内罗毕、肯尼亚和达累斯萨拉姆的美国外交机构的袭击造成近200人死亡；2000年在也门炸伤美国军舰造成19人死亡；2001年的“9·11”事件杀死了近三千余人。而正是“9·11”以后，美国才发动了对阿富汗和伊拉克的军事行动，本·拉丹的恶名全球皆知，对于这个极端激进的伊斯兰恐怖者及其以暴力推进伊斯兰教法行为的关注激增。

但世界的反应也令拉丹不得不转入地下活动。一些从他身边圈子里传出来的消息表明，这样的结果多少出乎他的意料，而且躲躲藏藏也严重影响了他对于恐怖组织的管理。

后来那些体现其“思想”的恐怖袭击，则实际是由他们的“中层干部”以拉丹的名义策划和组织完成。那些发生在伦敦、伊斯坦布尔、巴厘以及阿富汗和巴基斯坦国内的恐怖阴谋都与“基地”组织及其分支有关。但除此以外，还有其它的恐怖组织响应拉丹。在北非、索马里和也门的恐怖组织也发布消息对拉丹表示赞誉和感谢。除了有组织的恐怖行动，还有一些需求生命意义的过度兴奋的年轻人，为拉丹的全球反美号召所吸引，在尝试以他的名义展开活动。

无论拉丹“行动指挥”的角色如何被减弱，他都还是“基地”组织和全球伊斯兰极端运动的偶像。他从隐藏地（现在我们知道是在阿伯塔巴德）时不时发布的一些录音，被他世界各地的追随者所期盼和倾听。他这种持续的隐蔽状态成为极端主义者们的一种标志——圣战仍在继续而且还有可能成功。因而在这种意义上，拉丹作为“圣战”的标志性人物，他的死讯对于反恐斗争的双方是具有重要意义的。

显然，“基地”组织的许多分支将会以此为契机展开对西方的全球反攻。此外在中期预测上，我们也将继续看到来自北方、索马里和也门的区域性恐怖组织从他们的基地发起死亡攻击。今年全球各地也已经发生了多起恐怖袭击事件，而且他们仍可能继续。战争将会持续。

无论如何，通过美军在巴基斯坦无畏且确凿的打击，终于消灭了“基地”组织的一个重要头领。这既证明了西方世界有进行成功打击的能力，也表明一场以粉碎“基地”组织为目标的战争确实正在进行展开——这些，都可以在某种程度上回答一些人心中日渐加重的疑问：十年了，我们究竟在干什么？而拉丹的死也许会令“基地”组织的人产生动摇，他们的“胜利”究竟应是什么含义？近来发生在埃及、突尼斯和利比亚的情况会让他们看到，还有其他的方式可以改变世界，而不必像拉丹倡导的那样。不管他们到底怎么想，拉丹的死讯将有助于减弱基地组织在全球的吸引力。

短期内，拉丹之死对中国的影响不大。中国被基地组织视为次等目标。但长远看，这意味着美国在阿富汗和南亚的关注和介入会减少。奥巴马总统要摆脱他继承的几场战争，而现在是一个加快步伐的好时机。我们可以从刺杀行动的细节中推测出中国的风险。据媒体报道，此次行动巴基斯坦并不知情，在美巴关系紧张的背景下，这毫不令人吃惊。但拉丹住在离伊斯兰堡不远的一处很显眼的住宅中，照理说很容易被附近驻扎的军队发现。这表明巴基斯坦政府仍未有效打击在其国内活动的激进主义势力，也意味着中国的边境仍存在着一个恐怖主义者的天堂。

这当然会成为美国和西方的问题。过去数年中，我们目睹数起大规模高调的恐怖袭击阴谋在巴基斯坦组织、流出实施，拉丹死后，这些活动将会继续。显然，美国和北约阿富汗安全部队需要继续奋力确保粉碎这些阴谋，直到阿富汗最终成为安全稳定之地。然而在西方公众看来，拉丹之死意味着问题的核心已被移除，“基地”组织将成为“过去时”。政治家将更少关注它，公众也会转而担心其他的威胁——除非有另外一次与“9·11”程度相当的袭击。

结果将是减少美国和北约在阿富汗的存在。一些军事力量将继续留存以确保粉碎那些仍在组织的恐怖计划，但总量将会减少。这意味着，该地区将更加需要靠自己的能力来试图解决巴基斯坦的长期战略问题。巴基斯坦作为极端主义活动中心和核武国家，似乎仍然同情那些支持国际恐怖分子的极端主义者。

拉丹之死是在与伊斯兰极端主义的斗争中的重大事件，但这并不是斗争的终点。历史学家将会看到，这不过是通向终点的一步而已。（白澜 译）

What China Should Learn from Libya

Posted: April 14, 2011 in Oriental Morning Post
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Another foreign language piece I’m afraid, this time for one of the more liberal Chinese newspapers, the Oriental Morning Post. Sketches out what China should hopefully learn from Libya, though I know friends in China tell me I am being optimistic. The actual text can be found here, and below is what I initially submitted in English. The version published is slightly abbreviated.

What China Should be Learning from Libya

There is a sense of confusion in the Chinese press and decision-making community about what exactly is driving British and French actions in Libya. The cynics say that this is a show of force by weak governments embarrassed by their histories with Colonel Gadaffi, others say it is part of shoring up weakening domestic support for Nicholas Sarkozy and David Cameron, while yet others say it is a traditional war for oil. But all of these miss the key lesson that should be drawn from the crisis: bad governance is something that cannot be simply allowed to fester.

Whatever the reasons for the west now deciding to get involved, they are having to do this because they allowed Colonel Gadaffi to mismanage his country for too long. Ever since he admitted to developing a nuclear program and handing over the material to American and British secret services, Colonel Gadaffi has been readmitted into the international community. Contracts and contacts were developed as Libya opened its doors to foreign investment, including a substantial volume of Chinese businesses and citizens.

But at no point was any consideration given to the fact that Colonel Gadaffi was continuing to run his country as though it was a bank account accessible only to himself and his direct family and tribe. His dreaded secret police enforced a brutal security regime that allowed no discussion of the justness of the Colonel’s regime. Islamists both dangerous and not were incarcerated en masse, while torture was periodically practiced in prisons. And at the same time, while the Colonel and his family did well from the inflows of foreign investment, the Libyan people failed to profit much from this boom.

The result was a tinderbox of angry and disenfranchised population with a detached and kleptocratic regime surrounded by a police state willing to practice any action to maintain power. It was only a matter of time before it descended into the chaos that we are now seeing nightly on our television screens. And as a result it was only a matter of time before China would be obliged to shut down its vast investments in the country and evacuate its more than 30,000 citizens working in the country.

This mass evacuation both shows China’s growing capacity as a global power, but also highlights its growing presence in the world. On the one hand the nation needs to be applauded for its ability to get so many citizens to safety in such rapidity, but at the same time, it should consider that larger lesson that needs to be drawn from this and that is that bad governance is something that needs to be addressed.

This does not mean that China should be expected to copy Britain and France’s actions and support rebels in every country that is governed badly. But it should give some more serious consideration to the fact that the current policy of rigid non-interference is something that is clearly leaving large Chinese investments and growing numbers of Chinese citizens in unstable nations with governments that are susceptible to collapses like Libya. The result is an expensive evacuation, loss of material, and the need for China to once again have to choose sides in the United Nations Security Council. Far better to try to catch such situations before they descend into civil war and to try to stimulate the leadership to improve their domestic situation using the carrot of investment as a motivator.

China is already a major investor in many parts of the world where such similar future situations can be envisioned. The role it plays is a positive one in helping underdeveloped nations, but at the moment it lacks any directive to try to improve the internal situation in the country. By using this power to try to influence nations to improve their domestic situations, China can help both guarantee her investments but also improve the national situation. In this way China can use its growing global economic presence to make the world a more stable place and take its role as a responsible stakeholder in the global community.

Raffaello Pantucci is a Visiting Scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS).

China-Pakistan

Posted: December 27, 2010 in Oriental Morning Post
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A new article in Chinese on Sino-Pak relations for a Chinese paper called the Oriental Morning Post. It tries to explain to a Chinese audience why it is the West is so worried about Afghanistan and Pakistan and why they would like the Chinese to do more to help. Unfortunately for the time being, all I can provide here is a link to it for those who want to try to read me in Chinese. I will get the text to post as soon as possible, but in the meantime for those very eager and unable to read Chinese, please drop me a note through the contact page.

Update, here is the English text I initially submitted:

Chinese Premier Wen Jiaobao’s visit to Pakistan marks another high point in Sino-Pak relations. With billions of dollars in trade deals and bilateral loans signed, the visit confirmed China as Pakistan’s closest ally in Asia. Frustratingly for the NATO Alliance, however, the issue of Afghanistan and terrorist training camps did not seem to be a top element on the agenda, suggesting China was unlikely to be applying much pressure to Pakistan on this sensitive issue.

It is easy to understand China’s perspective on this matter. First of all, this was a visit to Pakistan by Premier Wen, and while Afghanistan is a major regional security issue, the priority was clearly the Sino-Pak relationship that predates current troubles in Afghanistan. Secondly, Pakistan is a state beset with domestic problems: the Chinese government’s calculus is that more pressure is unlikely to stabilize the situation. Thirdly, the simple fact is that for China, Afghanistan ranks as a secondary security concern. While sitting on China’s Western border, the nation has thus far not exported many security threats to China, with militants seemingly more eager to target Western forces and cities in Europe and North America than China and her interests.

But China underestimates the degree to which the west is concerned about Afghanistan and terrorist training camps. In the week prior to Premier Wen’s visit, an unmanned drone strike destroyed a vehicle in Pakistan’s lawless North Waziristan allegedly killing, amongst others, two British converts who were in the region connecting with Al Qaeda militants. It is unlikely that we are ever going to know what exactly they were up to, but they do highlight the ongoing threat that is posed by Al Qaeda and affiliated groups to the West. Previous individuals who trained in Pakistani camps have returned to Europe to carry out the July 7, 2005 bombings on London’s public transport system that killed 52 people as they were going about their daily business. Earlier this year, a similar tragedy was only barely averted when Faisal Shahzad incorrectly assembled the car bomb he left in Times Square New York. Shahzad had spent time the previous year training alongside the Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan. Earlier plots with links to the region have been disrupted targeting other British cities, as well as cities in Spain, Germany and Belgium to name but a few.

Clearly, this link is still alive and well, and while some responsibility clearly lies with the West where much of these individuals radicalization takes place, it still remains the case that they are training at camps in Pakistan. In addition to this, the camps in Pakistan provide Taliban elements in Afghanistan with a secure refuge that they can use to mount attacks that continue to result in the deaths of Afghan civilians and NATO soldiers. And while Western leaders continue to apply pressure to Pakistan to do more about this, stories from the region still point to the fact that the problem has not gone away.

But what role might China play in this already complicated situation? Clearly, Chinese forces on the ground in either Afghanistan or Pakistan are not really an option. NATO warmly appreciates current support that China provides to both countries, but there is a strong sense in the West that China could play an even larger, possibly game-changing role, if it wanted to. As this latest visit by Premier Wen highlights, the connection between China and Pakistan remains “higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey and stronger than steel.” What the West hopes is that China were able to use this political influence to stiffen Pakistani resolve in countering and eliminating the network of terrorist training camps that continue to act as a haven for radicals worldwide.

Additionally, while China’s support of Afghanistan is appreciated, it is clearly much less than China could provide. Premier Wen’s single visit to Islamabad has resulted in deals or aid worth almost $30billion, a sum that eclipses the $3.5billion investment China’s MCC has put into the Aynak Copper mine in Afghanistan and the roughly $200million China has given and pledged to the nation so far.

Like any sensible policy choice, this is not one that China would do for selfless reasons. Extremists targeting China continue to also be present to some degree or another in Pakistan’s lawless regions, and the presence of camps in Pakistan keeps the global extremist Islamist movement alive, threatening China’s other western border states like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Furthermore, a stabilized and extremist free South Asia would provide a region of prosperity that would directly benefit China’s underdeveloped Western Xinjiang province.

Additional to this there is the easy policy victory that China would score with the West. An active move towards helping the situation in South Asia and resolving trouble in Afghanistan would win China plaudits throughout the West and would lower the growing tensions around what is perceived as being a more assertive China globally. As State Councilor Dai Bingguo recently wrote while explaining China’s new path of Peaceful Development, “if a country wants to have security, it must make others feel safe too.” By taking more proactive positive steps in South Asia, China could play the role of change agent in the region, enhancing everyone’s sense of security and stability.

Raffaello Pantucci is a Visiting Scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and a China Program Associate at the European Council of Foreign Relations.

 

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